




# **Civil Society and the Rose Revolution in Georgia**

**Edited by George Khutsishvili**





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**Publication of the International Centre on Conflict and Negotiation**

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ISBN 978-99928-824-4-3

**“Those who make peaceful revolution impossible  
will make violent revolution inevitable”**

**John F.  
Kennedy**

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# Acknowledgements

Research group of the project “The Role of Civil Society in Rose Revolution in Georgia” included representatives of the International Centre on Conflict and Negotiation (ICCN): Dr. George Khutsishvili (head of the group), Dr. George Nizharadze, Rusudan Mshvidobadze, Dr Tina Gogheliani (researchers), as well as Davit Kiphiani (consultant), and Zurab Mkheidze (invited researcher). Prof. Zaza Piralishvili (I. Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University) provided valuable contribution to the research and writing of the book, as well as Heiko Nowak (University of Tubingen, Germany). Valuable advice on development of methodology and the composition of the research work was done by the project international consultant Dr. Françoise Companjen (Free University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands) who has co-written chapters and participated in the editing work. Each part of the book has its own author(s), though all the contributors share general responsibility for the final product.

The research group extends thanks to all organizations and individuals without whose input the project implementation would have been impossible. The group extends deep gratitude to the Dutch foundation **Cordaid** for their partnership, organizational and financial support for the project. Special thanks to the members of the project Steering Committee: Irina Khantadze (chair), Dr. Ghia Nodia, Mikheil Chachkhunashvili, Dr. George Margvelashvili, Dr. Gigi Tevzadze, Dr. Tina Khidasheli, and Dr. Sandro Tvalchrelidze (members), for their valuable input and constructive collaboration at different critical points of the working process.



Our thanks to all interviewed respondents and experts for co-operation, to all interviewers and statisticians who worked on and processed the research materials; special thanks to the technical editors, translators – Ghia Chumburidze’s input should be specially highlighted here - and proofreaders of the book - especially to Aniko Chabashvili et al. And of course, to the entire staff of the International Centre on Conflict and Negotiation (ICCN) who did their best to contribute to the successful implementation of the project.

# Preamble

The present work is the product of almost a two-year intensive collective labour. The idea to create this book took shape when the euphoria around the Rose Revolution reached its peak – right after the almost unanimous election of Mikheil Saakashvili to the post of the President of Georgia on January 4, 2004. As an NGO we felt that this phenomenon needed to be understood from the point of view of civil society, particularly the non-governmental sector. Even at that time the lack of such literature was evident. Negotiations with donors finally resulted in the interest shown by and the agreement achieved with the Dutch non-governmental foundation “Cordaid” (formerly known as “Caritas”) to support a large-scale research (both qualitative and quantitative) on the role of civil society towards the Georgian revolution. At the suggestion of the foundation, certain persons and organizations were outlined for cooperation with our working group, in order to achieve certain representativeness, as well as cogency of the work results. Gradually we also determined the time period to be covered by our research: from the processes preceding and having an impact on the revolution, right up to the moment when the revolutionary plan started to malfunction. By the time the project documentation and the working plan were to be finally approved (June 2004), the bloodless revolution in Ajara had already been victoriously accomplished and the public was waiting for the results of the venturesome project of applying a similar scenario to South Ossetia. Now we already know what the result was. This is why our research covers the period starting from a few months before the Revolution and up to June 2004, and the Batumi events are the last case study of it. We hope that the results of the study will be of some interest to both scholars and to international organizations operating in the post-Soviet area.

## Introduction

With the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the abolishment of the Warsaw Pact the world has gained a couple of dozen countries with a definite and rather specific – i.e. Communist – experience, but whose declared priority became no less than building a state based on market economy and democratic values. The years past since then show that the movement towards the declared goal has been far from even-paced. Some of the newly independent states (NIS) have reached the internationally acknowledged standards and became full-fledged members of the international democratic community; others are knocking at the doors of the same community, while some others are still in the initial stages of self-identification. However, there have also been notable similarities in development of all such states. It can hardly be incidental that in many post-Soviet countries, at least, in the earlier years of independence, representatives of former Communist nomenclature rose to power, and many of them under nationalistic banners. In some of the NIS the power is still in their hands, while in almost all Central-European, as well as Baltic States, the power transition went towards the Western-styled political forces of liberal-democratic orientation.

Generalizing the outcomes of the recent period, it can be said that *the closer a country is to Western Europe and the shorter*

*time it has spent under Communist rule, the more naturally and with less obstacles democracy and rule of law have been established there.* This consideration is in conjunction with another, and rather a widespread one: that the level of democratic development in a given country is in correlation with the strength of civil society. “Coloured revolutions” confirm that consideration: well before 2003 it had been noted that, according to the level of development of civil society, Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan were leaders in their respective regions.

Naturally, the Western democratic community is interested to spread democracy in post-Communist space, and has been spending significant funds to support this process, a good part of those – for the support of civil sector, in full accordance with the thesis ‘the stronger the civil society – the more democracy it provides’. It can be deemed that ‘coloured revolutions’ represent the answer to one of the most difficult questions that challenge, on the one hand, grant-giving and, on the other, grant-recipient organizations: what is the impact of this or that non-governmental organization’s activities on the society at large?

The existing literature (Goldstone 2001, Foran 1997, Huntington 1991, Paige 1975, Tilly 1973 to name but a few)<sup>1</sup> covers discussions on the preconditions, types, phases of development and characteristics of known revolutionary processes. Some scholars rather stress the interdependence between civil society development and the democracy-building process. Very little is

being said, however, about the involvement and the role of civil society and the media in revolutionary processes in recent times. Our research to a certain extent tries to fill this gap. It may be considered as a contribution to linking the regularities of the civil society formation – especially in post-totalitarian countries – to the modern views on ‘people power’ and ‘regime change’, which looks particularly relevant to us when looked at against the transition paradigm. In this sense, we hope that modern scholarly understanding of revolution acquires new dimensions as a result of this book.

### **Demarcation and Definitions:**

#### ***Positioning of Georgia in post-Soviet space***

In 1992-93, after Eduard Shevardnadze came to power, the process of relative stabilization and development (which lasted until 1997-98) started in Georgia. It was straightforwardly stated that Georgia was taking the course towards building a western type democratic state. In fact, there was no alternative whatsoever. The dissolution of the Communist bloc and the Soviet Union was a plausible argument for the advantage of democratic commonwealth; thus, despite the tide of nationalism in many post-Communist countries, it was evident, that every new state had to admit the loyalty towards democratic principles, at least nominally. Besides, an economic factor played a very

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<sup>1</sup> This literature is reviewed in chapter 2.

important role – under the conditions of economic collapse caused by the breakdown of the Soviet Union, the revival or building of national economies was impossible without western state and non-governmental donors that were willing to support, provided that the recipient declared the democratic course. Therefore, fifteen new sovereign countries emerged on the territory of the former Soviet Union with all the components of democratic constitution declared – the distribution of power, multiparty system, human rights protection guarantees, market economy, independent media, and non-governmental sector. However, soon afterwards, it turned out that just like in the times of the Soviet Union, the constitution never matched the actual regime. Under the impact of cultural-historical, geopolitical or perhaps some other factors, a wide spectrum of certain regimes was established – ranging from totalitarianism that acquired absolutely ridiculous forms in Turkmenistan to Western standard type of democracies in Baltic countries.

It must be noted that such development of events had certain grounds even back in the period of the Soviet Union. It was from the Baltic Republics (and perhaps Leningrad) that Western novelties spread in the Soviet Union in material, technological and spiritual spheres. Although the level of corruption and shadow economy was relatively low there, the democratic dissident movement was more powerful in the Baltic republics than elsewhere in the USSR. In Central Asia, the situation was

just the opposite. The following example is a perfect illustration of the above: in Uzbekistan, a certain Adilov, an ordinary chairperson of a collective farm, enjoyed an unlimited power of dictatorship and he even had his own prison<sup>2</sup>.

In this continuum, Georgia held a mid position. Corruption and shadow economy were flourishing; power distance (according to G. Hofstede's terminology<sup>3</sup>) was, in our assessment, higher than in Baltic countries, but much lower than in the countries of Central Asia; the country had an experience of mass protest actions against the Soviet regime (1956 and 1978). As well as that, there were some dissident groups, although of entirely nationalistic orientation. All "western" material, spiritual, or ideological production was a priori considered more attractive compared to the Soviet. It can be said that in certain groups of the Georgian civil society there was a will of psychological acceptance of democracy as a referential "instance", even if such acceptance was not based on practical "behavioral experience" of democracy.

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<sup>2</sup> <http://www.myarh.ru/news/index.php?id=21797&r=all&date=2005-05-13>

<sup>3</sup> "...the extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and organizations within a country expect and accept that power is distributed unequally" (Hofstede, G., 1991, p. 28).

## Post-Soviet Period and Eduard Shevardnadze

In the course of his long-lasting political career, Shevardnadze had more than once demonstrated his excellent understanding of the existing political conjuncture, and felt it was in need of the establishment of democratic institutions after 1992. All the above was implemented in Georgia with more or less success and, as a result, on Diamond's<sup>4</sup> interpretation, a *hybrid regime*, combining authoritarian and democratic elements, was created. Authoritarianism was expressed by the fact that Shevardnadze, the offspring of the Soviet nomenclature system and its outstanding representative himself, created an almost exact analogy of this system, which entirely subordinated economy and business, some separate structures and individuals to the state. This, similar to Brezhnev's times in the USSR, caused an uncontrolled growth of corruption, that in its turn resulted in stagnation, the systemic crisis of the establishment and in the long run, the Rose Revolution. It is possible to assume that Shevardnadze's regime could have lasted for some time, if not for the constituents of the hybrid democracy mentioned above, namely, independent media and a civil sector.

It is hard to say, what determined the situation that was created in Georgia: was it a "social order" ("the government is authoritarian to the extent to which the public allows it to be") or

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<sup>4</sup> Diamond, L., Thinking about hybrid regimes. *Journal of Democracy*, April, 2002, pp 21-35.



Shevardnadze's disability to evaluate the potential of the media and the civil sector? However, the fact is that the two institutions mentioned above were established and developed beyond government control, although not in every respect. Certainly, it was not only the strength of the media and of the civil sector that made Georgia different from most of other post-Soviet countries. In other words, the ratio of authoritarian and democratic constituents in hybrid regimes that emerged on the territory of the former Soviet Union was different and it still remains so.

In this case, we think it reasonable to address functionalism, to be more precise – the manifest and latent function concept<sup>5</sup>. According to this definition, the social function is understood as a contribution which is made by a certain social institution to a broader system, the part of which the given institution itself is<sup>6</sup>. Manifest function is explicitly stated and recognized, while the latent function is not explicitly stated or recognized. In the post-Soviet countries, the function of the admitted and legalized democratic institutions was the establishment and defense of legal democratic values and rights, but along with that, there were latent functions as well, that were in most cases more important and effective: monopolization of power by certain groups, intimidation and demoralization of the society or its certain parts, corruption, etc. However, the main latent function

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<sup>5</sup> The unanticipated consequences of human action: [Synopsis of the Structure-Functional Theories of Robert K. Merton](#), *Diligio*, 2000.

<sup>6</sup> Houlst, Th., *Dictionary of Modern Sociology*. Littlefield Adams, 1969.

was perhaps to “win the heart” of the West by creating a democratic veneer.

In our opinion, the discrepancy between manifest and latent functions of democratic institutions of this or that country may serve as a good indicator for measuring the level of development of the democracy in the state. The quantitative measurement of this distinction requires the development of a special complex tool, which is not possible within the given research. That is why we limited ourselves mainly to qualitative interviews and a sociological survey. Since we realize that it is not always possible to escape subjective views under the existing circumstances including our own role in this process, we tried to reflect on these results.

### **The Rose Revolution**

Here we have to say several words about the definition of the Rose Revolution and civil society. Usually we bear in mind the events of the particular period between the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 23<sup>rd</sup> of November 2003. The 23<sup>rd</sup> of November is considered the date of victory of the revolution and is rated as a national holiday. In reality, the revolution is a much longer and deeper process than just assuming of power and resignation of previous rulers. Of all the accepted possible objective criteria of legitimacy of the civil

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revolution, we shall bring the most important one from our viewpoint: *the process of democratic reforms must become salient in the period of governance of the group that accomplished the revolution and named itself the initiator of democratic reforms*. Only in this case may the democratic revolution gain the historical right to be named as such. Otherwise, in future, in the textbooks of history it may be named as just anti-constitutional *coup d'état* (in case of an authoritarian government) or as non-violent usurpation of power with the support of the street rallies (in case of more protracted and uncertain outcome).

Here becomes apparent the self-proclaiming essence of the new power, which exceeds the bounds of particular historical legitimacy and shows the aspiration to assume the status of impeccability and monopoly over the outcomes of the historical process, which is yet far from being completed. Post-revolutionary dynamics are still vague, though certain reforms are carried out.

Bearing all the above said in mind, we shall still refer to such terms as “the rose revolution”, “post-revolutionary processes” in Georgia, etc., although neither the independence movement, nor the state-building process started right in the year 2003, and what’s more, it has not finished yet. The question is, whether Georgia, until now lacking the appropriate practice, is fit to

dismiss the power by means of non-revolutionary measures (i.e. through elections) and whether the revolutionaries themselves will try to implement the constitutional ways of changing the government? The role of civil society is most important in relation to these questions: it has to show its vitality and vigour – if not, then even the most nitty-gritty revolutionary powers are doomed to turn into red-tape and autocracy.

### **Civil Society and Public Awareness**

The next most important term is ‘civil society’, and we far and widely reviewed this concept in our survey. Civil society in Georgia is firstly associated with the non-governmental sector, which by most of the respondents is perceived as remedial activities of NGOs. Only a small part of respondents attribute to it the independent mass media (considering the media as a more or less commercialized structure), and never - to any political groupings or movements. Actually, we have no experience of trade-union activities in Georgia, which in many ways (alongside with some religious institutions) shaped and affected the civil society consciousness in the West. Without perceiving the origins and development of the civil society in post-Soviet Georgia, it is impossible to carve out its role in the Rose Revolution.

When we refer to the role of civil society in the Rose Revolution, we mean not only the role of leading NGOs in the revolutionary processes, but also, to the same extent, to the increased level of public awareness of the Georgian people. This allowed a phenomenal leap forward – bloodless and non-violent transfer of state power to the opposition forces. The Georgian electorate stated that they were no longer going to tolerate the firmly established tradition of crude election forgeries; people in the street demonstrated a high level of solidarity, orderliness and civility towards each other, thus avoiding jam, bloodshed and provocations. Nobody could impose such behavior from the outside – people themselves had the perception of inevitability of dismissing the old, corrupted regime.

Three different, though interconnected dimensions of the revolutionary events are clearly present: that of political opposition, the politically active part of the civil sector, and mass rally participants. People acted in good order, they gathered and broke up. I remember a mother with a 25 days-old baby in her hands, who did not leave the territory under the arches of the building of parliament until the late evening (it was pouring outdoors, but the people tried to warm themselves under the tents). When I asked her if she was not afraid to let her baby catch cold, she calmly answered that in her home the temperature was even lower than in the street, and that she knew who was to be blamed for that. The demonstrators' behavior did not fit the

established stereotype of Georgian character and mentality. Two main ideas were dominant here: a) the government should be dismissed as it was no longer possible to live in this way; b) this should be done in a civilized and non-violent way.

### **Parliamentary Elections in November 2003**

The elections on November 2, 2003 were not outstanding from the viewpoint of standard forgery procedure: average, ‘standard’ breaching of the rules – generally speaking, everyone was used to such faking. Obviously, on the threshold of the last battle, in order to cause mass protest, the leaders of the opposition were interested to declare the elections extremely forged even before the process actually started – to accumulate the mass protest.

The November 2003 events can be divided into two phases: the first fortnight, when the mass protest was not up to the critical waterline, and the results were unpredictable; and then the following week, when the victorious processes became more outlined for the protesters. Consequently, the attitude towards the ongoing processes from official Washington also changed accordingly. However, when all was over, some ‘conspiracy theories’ became very popular, insisting that George Soros was the one who planned, organized, and funded the whole process – template-directing the events, as in Serbia. The Soros foundation definitely gave its helping hand to the KMARA team, but that

alone could not have provoked mass rallies, no way. Information is spread that, though they kept an intent eye on Georgia, official Washington hesitated to declare its moral support until mass protests reached the critical point. In February 2004, at the meeting at the Nixon Center in Washington, Zeyno Baran, a well-informed U.S. expert assured us that the officials in Washington D.C. hesitated to show open support to the Saakashvili-Zhvania-Burjanadze team until they faced the irreversibility of the revolutionary scenario.<sup>7</sup> Apparently CNN thought the same way, because only in the last few days left before November 23, 2003 CNN did decide to launch its campaign of global coverage of the Rose Revolution.

### **The Third Sector after the Rose Revolution**

Soon after the victorious Rose Revolution was declared as accomplished, many of its active participants amongst the leaders of the civil society took up key posts in the government, parliament and administration of the president. Commenting this, Rustavi-2 did not fail to mention that after the revolution, the Georgian public sector became ‘disintegrated and hollow’,<sup>8</sup> and that could be understood as a certain verification of these leaders’ ambitions, indicating they were the very backbone of

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<sup>7</sup> Guguli Magradze, Zurab Davitashvili and George Khutsishvili attended the meeting.

<sup>8</sup> The Rustavi-2 ‘Courier’ night program, January 2004.

Georgian civil society. Time showed that this statement (like many other comments by Rustavi-2) implied much more. Particularly, it was a certain political credo of the new government, which could be expressed as follows. The people that came to power on the wave of the public protest and had the mandate from the public to carry out radical reforms and modernize the country, the power that acted on behalf of the public and executed its will, naturally assumes the function of democratization of the country and implementation of the Western standards. From this point of view, Georgian civil society assumed power in order to carry out what it was urged to – the democratic reforms – only this time with the help of state power resources.

In the context of our study we raise the question whether this assumption and logic is correct and congruent with the generally accepted definition of civil society? May such a “succession line” guarantee that the post-revolutionary development of the state power will follow the line of democratization and not that of bureaucratization or even authoritarianism? Apparently, the governmental reformers imagined themselves in the role of the “founding fathers” of America in the 19<sup>th</sup> century: cowboys with the lynch law reigning around, but in their dreams they already see a powerful modern democratic country based on a firm rule of law.



But history proves otherwise – any high-rank official, however remedial and civil/human rights advocate he might be, cannot personify civil society. After any revolution, however democratic it be, society has to foster the civil sector activities, fulfilling the people’s control over the government, and has to never step aside from the course the power-would-be had declared before. Referring to Francis Fukuyama’s well-known thesis, democracy is only deeply rooted in those societies that have both a persistent demand for it, as the ability to self-organize in order to reach this goal.

# **Chapter One. Research Issue, Methodology and Hypotheses**

The initial question of “what role did civil society have in the Rose Revolution” is based on certain assumptions, which we shall clarify in this chapter along with the research method and theoretical perspectives we used.

One of the main assumptions of the present project is that civil society had a certain role in the RR and it implies three sub-admissions:

- a) Civil society exists
- b) A revolution took place
- c) There is some kind of relation between the two.

Those are “first order” social reality assumptions. To study a possible relation between the two we move to “second order” social reality, namely to the level of whether and if so how this relation is reflected and interpreted in the minds of the Georgian people and in the texts of the Georgian media. Therefore, our fourth sub-admission is that:

- d) This relation is reflected in the representations of citizens (active and passive), in the media (print, TV) and in terms of NGO activities.

From these assumptions we formulated several hypotheses, but we do not use these in a positivist way of finding causal relations. Rather, our research is about trying to gain insight in this hypothetical relation: What does it teach us about civil society in Georgia? In what way does it perhaps enhance our insight in the phenomenon of revolution? In other words the relation civil society – Rose Revolution, is embedded and contextualized in a larger, well documented relation in literature on democracy, namely between civil society and democratization (Carothers<sup>9</sup>, Putnam<sup>10</sup>, Diamond<sup>11</sup>, Huntington<sup>12</sup>).

This relationship has been conceptualized in various terms expressing various degrees and types of socio-political development, varying from electoral democracies (power of people to boot government), grey or hybrid democracies, until full-fledged democracies (See Diamond and Carothers). At first democracies were associated strongly with economic development, but more recently correlation's can be seen with democracy even in poor countries (Diamond). The crux to democratization appears to 'sit' either in free and fair elections and/or in having a well developed civil society, operationalized in terms of NGOs and free media. Therefore, we can illustrate the relations under study as follows:


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<sup>9</sup> Carothers, Th., *Critical Mission: Essays on Democracy Promotion*, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004.

<sup>10</sup> Putnam R., *Making Democracy Work: Civic Tradition in Modern Italy*, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993.

<sup>11</sup> Diamond, L., *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation*, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1999.

Diagram 1: Assumed conceptual relationships.



The diagram illustrates the relationships assumed between the concepts of civil society, NGOs and the Rose Revolution. Without going into Merleau Pontyan consciousness (1962) and Nietzschean “Will to power” (1901), obviously somewhere along

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<sup>12</sup> Huntington, S., *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*,

the way between independence in 1991 and the Rose Revolution in 2003 the consciousness and the will of the masses was awakened and strengthened, expressing two things:

- The will and consciousness to dismiss a government
- The will and consciousness to do so peacefully.

In order not to make things unnecessarily complicated (this research is not about delving into philosophy) we join these two aspects in one calling it “public awareness”. Thus the question arises: where did this public awareness come from? Did the civil society (NGOs, media) play any role in this? Or was it mainly a reaction to dismal economic conditions, a protest against malfunctioning rampant corruption and weak rule of law. Or was the opposition so charismatic and powerful that it got people on its feet channeling the general dissatisfaction to its own advantage? Though at this point we provide more questions than answers, hopefully we made clear that researching and reflecting on the role of civil society towards the Rose Revolution includes a possible relationship between NGOs and awareness raising of the general public.

## **Method and techniques: triangulation**

In our aim and strife to present a balanced representation, we used triangulation and three main research techniques: 1) Semi-structured interviews (referred to in the text as ‘expert interview’) with direct participants of the Rose Revolution (from different camps), experts, scientists, journalists, who possessed information interesting for us; 2) Content-analysis of media and of other published documents; 3) A poll/survey (1000 respondents all over Georgia except for Abkhazia and South Ossetia).

We ourselves are an NGO and part of Georgian civil society, therefore, to some extent this research involves self-reflection and we ourselves also have our representations of what happened. Therefore we added our reflections after the final conclusion of the book. To make this work as intersubjectively and with as much cogency as possible, we used triangulation as a method, counterchecking the answers of our respondents with documents and literature by Georgian and other political scientists, with expert opinions. In short triangulation means using different methods to research the same issue with the same unit of analysis (i.e. a semi-structured interview with experts on the Rose Revolution followed by a survey of respondents throughout Georgia on the same topic), thus cross-checking one result against another, thereby hopefully increasing the reliability of the result. The most interesting part is to analyse possible

contradictory results because this can lead to insight in more fundamental issues concerning either basic assumptions surrounding the topic or the research design.

We need to remember that we are studying this topic after it happened. Therefore we are dealing both with psychological and cultural phenomena of “sense making”, and are dependent on people’s memories with all the possible bias locked in memories. This is a reflexive research without the advantage of the great distance of pure historical research done after several decades.

### **Operationalization of concepts and of the assumed relations**

Various theoretical perspectives exist both on civil society and on revolutions, varying from structural, historical, functional, and interpretative perspectives. For now we summarize the operationalization of civil society and the rose revolution as follows. Civil society is narrowed down to NGOs and the media, i.e. the entity of social groups, institutions and movements that actively participated in creating the phenomenon of the Rose Revolution, both in the onset and during the process of it.

The Rose Revolution during the month of November is divided into two periods (chaos during the first two weeks, and an increase of pressure in the direction of resignation of president Shevardnadze during the second part, although as Zhvania and Burjanadze claimed, it was not completely clear what would

happen until the very last moment). The relation between civil society and the Rose Revolution is operationalized in terms of NGO activity, and in terms of reflection of NGO activity in the media.

## **Assumptions formulated into hypotheses**

### **a. Civil Society *does* exist in Georgia**

Several researches by Georgian and foreign authors were dedicated to the conception and evolution of civil society in Georgia. G. Nodia, who carried out a special work on civil society in Georgia, notes: “from 1992, i.e. after gaining independency, democratic countries of Europe and America got interested in promoting civil society in Georgia (...) Active part of the Georgian society, on its part received the possibility to seek new resources for their activities. (...) Non-governmental organizations became the main segment of the civil society” (See G. Nodia<sup>13</sup>; the author does not refer to free media but Companjen<sup>14</sup> does include media in the NGO Tbilisi field of action).

Thus, in Georgia (as well as in many other post-communist countries) it is a specific feature of civil society that it did not appear mostly from within, i.e. as a reaction towards the State,

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<sup>13</sup> Nodia G., *Civic Society Development in Georgia: Achievements and Challenges, Policy Papers*. Tbilisi: CIPDD, 2005, p. 15.

<sup>14</sup> Companjen, F.J., *Between Tradition and Modernity*. Amsterdam: Vrije Universiteit, 2004, p.28.



like in the countries with a tradition of democracy, but with the help of external support and financing. Despite this, the civil sector became a main promoter of liberal values in the country and soon gained an important position in the social reality of Georgia; making “...competence, prevailing ability of self-organization and articulation” its key weapon (Nodia, 2005 p. 12).

Free media, which unlike NGOs had not been dependent on western donors, gradually obtained a still greater authority in the Georgian society (although, of course, western grants were not quite unusual to the media companies). Media influence, as well as activity of civil society became evident after the events in autumn, 2001, when governmental repression against Rustavi-2 TV channel aroused mass protest actions. The government had to retreat. The attorney general, the minister of internal affairs and the minister of security had to leave their posts. We shall discuss these issues in more details below. At this stage we find all the above to be sufficient evidence for the first admission of our research.

The fact that the civil sector exists can be seen in every-day life. During the past several years, certain NGOs have been mentioned in every informational TV program or analytical publication<sup>15</sup>. A network of NGOs with different profiles has

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<sup>15</sup> Nodia G., *Civic Society Development in Georgia: Achievements and Challenges, Policy Papers*, Tbilisi: CIPDD, 2005.

covered the whole territory of Georgia (except for the self-declared republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia). Representatives of non-governmental sector are members of supervisory boards of almost every state body (where such a board exists). Many organizations participate in important state and international programs. From the **functional** viewpoint, as it was already mentioned, most of the active NGOs are the main promoters of liberal-democratic ideology in Georgia. This is carried out through educational projects (training programs, seminars, media publications, TV programs, etc.), as well as legislative initiatives, independent expertise, appeals to international organizations. The results of a poll carried out in spring 2003, which covered 1000 respondents, can be used as empirical evidence of the existence of the civil sector<sup>16</sup>, in the sense that the public has formed itself an opinion about this sector. These results could be called an **interpretative** point of view.

In the questionnaire respondents were asked to answer how would he/she estimate the activities of the institutions as shown in Table 1. As we can see, two main units of the public sector, the media and the NGOs, hold the second and the third ratings respectively. Based on the answers shown in Table 1, we consider that we may assume that civil society in the form of NGOs does exist.

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<sup>16</sup> Nizharadze, G., E. Jgerenaia, J. Kachkachishvili, R. Mshvidobadze, G. Khutsishvili "Urban population of Georgia about the religious issues", Tbilisi: ICCN, 2004.

Table 1: Evaluation of Institutions in Georgia

#	Structure/institution	Positive	More positive than negative	More negative than positive	Negative	I don't know
1.	Parliament of Georgia	1.2	4.7	22.7	71.5	0
2.	Government of Georgia	1.1	4.2	19.3	75.4	0
3.	NGOs	5.9	25.0	28.1	38.6	2.4
4.	Orthodox Church	38.6	38.2	12.7	9.0	1.5
5.	Mass media	25.6	41.3	18.3	14.5	0.3
6.	Police	2.3	5.7	16.7	75.2	0.1
7.	Office of Public Prosecutor	3.0	5.5	17.1	73.8	0.7
8.	Court	3.1	8.0	20.3	67.6	0.7

**b . The Revolution *did* happen in 2003 in Georgia**

The working group chose the following definition of the term ‘Revolution’ (considering it most adjustable to the November 2003 events): *A social-political act, characterized by the following features:*

- Action aimed at dismissing the regime, pushed forward by an alternative view of Justice and Law enforcement.
- Significant rate of both formal and informal mass mobilization.
- Provoking attempts for changes through non-institutional ways, such as mass rallies, protest manifestations, strikes, and even violence.<sup>17</sup>

**c. There is a relation between both 1) civil society and the Rose Revolution and between 2) civil society and public awareness in the context of transition**

That *Civil sector played a remarkable role in the revolutionary processes* can be substantiated as follows: Oppositional TV channels, especially Rustavi-2, should be evidently considered direct actors of the revolution, while they not only broadcasted the events, but also coordinated certain actions. During the whole period of revolution, the representatives of leading oppositional NGOs participated actually in all high rating talk shows and informational TV programs. After the revolution many representatives of the civil sector joined the state structures. This dual and ambiguous relation of being producer of and product of is important in another way. Depending on how one defines civil society and depending on how perhaps which function one attributes to civil society, one could perceive the relation between civil society which exists and revolution which took place, as a paradoxical one. One could argue that if civil society

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<sup>17</sup> Goldstone, J.A., “Towards a Fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory”, in: *Annual Review of Political Science* 4, 2001, pp 139-87.

is defined in terms of strong civic tradition and existing rule of law, this would have made a revolution redundant. People could have trusted free and fair elections and simply booted out a malfunctioning government. Thus a contextualizing of this research in the perspective of a country in transition with a weak rule of law is important to take into consideration.<sup>18</sup>

About the relation between civil society and public awareness: *In 1993-2003 free media and non-governmental sector enhanced the public awareness in Georgian people, which has contributed to the Rose Revolution – a large-scale, non-violent national action, aimed against the breach of civil rights by the government and which ended up with the change of the existing regime.*

#### **d. Civil activity is reflected in the opinions of citizens, experts and in the media**

At the stage of planning, our working group had one more assumption: Role of civil society in the Rose Revolution is reflected in the media of that time and in the memories of people we interviewed afterwards, both active participants and more passive onlookers from various camps.

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<sup>18</sup> Companjen, F.J., *Between Tradition and Modernity. Rethinking the role of NGO leaders in Georgia's transition to democracy*. Amsterdam: Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, 2004.

In the course of the primary analysis of the collected data, it became clear that the assumption regarding media was only partly correct. Of course, media and “revolutionary” NGOs often appeared in the content-analysis data and interviews, but their role was general, without identifying particular activity or contribution (this data is broadly illustrated in the main document), and the main accent was put on leading political forces and politicians. Here we shall not stop at explaining why it so happened (we shall return to this issue in more details in the corresponding part of the book). We shall just note that in our view, this can be attributed to the personalization tendency, typical to the Georgian collectivism.<sup>19</sup> By personalization tendency we mean that social life in Georgian minds is generally understood especially in terms of personal influence and not so much in terms of successful systems or well functioning institutions.

Finally with regard to this relation we should add that the results of interviews and content-analysis made us partially put additional focus on the research of **activities** that were hypothetically in direct or indirect relation to the Rose Revolution and were carried out by different sectors of civil society. This assumed relation we therefore ended up operationalizing into the following activities, which took place during the period of the Rose Revolution:

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<sup>19</sup> As described by various authors from literature on intercultural communication such as Gudykunst and Kim 2003, Hofstede 2001, Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck 1960.

- Demonstration that the election results were fraudulent;
- Influence made on public opinion;
- Actions aimed at criticism and delegitimization of the existing government;
- Arranging of actions of protest;
- Ensuring peaceful and organized form of the protest actions;
- The calling for mass mobilization by the media

The activities mentioned below carried out by the representatives of the non-governmental sector in the period preceding the revolution, have promoted the introduction of democratic values in the society, which has greatly contributed to mass mobilization and non-violent revolution under the aegis of democracy:

- Creation of activists network (critical mass) with public awareness of democracy;
- Criteria of democratic values / human rights and dissemination of this “language” amongst the public;
- Grounding in democratic institutions and legality, which appeared very important during the revolution (for example, passing the Administrative Code, the Election Law, consolidation of media);
- Monitoring, implementation of standards.

Having explained our research question, assumptions and research methods we will first give the reader an overview of theory on revolutions and civil society in the next chapter and then give an overview of Georgian NGO development in Chapters 3 and 4.



## **Chapter Two. Revolution and Civil Society: Theoretical Framework**

What theories on both revolution and civil society best suit our need to explain the political developments in Georgia? How can the Georgian case add to existing theories on revolution and civil society? What can we conclude from theory on an interrelation between revolution and civil society? If rule of law had been stronger and civil society more developed, a revolution might not have been necessary because the legal means of elections would have sufficed to send the previous government home. However, these legal means did not work with elections being rigged. Therefore, let us review literature on both revolution and civil society from various perspectives in an effort to answer the key issues.

This chapter does not aim at reviewing all the existing theoretical concepts of revolution. They are so numerous and multifold that it would be impossible to cover all. And then, it is not our goal to be complete. Rather we are more interested in those issues of the theory of revolution and civil society, which can highlight the Georgian experience. **Do any of these theories include a role for civil society and if so, which role?** Particularly we want to show, where the current revolutionary changes allow bringing arguments in favor of certain views and positions and where, on the contrary, these changes obviously contradict those views.

## Theories and concepts of Revolutions

Revolution became a subject of analysis in the XVIII-XIX centuries<sup>20</sup>. The definition of a “revolution” in the present-day interpretation dates from that period and is considered as inevitable. With time, this word acquired the meaning of changes, which are however beyond anyone’s control and are associated with violence. Such understanding of a revolution prevailed after the English and American revolutions in theoretical works of historians and political scientists such as J. de Staël, F. Guizot, and A. de Tocqueville. The authors carefully analyzed the revolutionary events, making comparisons in order to find both common and different features. Their attitude to the phenomenon of revolution was polysemantic. Some authors considered it as an event that changed nothing in the process of development, but just completed those tendencies, which eventually would be accomplished by the pre-revolutionary regime.<sup>21</sup> The main objective of revolution was understood in creating more centralized governance.<sup>22</sup> Other authors shared a different approach. They considered revolutions in the light of objective events within the evolutionary development of the state. Revolutions were regarded as positive developments leading to the overthrow of the obsolete regime and establishing a new

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<sup>20</sup> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Revolution>

<sup>21</sup> Tocqueville, A., *The Old Regime and the Revolution*. New York: Anchor Press – Doubleday, (1955 [1856]).

<sup>22</sup> Tocqueville, A., The French Revolution and the Growth of the State, in: *Revolutions - Theoretical, Comparative, and Historical Studies*, Goldstone, J., (Ed.), New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich 1986, pp.30-31.

progressive leadership. Thus, for example, Marx compares revolution with the “engine of history” , accelerating positive changes.<sup>23</sup> According to Marxist theory, a revolution plays a special role in history. It is predetermined by the course of social development and at a certain stage becomes inevitable. A revolution is also perceived as a rescue from the old regime and as a victory of the constitutional order.

In the beginning of the XX century, both accomplished and unaccomplished revolutionary experience gained special importance. Many researchers of that time carefully studied this issue with the purpose of making future political calculations – predicting the trends of future development. Thus, the analysis of revolutions shifted from the area of theoretical knowledge to the area of political practice, i.e. started to obtain the character of applied science.

Since the second half of the XX century, the experts’ attention switched to the processes developing in the countries of the “third world”. Political changes that took place in the developing countries became the subject of scientific analysis. Experts tried to find the explanations to mass riots, their psychological, civilization, cultural or international dimensions. Revolution became the subject of multifaceted analysis by political scientists, psychologists, sociologists, and economists. By that time, sufficient theoretical and practical data had been collected

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<sup>23</sup> Manifesto of the Communist Party in Marx/Engels, *Selected Works*, Volume One, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1969.

for a detailed and overall research of this phenomenon. Later the theories of revolution were classified in different categories according to some particular features (See the classification below).

R. Gurr uses a “relative hardship” definition, opposing it to absolute hardship. What actually happens in the society does not matter so much as how it meets the expectations.<sup>24</sup> If a long period of expectations changes with an abrupt recession and the expectations fail, this becomes a precondition for a revolution.

In some theories, revolution is considered as a phenomenon of underdeveloped societies, typical to agrarian-bureaucratic monarchies of the past and to the modernizing countries of the “third world”. According to Huntington, revolutions may follow the processes of modernization. He mentions that political modernization brings political awareness to new social groups and thus increases their mobilization. In his view, the **function** of a revolution is to create new political institutions, including these new groups.<sup>25</sup>

S. Huntington also introduced the definitions of “western” and “eastern” revolutions. A “western” revolution starts from a state crisis and then moderate and radical politicians bring post-revolutionary dictatorship. The “eastern model” is characterized by a period of dual power and ends with the defeat of the “old

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<sup>24</sup> Gurr, R., *Why Men Rebel*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970.

regime” and the victory of the revolutionary forces. Dual power can be considered as separation of a part of the governing elite from the existing regime and its transfer to the opposition and close cooperation with the civil society institutions.<sup>26</sup>

From the 80s a more **functional approach** began to emerge towards revolutions framed in conflict and development studies. Studying potential conflicts and relationships between and within the government and elite groups, and between the elite and other groups, became the cornerstone for understanding development. For example, Charles Tilly identifies a revolution as a situation of multiply sovereignty, when different groups enter into political conflict and are able to mobilize resources for their support. In a situation when the elite is unable, with the help of the existing resources, to satisfy the public needs, then the growing counter-elite starts mobilizing all the available resources (money, manpower, weapons, information).<sup>27</sup>

In the studies of revolution, special attention is paid to the analysis of state, the crisis of which indicates the beginning of the revolutionary processes, while its recovery and consolidation – meant the end of such processes. Some experts quite often apply to **structural approach**. Theda Skocpol after detailed

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<sup>25</sup> Huntington, S., *Revolutions and Political Order*, in: *Revolutions - Theoretical, Comparative, and Historical Studies*, Goldstone, J. (Ed.), New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich 1986, pp. 39-47.

<sup>26</sup> Huntington, S., *Revolutions and Political Order*, in: *Revolutions - Theoretical, Comparative, and Historical Studies*, Goldstone, J., (Ed.) New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1986, pp. 39-47.

<sup>27</sup> Tilly, C., Does Modernization breed Revolution? in: *Comparative Politics*, vol. 5, No.3, 1973, pp.425-447.

analysis of the French, Russian and Chinese revolutions came to a conclusion that their roots were not in the social field, but in the structure of state power and in the relationship between the government, elite and public. Following her thoughts, exacerbation of these relations, as well as increase of threat from outside and incapability of the government to resist the pressure, was the main precondition for a revolution.<sup>28</sup>

Jack Goldstone also shares the structural approach. An analysis of English and French revolutions led him to assume that revolutions take place in the period of weakening of the state power. In his opinion, while facing the increase of expenses and the decrease of traditional sources of income, the state experiences significant financial difficulties. A number of contradictions in the society start to aggravate, which finally leads to the frustration and deep public crisis and (in a number of cases) to revolution.<sup>29</sup> Actually, all the revolutions started from government crisis and the elite support accompanied by the protests “from below” both in favor and against the revolution. It finally led to the establishment of new elite that performed the duty of state reconstruction.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> Skocpol, T., / Trimberger, E., *Revolutions and the World-Historical Development of Capitalism*, in: *Berkeley Journal of Sociology*, 1978, vol. 22, pp.101-113, reprinted in: *Revolutions - Theoretical, Comparative, and Historical Studies*, Goldstone, J. (Ed.), New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1986, pp.59-65.

<sup>29</sup> Goldstone, J., (Ed.), *Revolutions - Theoretical, Comparative, and Historical Studies*, New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1986. Goldstone, J., *Theories of Revolutions - The Third Generation*, in: *World Politics*, Vol. 32, No. 3 (Apr., 1980), pp.425-453.

<sup>30</sup> Goldstone, J., (Ed.), *Revolutions - Theoretical, Comparative, and Historical Studies*, New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1986, p. 58.

The **institutional** approach implies the consideration of mechanisms of impact of the state institutions on the development processes, as well as of some factors having an effect on the changes in these institutions. In this theory, special attention is paid to the gradual and consequential evolutionary development, while the revolutionary processes are regarded as an external factor that can only to a certain extent change the development of institutions.<sup>31</sup> The liberal tradition in general prefers stable and balanced systems. Revolution is considered as deviation from the equilibrium, which can be avoided. So-called revisionists (B. Russell, F. Fourier) also have some prejudice over the function of revolution to stimulate public progress and doubt its appropriateness. Based on historical analysis, these authors completely reject the Marxist view that refers to the role of class struggle in the revolutions. Having analyzed the Great French Revolution, they concluded that the collisions had rather political than social reasons.

However, the theory of democratic development provides a different approach to the countries in the process of democratic transition. Here the revolutionary events are considered as an objective and inevitable outcome within the logic of evolutionary development of the country. But the question is: what is the connection between revolution and democracy? Revolution itself contradicts with democratic values, however, contains democratic claims. Analyzing the revolutions that took place in

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<sup>31</sup> See: North, D., *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*,

the late twenties, we can observe a very strong interdependency between revolution and democratic transition; however, these terms differ from one another.

Democratic transition implies gradual political and economic shift from non-democratic system to democratic regime; and this process of transition is developing at the background of active involvement of all parties who negotiate on basic principles by consensus. In such a case the interest of all parties involved including representatives of the old power are taken into account.<sup>32</sup> On the contrary, revolution is characterized with rapid changes of political regime in which social groups are involved and the goal is reached through fighting. Revolutions, in fact, are resolved through victory of one party while another one fails. Another difference with transition to democracy: a revolution is identified with violence while democratic transition is supposed to be peacefully performed. However, the revolution may aim at substituting the demoralized bureaucratic system and preventing total corruption and overall chaos; it may be accompanied by active participation of civil institutions and international discontent that requires political capacity of inter-political institutions and guarantees for accomplishment of democratic reforms and transparency. In such a case, a revolution is regarded

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Cambridge University Press, 1990.

<sup>32</sup> O'Donnell G., and Schmitter Ph., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*, Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1986.



as political transformation but not as political upheaval.<sup>33</sup> (Examples are revolutionary processes in Latin America and Eastern Europe).

It is interesting to consider also a **cultural approach** to the analysis of revolutionary processes, i.e. what is the role of culture in the political life. Some authors argue that culture is central for the outcome of a revolution as it holds a revolutionary coalition together in or after the revolution.<sup>34</sup> Such components of culture like folk beliefs, historical memories of struggles, shared “structures of feeling” fashioned out of common experiences, as well as explicit revolutionary manifestos and formally articulated ideologies, definitely have an impact on the form and dynamics of political processes. Furthermore, “historical experience” shapes “subjectivity” and raises “emotions” that influences the behavior of people.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> Huntington S., *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.

<sup>34</sup> Foran J., Discourses and Social Forces – The Role of Culture and Cultural Studies in Understanding Revolutions, in: *Theorizing Revolutions*, Foran, J., (Ed.), London: Routledge 1997, pp.203-268.

<sup>35</sup> Thompson E., *The Making of the English Working Class*, London: Victor Gollancz (1963); Foran J., Discourses and Social Forces – The Role of Culture and Cultural Studies in Understanding Revolutions, in: *Theorizing Revolutions*, Foran, J., (Ed.), 1997, p. 219.

## Categories of Theories of Revolution

There are many different types of theories of revolution. Two successful attempts to categorize them were made by Roderick Aya and Jack A. Goldstone<sup>36</sup>.

Aya divides the theories of revolution into four families: the psychological, the functional, the structural and the political theories.<sup>37</sup>

**Psychological theories** explain revolutionary movements by frustration. This frustration is the result from the discrepancy between what the people expect and what they get from the state. Following these thesis frustrated people will direct their aggression against the perceived source of frustration. While the outcome is a 'revolutionary movement', there may be different social causes of frustrations - e.g. steady social improvement followed by a sudden setback could raise expectations, which cannot be met. Or, rapid social change may have an influence on expectations and affords by the people, raising the first, lowering the second. Many of these theories come together with additional sufficient conditions, like insurgent strength and government weakness.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> Goldstone, J., Towards a Fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory, in: *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2001, 4:139-187.

<sup>37</sup> Aya R., Theories of Revolutions, in: *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences*, Smelser, N., / Baltes, P., (Ed.), 2001, Volume 20, pp. 13314-13317.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid, p. 13316

**Functional theories** use the picture of dysfunction or disequilibrium to explain revolutionary movements. In this case, available institutional means or procedures are not able to fulfill socially prescribed ends, goals or values and will create a gap between ideology and experience. If the government is too weak, it loses the control on its armed forces, or the revolutionaries will start to believe they may succeed, and might try to bring “salvation” to the people. A revolutionary movement will be the result.

**Structural theories** are based on structural constraints of the government. Such constraints can be government weakness, subaltern community organization, vanguard political-military organization, and geopolitical emergencies.<sup>39</sup> Those structural constraints may lead first to an elite, which try to subvert the government. This is then followed by rebellion and by radicals, who try to seize power. This constitutes a revolutionary situation, which will allow the new rulers to reconstruct state and society. In this way the structural theories not only explain revolutionary situations, but also their outcomes.

**Political theories** are built on collective actions and reactions, which are explained as rational efforts to satisfy interests. Those actions are subjects to constraints like organization, armament, threat, and opportunity. Ideology is only used to cover the

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<sup>39</sup> Katz, M., *Revolutions and Revolutionary Waves*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997; Skocpol, T., Cultural Idioms and Political Ideologies in the Revolutionary Reconstruction of State Power: A rejoinder to Sewell, in: *Journal of Modern History*, vol. 57, no.1, 1985.

interests, which serve as motivators. In this way political theories explain why certain people claim sovereignty, why others support these people, and finally, why governments fail to control such insurgencies.<sup>40</sup>

Jack A. Goldstone chose a different way to put theories of revolution into different categories. He follows the development of those theories through time and comes to the conclusion, that there are different generations of theories.<sup>41</sup> According to Goldstone, the first generation of theories of revolution appeared between 1900 and 1940. He describes them “as carefully investigated with regard to the patterns of events found in revolutions”. But he remarks that these studies lacked a broad theoretical perspective.<sup>42</sup> These were mostly historians and sociologists who examined the most famous revolutions of the West, namely the English Revolution of 1640, the American Revolution of 1776, the French Revolution of 1789, and the Russian Revolution of 1917. This generation includes researchers like LeBon, Ellwood, Sorokin, Edwards, Lederer, Petee, and Brinton.

The second generations (between 1940 and 1975) used theories of psychology, sociology, and political science. These included

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<sup>40</sup> Aya R., Theories of Revolutions, in: *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences*, Smelser, N., / Baltes, P., (Ed.), 2001, Volume 20, p. 13316.

<sup>41</sup> Goldstone, J., Theories of Revolutions - The Third Generation, in: *World Politics*, Vol. 32, No. 3 (Apr., 1980), pp.425-453; Goldstone, J., (Ed.) *Revolutions - Theoretical, Comparative, and Historical Studies*, New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1986; Goldstone, J., Towards a Fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory, in: *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2001, 4:139-187.

cognitive and frustration-aggression theories, structural-functional theory and pluralist theory of interest-group competition. Leading researchers were Davies, Gurr, Johnson, Smelser, Huntington, and Tilly. But while these authors developed a good base for theoretical analysis, scientists like Eckstein, Oberschall, Mueller, Salert, and Skocpol discovered weaknesses in the works of the second generation.

This knowledge led to the third generation, which appeared since 1975. The two main differences between the second and the third generation consist of a far better historically grounded analysis and a broader scope on possible results of revolutions. The studies not only asked, why a revolution occurs, but also, why it has got a certain outcome. Among the researchers of the third generations were Paige, Trimberger, Skocpol and Eisenstadt. They pointed to the structural vulnerabilities of regimes as the primary causes of revolutions.

Goldstone propagated to develop a fourth generation of theories of revolution. These should not seek to make a complete list of causes of revolution, but instead should concentrate on factors, that stabilize regimes, as the threat of revolution is an ever and ever repeating phenomenon. This fourth generation would set in, where the third stopped, because it would analyze the factors, which open the way for revolutionary leadership, ideology, and identification that go together with structural factors such as elite

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<sup>42</sup> Goldstone J., Theories of Revolutions - The Third Generation, in: *World Politics*, Vol. 32, No. 3 (Apr., 1980) p. 425.

conflicts and international pressure.<sup>43</sup> Following this advice we are also closing in towards theories of transition, as these are also analyzing the stability of states under changing international conditions.

**Table 2: Overview of theory on Revolutions**

Phase	Theoretical approach	Basic patterns	Authors
	<b>W e s t</b>		
First Generation 1900-1940	Descriptive approach; lack of broad theoretical approach	Mob psychology the breakdown of “social habits” “repression of basic instinctual needs”	LeBon, Ellwood, Sorokin, Edwards, Lederer, Pettee, Brinton
Second generation 1940-1975	Psychology (frustration-aggression theory)  Sociology (structural-functional theory)  Political science (pluralist theory of interest group competition)	Maintaining equilibrium versus a state of “disequilibrium”; function-dysfunction; dissynchronous changes in various subsystems (values, power)  <i>relationship between government, elite, public;</i> “State break-down”; loss of legitimacy by the sovereign; elite competition; call for transformation or new order; mass participation;	Davies, Gurr, Schwartz, Morrison, Johnson, Smelzer, Jessop, Hart, Tiryakin, Hagopian, Huntington Tilly, McDaniel, Amman, Stinchcombe  Goldstone, Skocpol

<sup>43</sup> Goldstone, J., Towards a Fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory, in: *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2001, p. 139.

	Cultural approach (theory)	ideology, historical memory, tolerance	Foran, Goldstone
Third generation from 1975 to the 80s	Grounded historically more holistic approach, seeking not only explanation of revolutions but also taking into account the outcomes	Expression and resolution of international conflict; coherence of armed forces; revolutionary elites with close ties to other elites ; international political and economic pressure	Moore, Jr. , Wolf; Gillis, Neumann, Rosenau, Paige, Kelly, Miller, Hermassi, Russel, Scockpol, Trimberger, Eisenstadt, Katz.
	Post-Soviet		
Fourth generation of revolutions (the 80s - 90s)		Inefficiency of centrally planned economies, loss of competitiveness, shortages and bad quality products; Socialist bureaucracy; and paternalism; discredited Communism; quest for external markets, strengthening of democratic values, international influence, nonviolence; the end of post soviet period, nationhood, integration into new world order	Huntington, Verdery, Kornai, Garton Ash, Wicham-Crowley  Remizov, Karamurza, Howard, Sharp, Broers

## *Karl Marx (1818-1883)*

Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels developed a very important view on revolutions and published their *Manifesto of the Communist Party* in 1848. They argued that Europe went through several modes of production since the Middle Ages and that each step was progressive. That way the society underwent the developments from the feudal to the capitalist mode. And Marx and Engels predicted the change from the capitalist to the socialist mode. They argued, that in each mode a particular social class dominated the society. This class has to be removed by a revolution before the transformation to the next mode would be possible. Those revolutionary transformations would never go peacefully.

They took the French Revolution as an example and showed that the privileged feudal aristocracy was removed to free the way for capitalism. But the freedoms and material benefits were only passed to the Bourgeoisie. This left out the class of the workers, which became important during the time of industrialization. To extend the benefits of the industrialization a new revolution would have been necessary, which would be a socialist one in the name of working class.<sup>44</sup>

## *Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859)*

Alexis de Tocqueville also examined the French Revolution and described how out of the revolutionary havoc a much more centralized

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<sup>44</sup>Goldstone, J., (Ed.) *Revolutions - Theoretical, Comparative, and Historical Studies*, New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1986, pp. 20-21.



state was born.<sup>45</sup> He described the “war” against the established powers that were scattered by revolutionary forces. The new rulers tried to break down class restrictions and inequalities. And under this anarchic surface, he argues, lies the tendency of centralization, as the new power used trained civilian servants and similar powers with strong commitment to the central government to replace the old aristocracy rule.

### *Max Weber (1864-1920)*

Max Weber focused on bureaucracy and its effectiveness. He argues that bureaucracy is much more efficient than former types of administration, like local ones and landlords. Because it is more efficient, it is also good for the state’s treasury. After a revolution it is therefore better to pass the administration of a state to the efficient bureaucracy. In this way Weber predicted outcomes of revolutions and added analyzed examples of bureaucracies of France, North America, England, Russia and China.<sup>46</sup>

### *Samuel P. Huntington*

Huntington defines a revolution as “a rapid, fundamental, and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a society, in its political institutions, social structure, leadership, and government

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<sup>45</sup> Tocqueville, A., *The French Revolution and the Growth of the State*, in: *Revolutions - Theoretical, Comparative, and Historical Studies*, Goldstone, Jack A. (Ed.), New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1986, pp.30-31.

<sup>46</sup> Weber, M., 1946, *Bureaucracy and Revolution*, in: *Revolutions - Theoretical, Comparative, and Historical Studies*, Goldstone, J., (Ed.), New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1986, pp. 31-37.

activity and policies. Revolutions are thus to be distinguished from insurrections, rebellions, revolts, coups, and wars of independence.”<sup>47</sup> According to Huntington, revolutions do only appear as consequence of modernization-processes and he describes it as an extreme case of explosion of political participation. Political modernization exports political consciousness to new social groups and thereby mobilizes those. The revolution has got the function to create new political institutions that are able to include these new groups. Following this opinion a revolution may be measured in the rapidity and the scope of expansion of political participation, and also in the authority and stability of the institutions, which it builds.

For Huntington examples for these kinds of revolutions are those in France, Russia, China, Mexico, Turkey, Vietnam and Iran.<sup>48</sup>

### *Charles Tilly*

For Tilly, “there are three necessary and one facilitating condition for a revolution”. The three necessary are: 1. The appearance of contenders or coalition of contenders, advancing exclusively alternative claims to the control over the government currently exerted by the members of the polity; 2. Commitment to those claims by a significant segment of the subject population; 3. Unwillingness or incapacity of the agents of the government to suppress the alternative coalition or the commitment to its claims.

The facilitating condition is the ‘formation of coalitions between

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<sup>47</sup> Huntington, S., *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman: Oklahoma University Press, 1991.

<sup>48</sup> Huntington, S., *Political Order in Changing Societies*, 1968.

members of the polity and the contenders making alternative claims.’

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### *Jeffrey M. Paige*

Paige examined how agrarian structure can affect revolution and its outcome. He analyzed rural conflicts in Peru, Angola and Vietnam and concludes that the relations between landlords and peasants is crucial for revolutions. Where landlords earn their money from land ownership and peasants through wage payment, a mass peasant revolution is likely to occur. In contrast, where landlords and peasants depend both on land ownership, a spontaneous peasant upheaval (*jacquerie*) is more likely to take place. And where landlords primarily depend on wealth through commercial commerce, as e.g. capital-intensive plantations, conflicts between the classes are more likely to be solved by labor movements or commodity reforms.

Paige’s main thought concerns the landlords, who get their income primarily from the possession of land. These are depended on the state and its institutions to protect their wealth. If such a structure meets well organized and wage depended peasants it is likely that a nationalist or communist party will pool these peasants and will attempt to destroy the upper class and the institutions of the state, which are protecting this class.<sup>50</sup>

### *S.N. Eisenstadt*

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<sup>49</sup> Tilly, C., Does Modernization breed Revolution? in: *Comparative Politics*, vol. 5, No.3, 1973, pp.425-447.

Eisenstadt combines structural with cultural explanations. In his view certain prerequisites must come together to create a revolutionary situation. As such a certain cultural orientation must meet with certain structures of the state and elites. If those come together, international economic and military pressures promote the creation of a revolutionary situation. Concerning the state structures he argues that there must be a significant discrepancy between a society's political and symbolic center and the periphery (the rest of the society). The highly closed and elite dominated center must attempt to influence the periphery.

Further the dominant elite must be divided and must have sufficient free resources to exercise a substantial degree of autonomy. Those resources must not be bound to other tasks. Under such circumstances intensifying international economic and military pressures are primary causes for the downfall of traditional regimes. These foreign pressures allow domestic competing elites to recruit mass support and to challenge the government, trying to establish a new regime.

The new regime tends to be more open and less coercive than the former, if the challenging elite had solidary ties with other elite elements or peripheral groups before the revolution. But if the new regime had no such ties, it creates a greater degree of coerciveness and monopolization of power. Examples for such outcomes are the results from the Bolshevik's regime in Russia or that of the CCP in China.

*Mark N. Katz*

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<sup>50</sup> Paige, J., *Agrarian Revolution: Social Movements and Export Agriculture in the Underdeveloped World*, New York: Free Press, 1975, pp.437-438.

Katz wrote about the international influence on revolutions and identified several ‘waves of revolutions’. Waves such as the Atlantic Revolutions - that of the United States (1776), Holland (1787), and France (1789), propelled by antimonarchical sentiment; the European revolutions of 1848, propelled by liberalism; the anti-colonial revolutions of the 1950-70s, propelled by nationalism; the communist revolutions of 1945–1979 in Eastern Europe, China, Cuba, Vietnam, and other developing countries; the Arab Nationalist revolutions in the Middle East and North Africa in 1952–1969; Islamic revolutions in Iran, Sudan, and Afghanistan; and the anticommunist revolutions in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe as well as “coloured revolutions” in Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. Katz identifies also ‘pro’ and ‘contra’ waves. ‘Against’ are antimonarchical, anti-colonial, anti-capitalist, anti-Western, and anti-dictatorial ones. ‘pro’ waves are those, which seriously attempt to establish a certain new order. Such revolutions can be in favor of e.g. democracy, Marxism-Leninism, Arab nationalism, or Islamic fundamentalism. It may also occur, that a single revolution be both at the same time – e.g. some revolutions were antimonarchical and pro-democratic.<sup>51</sup>

**Before moving on to the Rose Revolution, let us see how some revolutions – the French Revolution (as one of the best documented) and the Revolutions in the Eastern Europe (as a processes within democratic transformation) are considered and analyzed. Hopefully we can find some similar patterns with the Rose Revolution case.**

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<sup>51</sup> Katz, M., *Revolutions and Revolutionary Waves*, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997, pp. 11-24.

<sup>51</sup>Goldstone, J., Towards a Fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory, in: *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2001, 4:139-187, p. 145.

*The Great French Revolution of 1789, seen from Katz's point of view, is clearly a successful example of the Atlantic Revolutions. In Katz's sense this was a revolution 'against' monarchical structures and 'for' democracy.*

*Following Weber's arguments, the French Revolution must have created a more bureaucratic state, as this was the more efficient alternative to the abolished system of landlords and privileged aristocracy. The more efficient administration system had to be introduced, to confront international economic pressures.*

*Huntington also recognizes the problems of modernizations and the pressures that come with it. But at the same time he sees this as a chance. Modernization opened up the perspective for people, which had no privileges of the aristocracy to claim more rights. Those people were mobilized and finally created a parliamentary system through which they could participate in the polity.*

*For Tilly it is important that contenders appear and make alternative claims about governance. He found them in the educated classes of France, which claimed democracy and the abolishment of the aristocracy. The success of the French violent upheaval shows us also, that a significant segment of the population was supporting these claims. It was important that the state was not able to suppress the revolution by armed forces. For Tilly these conditions lead to the success of the revolution.*

*Skocpol and Trimberger saw that France was under economic and military pressure from international forces. Peasants, who had much autonomy from the ruling elite could use this weakness and successfully revolt against the ruling regime. As Weber, they*

*concluded, that the international pressure forced the following new regime to establish a very effective administration. Only a more efficient administration would be able to counter such pressures.*

*Eisenstadt also takes the international pressures into account and treats them as necessary conditions for a revolution, because they allow elites to revolt against the governing regime. Following Eisenstadt's view, the huge discrepancy between the aristocratic elite and the social periphery is important for rebelling elites to mobilize the periphery. Further, the claims against the church (as a landowner), for political and social change fit into Eisenstadt's judgment that during such formations, rebellion is most likely. In regard to the outcome, Eisenstadt concludes, it had to become more coercive and centralized, because the new regime had no close ties with the aristocracy.*

*The collapse of the Soviet Bloc is perceived by Foran as liberation from 40 years of repression and dictation on discourses. Interestingly he argues, that political culture does not have to be created through text based discourses, but can also be based on suppression from outside. The socialist governments of Eastern Europe were backed up by Moscow, and when this violent and aggressive back up disappeared, the socialist governments were no longer able to defend their position out of the socialist ideology. Instead they had problems to justify violence against their own people, who were looking for freedom to express themselves and therefore wanted to get rid of the socialist system. Also Katz saw the collapse of the Soviet Bloc as simple anticommunist revolutions.<sup>52</sup>*

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## **The Rose Revolution from a theoretical point of view**

Experts may argue about the pure revolutionary character of the “Rose Revolution” indicating the absence of classical signs of revolution such as changes in the economic system, social structures and cultural values, as well as acts of violence. None of these features could be attributed to the Georgian revolution. Although, there were other obvious signs of revolution, such as mass protest, unwillingness of the society to follow the old rules and the incapacity of the government to rule in the old style. Moreover, the Rose Revolution had a legitimate character which is one of the most significant features of the revolution. Without that legitimacy, its equity and success may be prejudiced. Breaching the constitutional and democratic principles of the country, a revolution is justified by the participation of broad social groups. This makes a revolution legitimate.<sup>53</sup>

The Georgian revolution, based on successful mass mobilization and led by the opposition political forces (separated from the ruling elite) started dismantling the post-Soviet regime and set a goal to create a new political system, based on national-democratic principles.

Political experience in the post-Soviet area shows that the change of political regime, including both the political elite and

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<sup>53</sup> Karumidze Z., Wertsch J. (eds.) *The Rose Revolution in the Republic of Georgia* 2003, NY: Nova Science Publishers, 2005; Nikonov, V., «Orange Revolution» in the



governance, is possible only through substitution of the old regime with the counter-elite.<sup>54</sup> (Examples are Georgia and Ukraine).

A significant characteristic of the Georgian revolution was the pressure of critical mass on the government with the purpose to carry out reforms, secure sovereignty and foster positive changes.<sup>55</sup> The Georgian revolution represented a protest against the imitation of democracy. Its reason was an extremely low level of living standard and an inappropriate response of the government to the existing problems. Open redistribution of property and lobbying of interests with the state officials, undisguised overall corruption, bad governance – brought the country to disorder and chaos and made revolutionary processes inevitable. The Rose Revolution aimed at substituting the corruption and pseudo democratic ideology with the national-liberal one, oriented to actual (not just formal) establishment of democratic values. The main argument in favor of revolution was the necessity of renovation. The guarantee for renovation inside the country would be public order, struggle against corruption as well as honest and professional politicians.

A significant factor that determines the character and course of the revolutionary process appears to be the armed forces of the

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context of genre. in: *Orange Revolution*, Pogrebinski V., (ed),. Moscow: Europe, 2005, p. 111.

<sup>54</sup> Wheatley J., *Georgia From National Awakening to Rose Revolution*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005.

state and the very structure of the state, which is able either to avoid public disturbances or to escalate the confrontation. Armed force's disloyalty, as a rule, is necessary for a successful outcome of a rebellion, but it is not a sufficient condition<sup>56</sup>. However, in modern revolutions armed forces involvement is not a necessary attribute. Many revolutionary processes of the late 80s and early 90s of the XX century could avoid mass violence. The Georgian revolution proved to be one of the most "velvet", without a single, even insignificant fact of using force. In this regard, it is unique.

Analysis of the published works dedicated to the Rose Revolution gives a possibility to distinguish two main approaches to the reasons of the revolution and the sources of its realization. Most of the experts point to the purely objective character of the revolution, that was determined exclusively by social, economic and political realities in Georgia,<sup>57</sup> while others envisage the interests of external actors and international community's claim for good governance, effective leadership, rule of law and transparency. Obviously, an important precondition was successful mass mobilization by the opposition,

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<sup>55</sup> Mihailisko K., Belarus: Retreat to Authoritarianism", in Dawisha K. and Parrot B., *Democratic Changes and Authoritarian Reactions in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova*, Cambridge, 1997, p. 223 – 281; p. 240.

<sup>56</sup> Blair, J., Review: Rebellion, Revolution, and Armed Force: A Comparative Study of fifteen Countries with Special Emphasis on Cuba and South Africa, Russell, D.E.H. in: *Social Forces*, 1977, vol. 55, no.3, pp. 829-830.

<sup>57</sup> Wheatley J., *Georgia From National Awakening to Rose Revolution*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005; See: Broers L., *Rose Revolution: Civil Society and Democratic Sustainability in Georgia*, Open Society – Georgia Foundation, 2005; Karumidze Z., Wertsch J. (Eds), *The Rose Revolution in the Republic of Georgia*, NY: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2005.

with the support of a considerable part of armed forces. Although, it is worth to note Gramsci, who does not downplay the role of public, however, underlines that the alliances of internal and external forces united by a common purpose of overthrowing the government, play the key role in a revolution. These alliances are formed in a particular moment and have a dynamic character.

The mass consolidation in the Rose Revolution was to a greater extent both morally and financially supported by the international community. It is noteworthy to mention the special contribution of *National Democratic Institute, the Open Society/Georgia Foundation (informally called George Soros Fund), the International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy* to the revolutionary processes in Georgia.<sup>58</sup> These NGOs we will describe in the next chapter.

M. Katz has an interesting view on the slipover effect of revolutionary experience to other countries and regions. “There is one central revolution and other revolutions follow the first one. Usually it is the regional or global most important state, which develops a central revolution, which then spreads out”.<sup>59</sup> Some authors see the similarity of the Rose Revolution with the Serbian revolution in 2000. They note that the Georgian opposition forces just copied the tactics of the Serbian

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<sup>58</sup> Wheatley J., *Georgia From National Awakening to Rose Revolution*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005.

<sup>59</sup> Katz, M., *Revolutions and Revolutionary Waves*, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997, p.11-24.

revolution,<sup>60</sup> although unlike the events in Belgrade, where some elements of violence, dislocation of troops, fires still took place, in Tbilisi everything was accomplished peacefully, without a single fact of violence.

The analysis gives us possibility to state that the November 2003 Rose Revolution is a very interesting precedent. It will definitely become an object of deep and detailed analysis in the future. The Rose Revolution will take its own place in the history of revolutionary processes as the event that aimed at overthrowing a corruption-oriented regime causing stagnation and establishing a certain new order in favor of democracy. The “Rose Revolution may be described as a revolt in defense of the constitution, an attempt to uphold accepted democratic rules. This revolution against cheating...against corruption may be considered as a part of the modern democratic ‘wave of revolutions’ and very important experiment in democratic transition with beyond going perspectives.<sup>61</sup> However, the success of this experiment still needs to be proved.”

## **An overview of concepts on civil society**

Civil society exists in two main interdependent dimensions: a social and an institutional one. A social component – historical

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<sup>60</sup> Wheatley J., *Georgia From National Awakening to Rose Revolution*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005.

<sup>61</sup> Nodia G., The Rose Revolution in the Republic of Georgia 2003, in Karumidze Z., Wertsch J. (eds.) *The Rose Revolution in the Republic of Georgia*, NY: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2005.

experience – collective and individual, which determines the political behaviour of a person, his/her way of thinking and other aspects of interpersonal relations. The institutional dimension of civil society can be imagined as an aggregate of independent organizations of political and non-political character, expressing the interests of different parts of the society and realizing them independently from the government.<sup>62</sup>

The idea of civil society originates from the distant past, in the political views of antique and medieval thinkers, even though this phenomenon did not exist in the antique period with its contemporary meanings. In the early traditions, civil society was perceived as “the autonomy of individuals, relationships of institutions operating in close interaction with political power”.<sup>63</sup> In those times, civil society could not be imagined as a social formation contradicting the state power. It was not an antithesis to the government: civil society, political entity, and the State were considered as synonyms. The ancient Greek *polis* was shaping an entity of urban society and the State. In case of interest clashes, the *polis* interests were taking over.<sup>64</sup> Considering civil society in its modern understanding becomes possible only when there is a citizen who perceives himself as an independent member of society, and is aware of it, a citizen, who has his/her rights and freedoms and is, at the same time, responsible before the society.

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<sup>62</sup> Политология, под ред. М. А. Василица, Гардарики, Москва, 1999, с. 140-151.

<sup>63</sup> Максименко В. Идеология civil society и гражданская культура, *Pro et Contra*, 1999. v. 4 № 1 p. 114.

The transition from the Middle Ages to the New Time was marked by the realization of differences between the civil society and the state. In the works by John Locke, Charles Montesquieu, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, civil society is regarded as a separate and independent political category. Despite these authors interpret civil society in different ways, they are unanimous in admitting the leadership of civil society over the state.

The idea of civil society appeared along with the need for separating private life and spreading an idea that public life must be constructed and operated according to the agreement, i.e. based on associative links established on the voluntary and parity footing. Understanding and acknowledgement of these principles, as proved by German sociologist F. Tönnies (1855-1936), is associated with conceptualization and legitimization of the modern social stratum as of a civil society.

The German philosopher Hegel (1770-1831) was the first to use the term “civil society” in the modern meaning. Civil society, according to Hegel – is an area of realization of particular, private interests; it appears “between” the family and state. Hegel unites corporative structures into a certain organized unity, which he calls a civil society. This society, based on private property, social differentiation and various interests, interaction of groups and individuals, becomes the area of mediation between individuals and universal conditions of the state. It is internally discrepant; hence, there is a need of certain guarantor

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<sup>64</sup> Аристотель – Сочинения. М. 1984. Т. 4. с. 55.

for the revealing and satisfying of public needs and interests.<sup>65</sup> Such guarantor is the government, which expresses the interests of the public. Hegel notes that the final goal of the corporation is to impose the civil society over the state.<sup>66</sup> Civil society exists not inside, but alongside the state, but at the same time is dependent and to a certain degree absorbed by it. Such a viewpoint admits the primacy of the state, emphasizing that the government takes the decisions on public issues.

Like Hegel, some theorists of liberal civil society<sup>67</sup> see the political system or state as the only possibility to reach the organization of universality. At the same time, in the variety of structures of civil society there is a possibility of mediation and influence on the government. Modern theorists believe that civil society is comprised not of corporate structures, but rather of social movements, which are formed according to professional activities. And if Hegel speaks about imposing of civil society over the state, liberal theorists speak about the maintenance of autonomy and forms of public movement even by means of civil unrest and resistance. Civil institutions appear in order to achieve certain goals, after which they disappear. Liberal tradition emphasizes the self-regulating function of the civil society as of the protector from the infringements of the government. Yet in his early works the main issue was the interrelation between the

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<sup>65</sup> Civil Society, Concept and History of by H. Islamoglu, Islamoglu, H. 2001, Concept and History of Civil Society, in: *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences*, Smelser, Neil J. / Baltes, Paul B. (Ed.), 2001, Volume 3 p.1894.

<sup>66</sup> Гегель Г. *Философия права*. М. Мысль. 1990.

civil society and the state, which involves such concepts as independency, power, and balance of forces.

As a rule, civil society appears separately from the state and often as a counter-balance to it. On the other hand, formation and development of the civil society is to a significant degree determined by the state. The very process of formation of the civil society is quite complicated and exposed to influence of such factor as the type of state and of existing political power. Apart from internal factors, in the present-day world, the direct or indirect impact of external factors is also very important. The role of financial support by the external actors, especially when the state and society have insufficient resources for the development of civil society is of paramount importance.

According to Hegel, corporate structures of civil society were a part of state ideological structures, a “private voice of state”, which supported state ideology, especially in the periods of crisis.<sup>68</sup> Civil society may get rid of such dependency and acquire autonomy if the state gives away the freedom or when a total crisis of power shall weaken this hegemony. Civil society may become an independent ideological force, which unlike the state authority, is at the same time trustworthy. It was when the government got weak in the countries of Eastern Europe, when

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<sup>67</sup> Cohen, J. L. & A Arato, *Civil Society and Political Theory*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992.

<sup>68</sup> Gramsci A., *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, International Publishers, New York, 1971; online version: Antonio Gramsci Internet Archive ([marxists.org](http://marxists.org)) 2001.



the civil societies started to appear as a counter-balance to the government.

According to the Marxist conception, civil society is primary to the state and the interrelation between the civil society and the state is understood as the interrelation between the personal freedom and public power. Differences between the civil society and the state are best visible in the political life. The State is a part of structure and life of the society as the most important element of its political organization, but at the same time, it is not a part of civil society.<sup>69</sup>

The Italian theorist Gramsci (1891-1937) considers civil society in the triple historical context: when it is destroyed by the state (fascist Germany), when the state is its “external form” (Nazi regime in Italy) and when there is a balance between state and civil society (developed Western countries). In general, he believed that in future civil society would absorb the state and undertake the governing of masses. According to Gramsci, civil society and the state are two levels of politics. (Political parties and other “private” unions struggling for hegemony by creating alliances best express civil society).

The most radical conception of civil society belongs to Thomas Paine (1737-1809), one of the leading ideologists of American bourgeois revolution. In his works the issue of civil society that resists the state, is a central issue. In transition periods, civil

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<sup>69</sup> K. Marx, F. Engels, *Works*. V. 21, International Publishers, p. 310.

society either takes a form of opposition to the existing regime (in case of an authoritarian regime), or closely cooperates with the state and citizens and ensures their effective interaction.<sup>70</sup>

Political philosophy from Adam Ferguson to Antonio Gramsci and Ernest Gellner (1925-1995), assumes that civil society is both political and commercial and it must be democratic and well organized. Civil society is one of the main elements of political life and plays a certain role in political changes. The examples are the countries of Latin America and South-Eastern Europe, where the civil society fostered political changes and was actively involved in these processes. Therefore, civil society is actually able to determine political goals and ways to achieve them without participation in the political decision-making and provision of those decisions,<sup>71</sup> however, its function as a decision-maker remains possible. There is also another approach - to consider the function of civil society in the expression of interests of different groups of population, but not in the protection of those interests. Realization of public interests by these institutions seems impossible because of their structure. Protection of interests is the responsibility of political parties, which are not identified with civil society.<sup>72</sup>

Different opinions are expressed on the nature of civil society and the conditions for its formation. In this connection, the key

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<sup>70</sup> See: Paine, Th., "The Crisis", <http://www.ushistory.org/paine/crisis/singlehtml.htm>

<sup>71</sup> Offe, C., *Modernity and the State: East, West*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996

factor is interrelation between the state and civil society. Civil society exists and operates in the discrepant unity with the state. In case of a democratic regime, it operates in close cooperation with the state, while in case of authoritarian or totalitarian regimes it is in active or passive opposition to the state. The state is able to limit the civil society, but cannot destroy it. For its part, a civil society may also limit the functions of state, but is not able to substitute it on the present stage of development.

In the modern world, civil society becomes the partner of the state in securing public consensus. Normal operation of civil society requires, on the one hand, its consolidation for the achievement of common goals, and on the other hand, its close cooperation with the state. For the proper development of civil society, it is necessary that the state shall secure the citizens with institutional and legal conditions in order to unite and interact with the state through the system of democratic institutions and thus realize their group interests, as well as the interests of the society in general. In this regard, the civil society could influence the state and encourage people to broaden their circles of association and create a more active, participatory, and responsive democracy.<sup>73</sup> The features of a civil society are strong

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<sup>72</sup> ბროერსი, ნ., “ვარდების რევოლუცია”: სამოქალაქო საზოგადოება და დემოკრატიის სამყაროს სათულობა საქართველოში”. ფონდი “ღია საზოგადოება – საქართველო”, 2005.

<sup>73</sup> Howard M.M., *The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe*, Cambridge University Press, 2003; also see: Howard M., “The Weakness of Postcommunist Society”, *Journal of Democracy*, vol.13, no.1 (2002), pp. 157-69.

organizational capacity, autonomy from the state, adherence to civic values rather than private interests.<sup>74</sup>

In principle, civil society may not be considered as a political entity; however, it has to be involved in politics to an extent impelled by the existing reality. Theory of civil law emphasizes that liberal social movements must strive to obtain influence in the area beyond the political power. Nevertheless, if the primary goal is to achieve democratic freedoms, then the potential of democratic society may be considered in close connection with the government. It is noteworthy to mention that since the 80s various political unions, organizations and movements have started to appear within civil society. During the democratic transition, civil institutions obtain a political slant and acquire the function of an influential inter-state opposition force.

In the late 80s and early 90s of XXth century studying of civil society in the context of democratic changes became an issue of particular importance; scholars and practitioners debated over the influence of civil society on the political processes especially within a state in democratic transition (Robert Putnam, Samuel Huntington). Civil society achieves prosperity only under democracy, while the latter is developed on the solid basis of civil society. If the civil society is well developed, it creates a better ground for establishing the democratic forms of state. On

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<sup>74</sup> See: Howard M., *The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe*, Cambridge University Press, 2003.

the contrary, if it is under-developed, this nourishes the creation of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes.

According to democratic theory, the operation and development of civil society is regarded as the cornerstone of democratic processes. (The civil society alluded to includes the concept of civil culture) It assumes that political culture, including individualism and willingness to participate in the public life, is a necessary condition for establishing democratic regime in the country. For example, Aristotle already spoke about the state of mind that could have an effect on the stability or changes in a society. A. de Tocqueville emphasized the importance of political values and spirits. Max Weber also attached special importance to values, but emphasized religion in the formation and operation of political structures.

In the 60s of the XX century an American political scientists G. Almond and S.Verba raised a concept of political culture. Analyzing different types of political cultures, they concluded that the democratic political system corresponds to the civil political culture.<sup>75</sup> This type of culture implies a mix of patriarchal, national and activist fragments of political culture, as well as the national and patriarchal features among active members of the society. Almond and Verba emphasized that patriarchal and national orientation balanced the activity and political participation of individuals, and therefore provides the

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<sup>75</sup> Almond, G., S.Verba, *The Civic Culture and the Stability of Democracy*. Journal *Polis*, Moscow, 1992 № 4

stability of democratic political system.<sup>76</sup> At the same time, people should try to have an influence on the government while performing loyalty and be potentially active while not expressing permanent activity.

The main characteristics of civil political culture are: consensus on the legitimacy of political institutions, tolerance towards other values and interests, and competency. These are the features of a perfect civil culture, and many political scientists admit that it is the civil culture that makes a solid basis of the democratic regime. Civil culture is a culture of pluralism, based on the culture of consensus and variety, a culture grounded on democratic principles that aims at establishing and consolidating democratic values and welcoming changes with maintenance of the balance.<sup>77</sup>

In many works of liberal authors, it is noted that stability of democracy depends greatly on the strength of civil society. Civil society organizations “instill in their members habits of cooperation and public-spiritedness, as well as the practical skills necessary to partake in public life”.<sup>78</sup> Civil institutions are able to have an effect upon the political processes.<sup>79</sup> In this regard, strength and power of civil society is determined by: 1. The level

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<sup>76</sup> Almond, G., S. Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963, p.8

<sup>77</sup> Almond G. & S. Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*, Princeton, 1963. p.8.

<sup>78</sup> Putnam R., *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000.

of organizational membership; 2. Trust in civil society; 3. The prior regime and current regime type in the country.<sup>80</sup> Therefore, actually such an active participation by civil society may protect from potentially unjust rules law and policies and positively influence the legislation; however, the impact of civil society on the political decision-making remains highly controversial even in well-developed democracies.

At the same time, Almond and Verba showed that interpersonal trust, which is a necessary condition for the formation of secondary associations that are very important for effective political participation in any kind of democratic system, is also a precondition for the establishment of democratic rules of game.<sup>81</sup> For example, it is important to estimate the opposition as loyal, which in case of gaining power, would not persecute its opponents and be able to govern the country within the limits of law.

From another viewpoint, the absence of a strong vibrant civil society poses no obstacle to democracy and democratic stability. This approach states that the weakness of civil society does not necessarily mean that democracy is in danger; it just indicates a qualitatively different relationship between citizens and the state.

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<sup>79</sup> Skocpol, T., Cultural Idioms and Political Ideologies in the Revolutionary Reconstruction of State Power: A rejoinder to Sewell, in: *Journal of Modern History*, vol. 57, no. 1, 1985, pp.86-96.

<sup>80</sup> see Rose R., "Rethinking Civil Society: Post Communism and the Problem of Trust", in *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 5, No.3 (1994), pp. 19-22.

<sup>81</sup> Almond G., & S. Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*, Princeton, 1963

Embracing different views we can conclude that no matter whether civil society is weak or strong, in all cases it will encourage the development of “civic skills” that are important for supporting and consolidating a democratic system.

Historical experience certifies that “transplantation” of democratic models to the countries with non-Western values often ends up with failure: either a direct return to authoritarian regime, or a “gradual” hybridization of the existing regime. Therefore, the formation of civil political culture is one of the main conditions for the successful transition to democracy. It is impossible to copy the Western political culture; the emerged civic political culture in every country is based on, or fed by specific national features, embedded in historical and political experience of the country.

Considering that revolutionary development is not intrinsic in the impact civil society aims to make on a society, there are certain historical, political and economic conditions that make politicization of civil sector a necessity, and that is what happened in Georgia. So Howard’s vision may be the closest to the case of Georgian revolution, in which NGOs and free media as basic components of civil society in Georgia, had a mobilizing and organizing role, together with oppositional political forces. This is our perspective, which we will try to substantiate in the subsequent chapters.



## **Linking theory on Revolutions to theory on Civil Society**

Having discussed some theories of “revolution” and “civil society”, we shall now try to view the interdependencies of these concepts and the role of civil society in the revolutionary processes. In our study we will follow the concept, which defines civil society as the intermediate institutional space between the private (personal) and public (the object of official political institutions and actors).

According to Huntington’s theory, modernization leads to a new political consciousness of groups, which then will mobilize them against the ruling regime. Such a group could be civil society itself. The demand for more participation could rise out of civil society. Otherwise civil society as an institution that is used to negotiate between the ruling regime and non-ruling group could dampen the political conflict and could prevent a revolution.

Tilly’s theory (see above) of civil society perfectly fits in. Contenders or groups of contenders may organize themselves within civil society and may challenge the government. Popular support for such contenders, which is seen by Tilly as very important, could be manifested through the civil society. Examples for his could be the student organizations ‘Otpor’ and ‘Kmara’ in Serbia and Georgia. These were groups of the civil society, which promoted the protest against the existing regime and mobilized people to come out in the streets.

Russell examined the intervening variable of ‘armed forces’ and concluded that revolutionary movements must either gain the support of the armed forces, or these must be incapable to act. Civil society could play a role here, and an example would be an active civil society, which promotes a discourse within the population (including the armed forces) that establishes a social constructed taboo, banning ‘the use of armed forces against the own people’.

Paige wrote about the relation between landlords and peasants and the type of their income that determines the outcome of a revolution. His thesis is that where landlords primarily depend on wealth through commercial commerce, conflicts between the classes are more likely to be solved by labor movements or commodity reforms. In our opinion, the civil society could also play a role in this outcome, if it is able to solve this conflict.

Foran pays special attention to the relation of the organizations and the networks of civil society with the political culture, revealing thus their impact on the creation of pre-revolutionary conditions. Having analyzed various revolutions, one may come to the conclusion that far before the accomplishment of revolutions, many writers and publishers, as well as the other institutions and members of the society promoted and developed revolutionary ideas by means of the available tools (books,

pamphlets, etc).<sup>82</sup> Civil institutions disseminated democratic ideas, implemented “civic consciousness and skills”. This way these people influenced the political discourse and therefore part of the political culture.<sup>83</sup> They lay ground for the ideologies, which later propelled the revolutionary upheaval. They even operated from foreign countries to avoid the state structures and regime’s oppression.

Civil society could also be applicable to Eisenstadt’s theory. Where he describes international economic and military pressure, one could expand this thought with international ideological pressure. For example, inter- and transnational non-government organizations could create a discourse, which evaluates state actions as ‘good’ or ‘bad’. If this ideological pressure becomes social reality for the population of a country and also it’s government, it may limit the state’s opportunity to act in a ‘bad’ way. Secondly, Eisenstadt spoke about the cultural component of the state structures, which must be favorable for a revolution. Also here civil society may play its role to establish and influence the cultural component through discourses and actions.

Civil society can also be fit for Katz’s ‘Waves of revolutions’. If civil society organizes itself in an inter- and transnational way,

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<sup>82</sup> Foran J., Discourses and Social Forces – The Role of Culture and Cultural Studies in Understanding Revolutions, in: Foran, J., (Ed.), *Theorizing Revolutions*. London: Routledge, 1997.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid

this could help to spread the ideology of a revolution. The civil society could be seen as a channel of communication.<sup>84</sup>

The role and function of civil society may differ. Civil society may function as contender of the governing regime, its structures can be used to spread information quickly, or it may help to create a discourse that leads to new consciousness or ideology. Whether the civil society creates, accelerates or dampens a revolution -- depends on its function and its culture. For example, out of the civil society may rise contenders for the governing regime and thus civil society would create the base for a revolution. Or the international community of civil society is closely linked to each other, spreads new ideology quickly and thereby accelerates the international spillover of revolutions. Or civil society may be useful to negotiate between the ruling regime and the potential contenders and thus 'defuse' a revolutionary situation and prepare the state for more slow transformations that will solve the conflict peacefully.

## **Conclusion**

Taking into consideration the overview of literature on revolutions and various interpretations of civil society we conclude that the Rose Revolution may be considered as a revolution. Although it did not bring a radical change of the

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<sup>84</sup> Katz, M., *Revolutions and Revolutionary Waves*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997.

existing political and economic system, nor of values or beliefs, the mass protest along with active participation of broad social groups in these processes made this revolution credible and legitimate. The roots of this revolution are not to be found in social, economic or cultural fields, but in the public's dissatisfaction with the state power structure, which was falling apart and with the poor relationship between this fragmented governmental elite and society. The Rose Revolution aimed at removing this discredited political leadership and restoring the rule of law; it was supported by active participation of some active NGOs and by the wide public.

Civil society with its role to express the interests of different groups of the population and serving as a mediator between the state and public interests in some cases - like in the Georgian Rose Revolution – becomes involved in politics to an extent impelled by the existing reality. We share the opinion according to which civil society institutions – mainly, NGOs and the media – exist as a counterbalance to the government trying to monitor and control government's actions and protect the society from the infringements of the current political regime. Civil society's form and level of participation in political processes is determined by a quest for democratic changes, as well as threats and challenges existing for the democratic choice of the country. In the Georgian Rose Revolution, NGOs and free media played the mobilizing and organizing role together with opposition

political forces, and they also contributed to the peaceful nature of the revolution.

Considering various definitions of revolution and civil society as well as analyzing the different approaches to revolutionary processes and the role of civil society in political developments we chose the framework offered by Goldstone which best explains the phenomenon of the Georgian Rose Revolution. This social political act was characterized by the following features: *Action aimed at dismissing the regime, pushed forward by an alternative view of Justice and Law enforcement; Significant rate of both formal and informal mass mobilization; Provoking attempts for changes through non-institutional ways, such as mass rallies, protest manifestations, strikes, and even violence.*<sup>85</sup>

This definition includes a role for civil society in terms of NGOs and mass media. Civil society groups in this case were trying to protect the interests of citizens against the State and to serve as a mediator (link) between the State and the citizen.

In the next chapters we will highlight both the role of particular NGOs in the onset towards and during the revolution as well as the role of some particular newspapers and TV stations.

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<sup>85</sup> Goldstone, J., Towards a Fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory, in: *Annual Review of Political Science* Vol. 4: 139-187 June 2001.

## **Chapter Three. Non-governmental Organizations in Georgia before and during the Rose Revolution**

### **The Development of Civil Society**

Let us consider, from our point of view, the most interesting institution – the civil sector. Civil society in Georgia started to develop in the early 90s in the form of non-governmental organizations, newspapers and TV. It has emerged in the context

of post-Soviet transition towards democracy. Democratic changes in Georgia took place in the context of a state lacking democratic traditions and institutions.<sup>86</sup> In fact, civil society in the contemporary meaning of this term has started its development from scrap. Democratic institutions were initiated in both ways: “top down” and “bottom-up” and this process expanded in a horizontal direction as well. This development was characterized by a strong influence from external actors. Western organizations as part of global regimes<sup>87</sup> have provided active organizational and financial support to the activity of stimulating democratic principles. The enhancement of civil society was considered as one of the key elements in this process. Social groups obtained new resources, and a good demonstration of that became the establishment of non-governmental organizations. Their manifested function meant a support of and adherence to liberal democratic values that implied human rights protection, peaceful resolution of existing conflicts, civic education, etc.

The first NGOs were established in Georgia in 1992-93. The foundations – “Open Society- Georgia”, “Eurasia” and “Horizonti” played a major role in the development of this sector, as described by G. Nodia and F.J. Companjen.<sup>88</sup>

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<sup>86</sup> Rondeli, A., Georgia: Foreign Policy and National Security Priorities, *Discussion Paper Series 3*, Tbilisi, 1999.

<sup>87</sup> According to Held (1995:108), regimes can be understood as a junction of power imbued by Western values with a strong preference for democracy and free market ideology as steering principles. *Democracy and the Global Order*. Stanford.

<sup>88</sup> Nodia G., ‘Civil Society Development in Georgia: Achievements and Challenges’. Tbilisi, CIPPD, 2005, (in Georgian) and Companjen, F.J., *Between Tradition and*



Obviously this process, as the researchers indicate<sup>89</sup>, developed differently than once upon a time in Western Europe and North America, i.e. not from the “bottom”, but rather from the “top”. In a transition period civil society is assumed to pass the following stages: “defense”, “formation”, “mobilization”, and “institutionalization”.<sup>90</sup> In our view, this order was broken in Georgia: civil society has started its development from “institutionalization”, then turned to “defense”, followed by “mobilization”; however, all these stages were at work against the background of “formation”.

### **The Phase of Institutionalization**

Fact is, that after the fall of the Berlin wall and the beginning of the discourse of a New World Order, the development of the non-governmental sector in the former communist bloc countries, including Georgia, became one of the key priorities for western donors.<sup>91</sup> According to economic terminology, there appeared supply, followed by demand. A couple of years later, after 1993, the number of NGOs reached a several thousand.<sup>92</sup> The majority of them however, had just registered and never

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*Modernity. Rethinking roles of NGO leaders in Georgia's transition to Democracy.* 2004. VU Amsterdam.

<sup>89</sup> Companjen, F.J. *Between Tradition and Modernity. Rethinking roles of NGO leaders in Georgia's transition to democracy.* Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, 2004.

<sup>90</sup> Weigle M. A. and J. Butterfield, Civil Society in Reforming Communist Regimes: The Logic of Emergence, in: *Comparative Politics*. 1992, Vol. 25. No 1.

<sup>91</sup> See also G. Soros, *Soros on Soros Staying Ahead of the Curve.* John Wiley, 1995.

showed any activity. This was due to various reasons: some organizations could not meet the donors' requirements, some did not have any experience in fund raising, and some were established "just in case", simply to follow suit.

A great number of organizations of different profiles emerged by their side, where there was a concentration of fairly qualified contingent, mainly scientists, technicians, and creative people. For such organizations the obtained grants were the source of living; they obtained grants more or less regularly, performed their duties more or less honestly, thus ensuring relative economic stability for themselves. Along with this, it is noteworthy, that such NGOs had and they still have a certain impact on the Georgian public through training, publications, and introduction of a new language. Certainly there are cases, when the above type of organizations experienced certain headway, perhaps under the influence of dissonance reduction effect<sup>93</sup> and found themselves in the vanguard of the civil sector. That is why such organizations were called "grant-eaters";<sup>94</sup> in our opinion, the term was born among those people working at the Academy of Science and universities, who had to put up with the modest funding the state would provide.

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<sup>92</sup> According to G. Nodia, the number of registered organizations could well be up to 8.000; In 2006 about 5.000 were registered, with some 10-15 percent functioning. Companjen 2004 also gives figures regarding numbers of registered NGOs.

<sup>93</sup> Festinger, L., *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance*. Stanford University Press, 1957.

<sup>94</sup> Companjen, F.J., *Between Tradition and Modernity. Rethinking roles of NGO leaders in Georgia's transition to democracy*. Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, 2004.

The core of the civil society in Georgia was a small number of energetic NGOs, who shared democratic principles performing within their possibilities. It is the representatives of these organizations, who represented the NGO sector in the media, as independent experts, and these organizations were most frequently quoted in sociological surveys<sup>95</sup>.

G. Nodia distinguishes eight criteria of the institutional development of NGOs, which are summarized in Table 3:

*Activities and experience (number of accomplished projects, the area of activities, the variety of activities);*

*External relationships (cooperation within the sector, with government, media);*

*Structure (differentiation of units, distinction of functions);*

*Procedures (action planning and evaluation, documenting);*

*Mission and strategy;*

*Material-technical basis;*

*Finances (budget, continuation, diversification);*

*Human resources (the staff size, qualifications).*

According to these criteria, NGOs of Georgia can be placed on four levels. First come the most developed organizations, the number of which, according to the author's assessment, amounts to 40 to 50.<sup>96</sup>

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<sup>95</sup> Nodia G., 'Civil Society Development in Georgia: Achievements and Challenges'. Tbilisi, CIPPD, 2005, (in Georgian)

<sup>96</sup> Ibid. p.43.

The spectrum of NGOs in Georgia is not limited to the above. The so-called GONGOs (Government-organized non-governmental organizations) are also worth noting. As can

Table 3: Institutional Development of NGOs

<b>Criteria</b>	<b>level 1</b>	<b>level 2</b>	<b>level 3</b>	<b>level 4</b>
<i>Activities and experience (number of accomplished projects, the area of activities, the variety of activities)</i>	Large various experience, including several projects with more than \$100.000 budget; broad geographic coverage	3 projects a year on average; single town or region coverage	Small projects with about \$5.000 each; narrow coverage; no regular links with target groups	None or very poor
<i>External relationships (cooperation within the sector, with government, media)</i>	Regular exchange of information; website, periodicals; PR unit, cooperation with government, media; joint projects with other NGOs; networking	Cooperation with other NGOs, joint projects; not regular cooperation with government and media; information spread out not in a quite consistent manner	Sporadic relations with government structures and media; information spread spontaneously, mainly through leaflets	None or very poor
<i>Structure (differentiation of units, distinction of functions)</i>	Board is a decision maker; decision making procedures are strict & precise; board's & executive unit's	Decision making functions divided partly; interim executive unit (program managers)	Board mainly shares executive functions; decisions made by director personally	None or very poor

	functions divided			
<i>Procedures (action planning and evaluation, documenting)</i>	Short and long term strategic planning; internal & external evaluation; monitoring	Long term aim; evaluation is limited with project reports and internal reports	Long term plan exists only as a list of spheres or directions	None or very poor
<i>Mission and strategy</i>	Mission clearly defined; activities determined through strategic planning	Aim exists, though not formulated as mission statement, but reflected in various documents	Single activities planned; no strategic perspective; evaluation based on general judgments	None or very poor
<i>Material-technical basis</i>	Good technical and communication resources (OFFICE)	Satisfactory equipment & communication; sometimes lack of work space (but in formal environment)	No office rent; located in staff member's apartment or sheltered by stronger organization; poor equipment	None or very poor
<i>Finances (budget, continuation, diversification)</i>	About \$100-500.000 annual budget; continuous financing	Small gaps between projects; about \$50-70.000 annual budget. General budget not planned	Gaps up to 1 year; up to \$10.000 budget; 1-2 local donors	None or very poor
<i>Human resources (the staff size, qualification)</i>	7-35 permanent staff; recruiting through open vacancies; selection criteria for recruiting	3-7 permanent staff; selection criteria not clearly determined	Staff and salaries based on financing. No practice of vacancy announcement.	None or very poor

be seen from the title, such organizations are established on government's order and support, and their aim is to create the impression among the public, that non-governmental sector, as an attribute to democratic state, supports the government (it is clear that there is a big distinction between manifest and latent functions in these types of organizations). As a rule, "Gongos" are set up before elections or under the period of crises. For example, in 1999, a pompous "NGO Forum" was held in which 96 organizations took part who declared a full support to Shevardnadze and his party, "Citizens' Union". The event got a wide coverage in the media that was entirely controlled by the government. After the elections, almost all the participants of the forum disappeared from the "field of vision", though. After the "Rose Revolution", Aslan Abashidze, Ajara leader, who distinctly confronted the new regime, hastily established the whole array of NGOs.

In this case, we are interested in one characteristic feature of the NGOs in Georgia. Either on donors' request or under the influence of some other factors (it is not that important) one of the main principles of NGOs was to delimit themselves from any particular political power. This does not mean that NGOs do not participate in political life. Under the initiative of NGOs, many conferences and seminars have been held regularly on urgent political issues, the ways of development of Georgia, etc. Representatives of both, government and opposition parties took

part in these events. They wrote draft laws, filed analytical reports, drafted independent expertise conclusions and recommendations; NGOs were involved in many governmental projects; political parties constituted individual target groups of educational projects (for example, the International Center for Conflict Resolution and Negotiations held a series of training for the youth organizations of major political parties, including the ruling party); the coalition of NGOs named the “politician of the year” twice (M. Saakashvili and Z. Zhvania, respectively). Despite the above, the NGOs being non-partisan organizations was a norm, and those organizations that were obviously or discreetly connected with this or that party, were considered the violators of the “rules of game” and did not enjoy any respect.

### **The Phase of Defence (e.g. of electoral rights): A Change in orientation after 2001**

The situation started to change from 2001, when parliamentary and presidential elections appeared on the horizon. It became clear by that time that the existing governmental structure had started its decay. Democratic principles were erased, corruption penetrated every governmental structure; the state structures were broken and governmental staff was demoralized. In fact, Georgian leadership has lost any support by the population. According to G. Tevzadze, there was a “power simulation”.<sup>97</sup> In such a political situation in NGOs, adhering to democratic

course, as well as in the entire civil society, the assumption was born that Shevardnadze's team would spare no effort to remain in power and as for the presidential post, an odious sort of person from the team would replace him. A series of discussions was held where the idea of NGOs "politicization" was presented, on the issue to eliminate the discredited course of the existing government so that the country could take a genuine democratic course.

At the same time, the opinion about the methods of political struggle split up. The opponents of the government (who by the way behaved rather correctly towards each other) became the ones to take leading positions in the non-governmental sector of Georgia: Civil society think tanks such as Ghia Nodia's (Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development), Levan Berdzenishvili (Civic Development International Center), supported by the Liberty Institute. G. Nodia advocated constitutional methods of struggle, while L. Berdzenishvili did not exclude non-constitutional, though peaceful methods, such as in fact – a "velvet" revolution.

L. Berdzenishvili: (MP, Republican Party, NGO CDIC)

... The revolutionary course had been outlined, which was basically carried out by the youth wing of the NGO sector. By the way, I myself had almost similar thoughts, as I could not see any "decent" way for Shevardnadze's

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<sup>97</sup> Tevzadze G. , *Georgia: Return of the Power*, Tbilisi, 2003.



resignation. But the revolutionary line did not imply what had happened – breaking into the Parliament building and such. This had never been discussed. It had always been implied that some pushing was needed, in other words, defending electoral rights. While the other party claimed we should avoid revolution by all means.

Of course this statement raised the question from our side what he meant by non-constitutional or revolutionary methods, because after all, the defense of electoral rights is absolutely constitutional. Berdzenishvili answered as follows:

By revolutionary way I mean that if we would not be able to defend our votes, then we would take to the street ... in any country, except Venezuela perhaps, if the public opinion is being persistently expressed for a long period of time in a central place, it is quite clear that the government is going to collapse. (...) The policy had also been changed by one of the major donors of democratic orientation of the NGO sector, “Open Society – Georgia foundation. A new leadership came: Mr. Kakha Lomaia first headed the coalition “Democratic Initiative” established on the basis of the Foundation, in which seven leading NGOs were united, and by the end of 2002, Lomaia was appointed the executive director of the Foundation. On the initiative of the foundation, a group had been created and funded, who later developed a well-known document called “The Ten Steps”.

Opinions differ on these initiatives and the changes in the policy of the foundation. The position, according to which Mr. Lomaia was just the provider of George Soros’ directions, has more supporters. But there is an opposite opinion too. For example, our respondent, Ms Irina Tsintsadze (and not only she), the

former director of a non-governmental organization “Alternative”, considers that the policy of the foundation has been changed at Mr. Lomaia’s personal initiative, and that he persuaded George Soros of the appropriateness of a new strategy.

In Levan Berdzenishvili’s opinion (in an interview), the American foundation NED (National Endowment for Democracy) played a certain role in changing the general atmosphere by having financed several “political” projects (such as the Political School, the Political Club).

Thus, among the leading non-governmental organizations with democratic orientation, the idea that civil sector should use its potential to bring pro-western orientated reformist forces took off after the 2001-elections. The stake was made on two political unions: the “National Movement” headed by M. Saakashvili and the “New Democrats”, with Z. Zhvania as a leader, later joined by N. Burjanadze. The leaders mentioned above who were often referred to as the “Young Reformers” left the ruling party (“Citizens’ Union”) with much ado in 2001 and resolutely confronted it. The common spirit of their criticism towards the government, as well as their propositions was indeed based on democratic, pro-western, reformatory principles. Therefore, their alliance with the leading NGOs and independent media was quite natural.

In many states of democratic transition the political elites quite often seek the support of civil society). We may say that the alliance between the “Young Reformers” and civil society was successful in the Georgian case as ‘proved’ by the results of the political process in November 2003. While being the members of Shevardnadze’s team and, therefore in power, the “Young Reformers” had started to construct their own power scheme: they needed the liberal-democratic support of civil society institutions and mass media that was afterwards followed by the involvement of the business sector. Georgian society demonstrated its power in fall 2002 while organizing protest rallies for supporting the Rustavi-2 Broadcasting Company in response to the government’s attempt to take control over it. These actions were ended with the deliberate resignation of Z. Zhvania and the withdrawal of M. Saakashvili from the ruling party. In retrospect it almost looks like a “rehearsal” for the Rose Revolution with participation of the same major actors: the “Young Reformers”, the media supporting the opposition, particular NGOs and the masses. The events of 2002 demonstrated that civil society in Georgia gradually went beyond its traditional function.<sup>98</sup>

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<sup>98</sup> O’Donnel G., & P.C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Transitions*. Baltimore: John Hopkins UP, 1986, p. 48

## **The Phase of Mobilisation: The Monitoring of the Elections**

After a whole series of seminars and consulting meetings, the main trends of the pre-election period of the non-governmental sector were set, namely to prepare for the monitoring of every component of the elections, and to activate youth, students primarily in the struggle for democratization: the so-called Ten Steps program.

Concrete activities of concrete non-governmental organizations are described in the following text, which have seriously influenced the revolutionary events. The election fraud was anticipated from the start as one of the major threats. Practically nobody believed, that the government would hold the elections in a decent and fair way. The ISFED survey carried out several months before the elections contained the item: ‘When election results are published, whose data would you trust more - that of the Central Electorate Commission, of the exit poll coalition or of the “Fair Elections” committee?’ The results were 4%, 40%, and 40% respectively.

For the monitoring of elections, two methodologies had been devised: exit polls and parallel vote tabulation.

***The Exit poll.*** As Mr. Levan Tarkhnishvili, the curator of exit poll project and the director of the Caucasian Research Resource Center said, at organizational meetings in the summer of 2003, in order to ensure an objective and unbiased approach, they attempted to have a wide spectrum of implementators and donors. Also, a foreign expert was invited. In the long run, the implementation of the project was under the responsibility of the coalition, which included the following organizations: the Caucasian Research Resource Center, IPM (Institute for Polling and Marketing), BCG (Business Consulting Group). The project was funded by the Eurasia Foundation, “Open Society - Georgia” foundation, Swiss Development Fund, British Council and TV-company Rustavi-2. Mr. Scott Elber was an invited expert (Strategic Research Group).

Exit poll results were approximately the same as those of parallel vote tabulation (see below), i.e. significantly different from the preliminarily and finally published by the central election commission. It is true, that compared to the parallel vote tabulation results, exit poll results were less reliable due to the high indicator (about 20%) of no responses. It is noteworthy, that no responses were a frequent case in Ajara and the Kvemo Kartli regions, where “regional” authoritarianism, and consequently the pressure over the electorate was the strongest.

Despite the above, the publication of exit poll data found a broad response. The results, together with the results by central election commission, were permanently broadcasted on TV-company Rustavi-2 via scrolling text line that might have had a stronger effect than the published parallel vote tabulation results.

***The Parallel Vote Tabulation.*** The starting date of the Rose Revolution must be considered November 3, 2003, when the “preliminary statement on Parliamentary elections of November 2, 2003”, was published by an NGO – The International Democratic Society and Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED), followed by mass protest actions.

The statement mentioned that the government and the electoral administrations were not able to ensure the proper administration of elections. Among the most serious violations mentioned, were the imprecise voter lists, pressure on observers, manipulations with bulletins and minutes and other procedural infringements. All the above was qualified as a deliberate violation of the law and offense.

But the major reason, for which the statement of “Fair Elections” had become the main document for the disclosure of Shevardnadze’s government, was the final result of the parallel vote tabulation. For the first time in Georgia, “Fair Elections” conducted a parallel vote tabulation of election results and of the activity of the electorate. This was performed on the basis of

expert methodology developed by The National Democratic Institute (NDI) that had been tested in many countries before. The discrepancy between the parallel vote tabulation of the Parliamentary election results of November 2, on expert evaluation, compared to the real outcome, was no more than 1-2%. The considerable difference in figures given in the statement and in officially published preliminary and final results became a major tool in the hands of opposition and a detonator for public discontent to trigger further events.

Below we give the official data of Parliamentary elections and the results of parallel vote tabulation conducted by “Fair Elections” (only for those parties and blocs, who passed a 7% barrier):

Table 4: Parallel Vote Tabulation 2003

	<i>official data</i>	<i>parallel tabulation</i>	<i>vote</i>
<i>'Saakashvili-National Movement'</i>	<i>18.08</i>	<i>26.26</i>	
<i>Governmental block 'For New Georgia'</i>	<i>21.32</i>	<i>18.92</i>	
<i>'Labor Party'</i>	<i>12.04</i>	<i>17.36</i>	
<i>'Burjanadze- Democrats'</i>	<i>8.79</i>	<i>10.15</i>	
<i>'Union of Democratic Revival'</i>	<i>18.84</i>	<i>8.13</i>	
<i>'New Rights'</i>	<i>7.35</i>	<i>7.99</i>	

(The data are given according to the official site of the Central Electoral Commission: [www.archive.cec.gov.ge/2003/](http://www.archive.cec.gov.ge/2003/))

Below are the results of the Parliamentary elections of March 28, 2004, in order to compare data from official and “Fair Elections” count:

Table 5: Parliamentary Elections March 28 2004

	<i>official data</i>	<i>parallel tabulation</i>	<i>vote</i>
<i>'National Movement – Democrats'</i>	<i>67.32</i>	<i>67.78</i>	
<i>Block 'Right opposition – 'entrepreneurs', 'New Rightists'</i>	<i>7.51</i>	<i>7.75</i>	
<i>'Union of Democratic Revival'</i>	<i>6.03</i>	<i>6.60</i>	
<i>'Labor Party of Georgia'</i>	<i>5.97</i>	<i>6.14</i>	

T. Zhvania (editor). Report for monitoring the parliamentary elections of March 28, 2004. Tbilisi, ISFED, 2004, pp. 50-51.

## **The International Society of Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED).**

The organization was established in 1995, to support the development of democratic processes in Georgia.<sup>99</sup> Initially one of the major goals and priorities of the organization was to

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<sup>99</sup> Companjen, F.J., (2004) devoted a chapter to this NGO with detailed descriptions of its activities and meetings.



conduct an unbiased monitoring over the elections, parallel to which, legal recommendations, civil education, electoral rights' protection, etc. were to be provided. Later on, the sphere of activities became broader (monitoring of government transparency, mobilization of the citizens, advocacy of civil interests), although election monitoring remained the key priority. The organization has conducted the monitoring of all elections since 1995 on a large-scale. For years, the organization has been providing the Georgian public, media and the international entities of corresponding profile with conclusions, obtained as a result of monitoring, indicating a great number of violations, and a qualitative evaluation of elections administration. But only for the elections of 2003 the organization seemed to have the tested methodology, by means of which it became possible to make quantitative and qualitative assessment, and to produce a documented statement about the scale of forgery of elections.

The organization has a network of volunteers, covering the whole of Georgia and it counts about 3000 people in its ranks. The volunteers are given qualified training; they are involved in different activities for the support of democracy. USAID, OSCE, NED, UNDP, different embassies, and funds, etc. provide the main financial support.

Among the activities of “Fair Elections” should be noted the participation in the elaboration of electoral legislation and recommendations on different issues presented to the Parliament. It was through the lobbying of “Fair Elections” that the independent observers’ rights in the electoral code had been expanded, that made it possible to make observation neutral and to conduct comprehensive parallel vote tabulation.

In the pre-revolution period, the monitoring over the accessibility of the public information and the campaign carried out by the organization against corruption in passport offices was also significant and successful. In order to get their IDs the citizens had to pay 15- 20 GEL (instead of an official fee of 2.5 GEL). The organization carried out a large-scale monitoring over the above procedure and as a result, the situation has improved considerably.

As the current executive director of “Fair Elections”, Ms Tamar Zhvania mentioned in the interview, the organization is still going on with its activities in the field of electoral rights. As well as that, it is aiming to increase the accountability of the government and activate the public. According to T. Zhvania, through the efforts of the organization, the country has developed a sustainable independent system of observation, which will greatly hamper the faking of the elections and the fraud hiding, whoever attempts to do it.

## Ten Steps

The idea of “Ten Steps” originated at the initiative of the Open Society – Georgia foundation at the meeting of non-governmental organizations (summer of 2003). According to the proposal, the non-governmental sector should have worked out and published a list of vital problems in Georgia that the government could not cope with. Along with this, an issue was raised that the sector should offer cooperation and support to those political forces that would recognize the problems as guideline principles.

As a result of opinion exchange and mutual agreement, ten items were developed, that covered a wide spectrum of problems existing in the country. The document called “Kmara! or Ten Steps to Freedom”, was published in the press. Below is the text from the document.

### ***Kmara! or Ten Steps to Freedom***<sup>100</sup>

*Today, when Georgian Government has drastically deviated from the way to freedom and is trying to maintain the power through authoritarian methods, we, the representatives of the civil society of Georgia, offer cooperation with those political*

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<sup>100</sup> [civil.ge/eng/article\\_ngo](http://civil.ge/eng/article_ngo)

*forces, who will appreciate the ten principles listed below and will fight for the implementation of those in order to protect the dignity and freedom of its citizens in the elected Parliament on November 2.*

- 1. Reform the Soviet system of state management and restrict appointing the Soviet security personnel, communist party nomenclature (members of the central committee, department heads, secretaries of regional and city councils, heads of parties) representatives on top positions.*
- 2. Adopt the law on the return of unjustified property and income from government authorities.*
- 3. Strengthen the guarantees of inviolability of private property; improve business environment; cancel the laws restricting free entrepreneurship; protect entrepreneurs against illicit pressure of legal and controlling bodies; adopt liberal tax code; ensure stability of legislative and fiscal policy.*
- 4. Develop and carry out the common state policy for the restoration of territorial integrity of Georgia.*
- 5. Appoint Tbilisi and Poti Mayors by elections; ratify European self-government Charter; delegate the local self-government property and adjudicate financial autonomy; adopt the constitutional law on administrative-territorial arrangement.*

6. *Withdraw Russian military bases from the territory of Georgia before 2007; develop strategic plan for the purpose of joining European Union and NATO and its implementation; abolish the conscript system in the armed forces and development of a professional army.*
7. *Introduce the jury; decentralize legislative bodies; appoint local police heads and public prosecutors by election; base a new criminal code on the principle of human rights protection, competitiveness and equality of parties.*
8. *Cover any pension or salary arrears before 2006 in full; equal the minimum salary in the state sector with the consumer basket, direct healthcare programs towards socially vulnerable citizens and make it a priority;*
9. *Make educational institutions financially and administratively independent, appoint supervisory councils and headmasters by election; adopt scholarship system to fund education; increase educational expenses, at least twice; enroll students in universities or higher educational institutions on the basis of common standard state exams.*
10. *Adopt the law on freedom of speech and press; reform the state television and radio to make it a public broadcast.*

The document was signed by the following organizations: The Georgian Young Lawyers Association; The Association of

Young Economists of Georgia; The Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development; The Civic development center “Alternative”; The Open Society- Georgia Foundation; The International Center of Civic Culture; The UN Association of Georgia; The Liberty Institute; The Academy of Legal Development; The Project “Legal Culture”; The Transparency International; The NATO Association; The Institute of Civic Development; The Strategic Research and Development Center of Georgia.

Soon two political entities – The New Democrats (lead by Z. Zhvania) and The National Movement (headed by M. Saakashvili) joined them and declared publicly, that they accepted the document as a kind of guidebook.

The Publishing of “Ten Steps” had a wide resonance in the public. Heads of the organizations and political leaders who signed the document regularly appeared in the press and more importantly, on TV, giving a detailed interpretation of the vital importance of each step, showing (often in disputes with government representatives) that Shevardnadze’s regime had no ability to cope with the most significant problems the country was facing.

From the beginning of 2003, in the streets of Tbilisi and other Georgian towns were filled with the “Kmara!” (*Enough!*)

graffito. The organizers of the action never revealed themselves for a certain period. There were many gossips about who was standing behind all this. However, everything cleared up. TV-company Rustavi-2 presented the viewers a youth organization “Kmara”, whose leaders claimed that they were fighting for holding democratic elections in Georgia. They asked civil society for support in the struggle against the corrupted government. “Kmara” protest marches went on and became more diverse. Posters appeared. Proclamations and several rallies were held to denounce particular corrupted government officials. The opposition media gave a broad coverage of these activities. Below we quote the publications from only two newspapers:

Yesterday “Kmara” was very “busy” (*24 Saati*, 13.06.03)

“Kmara” sues the Minister of Internal Affairs (*24 Saati*, 15.06.03)

“Kmara” activists are being watched by security officials (*24 Saati*, 26.06.03)

The government starts beating people up (*24 Saati*, 7.08.03)

Stones thrown at “Kmara” activists (*24 Saati*, 24.10.03)

“Kmara” holds a large protest rally in Vake (*24 Saati*, 01.11.03)

“Kmara” held a protest march in Tbilisi streets (*Akhali Taoba*, 05.11.03)

“Kmara” ads are banned (*Akhali Taoba*, 11.11.03)

“Kmara” activists are called for military service (*Akhali Taoba*, 12.11.03)

“Kmara” got 2 million dollars from Soros Foundation (*Akhali Taoba*, 14.11.03)

Zugdidi legal authorities get familiar with “Kmara” proclamations (*24 Saati*, 17.11.03)

Flowers from “Kmara” (*24 Saati*, 18.11.03)

“Kmara” members presented flowers to the police (*Akhali Taoba*, 19.11.03)

The government tried to take counter-actions. Media broadcasted features showing “disreputable” facts (in which “Kmara” was accused of being funded by foreign countries); Several times “Kmara ” actions were violently suppressed by the police. But the goal could not be achieved. “Kmara’s” boisterous campaign and actions attracted more attention than the thoughtless conduct of the government.

“Kmara” became particularly active after the elections of November 4. Proclamations, posters, disseminated under the name of the organization were striking; “Kmara” leaders were making daily appearance on “Rustavi -2”, and later, on the other channels. That is why it is not surprising that “Kmara” was the most quoted in our sociological polls as an organization having made a “certain contribution to the Rose Revolution”.

In the words of A. Lomaia (the executive director of “Open



Society - Georgia Foundation” in 2003, from 2004 the Minister of Education and Science):

Kmara certainly was a project. Once a journalist asked me, what is “Kmara”? I answered that it was an enzyme, which is added to milk to make yogurt. It was a non-political movement and has remained so. It was the movement that introduced some new standards of protest, let’s say, some various sorts of theatrical performances. It was very important that they said “Kmara!”- Enough! Why enough? Because our country has no future under the existing regime with this level of corruption. Whatever others put in the language of politology and science, “Kmara” translated it into understandable and popular words.

The leaders of Kmara whom we interviewed agree with this view. L. Chkhartishvili for example also stresses the **catalyst function** of the organization. Public opinion was presented by non-governmental organizations and of course, “Kmara” was the one who had a function of catalyst; i.e. it had to accelerate processes by once again showing to the public the real face of the government. Its function was to stop Shevardnadze’s regime from distracting public attention with big lies and small ploys, and it performed the role more or less successfully whereas T. Tutberidze points to the creativity and the originality of their actions, a principle learned from the Serbian “Otpor” organization.

We had consultations, met different people, and were learning from them things we did not know. For example, “Kmara”

movement learned a lot from “Otpor” members, although I consider that “Kmara” was much more efficient. The main principle we adopted from them was, that every act or activity had to be different from the activities of any other political parties. Often the action held by five people of “Kmara” was more efficient than crowded rallies held by some political parties.

Kmara’s establishment and functioning were supported by two non-governmental organizations: The Liberty Institute and “Alpe”, although other NGOs were actively cooperating with Kmara as well. The Liberty Institute held a training session for young activists.

80 members of Human Rights Youth Network were trained in the summer camp organized by The Liberty Institute, with the financial support of International Foundation NED (National Endowment for Democracy). 80 members of Human Rights Youth Network were trained in the summer camp in Bakuriani, organized by Liberty Institute. Young people selected from different regions of Georgia spent a two-week holiday at one of the best resorts of the country, taking part in the activities devised by the camp leaders. The aim of the camp was to develop contacts between activists and deepen the knowledge in the sphere of civic activism.

The program that was led by 5 trainers, covered daily training sessions, seminars and practical assignments on the following issues: History of human rights and its essence; history of non-violence campaigns and methodology; strategic planning of public campaigns; attracting activists for various campaigns; strategies and the importance of public relations; managing media campaigns; project drafting and fund raising<sup>101</sup>.

**Alpe** is an independent non-governmental organization, which pursues professional communication activities; its goal is to strengthen civil society in Georgia. Social advertising, media campaigns, and regular publishing activities, educational programs, and training – are major instruments for communication strategy of the organization. In the fall of 2003, under the auspices of the Open Society - Georgia Foundation, Alpe carried out the program supporting democratic elections – “Let’s Get to Business”.<sup>102</sup> Kmara was an active participant of the program.

There were many rumors spread in the public about financing “Kmara”. It was said that George Soros personally allocated several million dollars to the organization for “making the revolution”. Several experts interviewed by us also mentioned the above, but the then leaders of the Open Society- Georgia Foundation **A. Lomaia and M. Chachkhunashvili** (the chair of

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<sup>101</sup> [www.liberty.ge](http://www.liberty.ge)

the executive council of Open Society- Georgia until 2004) deny this idea and stress the small amount of money involved per definition for printing some posters and flying in two “boys”.

...As for funding, only a few thousand posters were printed and just a few flags were fluttered. “Kmara” participated in several projects and got funding from them. They never got funded regularly. What kind of funding was needed for making several posters and flags? Or what costly meetings they held – just two boys, the former “Otpor” activists arrived from Serbia twice and that was all. (A. Lomaia)

The funds for the support of the elections were allocated from the budget in the year of elections, which made up less than half a million and even that had not been spent fully. The money was intended for exit polls, for campaigns that people went to the elections, etc. Within the framework of the foundation project, some activities were supported but it was not “Kmara” in particular. Kmara has never got any direct support (. . .), it has never applied for it. The foundation money could not reach “Kmara” directly. The only money that they might have received could have been from a non-governmental organization that had received the grant from our foundation. This organization might have used “Kmara” in the process of implementation. (M. Chachkhunashvili)

That “Kmara” had been financed is still open to doubts among the public. What is more, in L. Berdzenishvili’s opinion (MP, Republican Party, NGO CDIC) it was a clear sign that the existing funds in Georgia “turned” to politics.

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<sup>102</sup> www.alpe.ge

The Soros Foundation definitely showed confrontation when it started to fund such organizations as “Kmara”. The foundations tended to act in such a way that the organizations could be able to get involved in politics. My organization (International Center for Civil Development) too, received several grants for political clubs. Before, it was hard to imagine getting such type of funding. Even some serious, rich funds were involved in the activities. (L. Berdzenishvili)

According to our estimation, “Kmara” played quite an important role in Rose Revolution. Extraordinary forms of protest, scale and frequency of their activities made a great contribution to stirring up the protest spirit in the society and persuaded them that Shevardnadze’s government was unable to rule the country. It was also much to the credit of “Kmara” that the government was “delegitimized“ in the public awareness.

### **The Liberty Institute (LI)**

This NGO was established in 1996.<sup>103</sup> The immediate reason of its foundation was the well-known events related to the Rustavi-2, an independent TV station. About a month before, the Ministry of Communications had suspended the company’s broadcast license. This move of the official authorities was regarded as a blatant violation of freedom of speech and a threat to the independent media. At that time, the non-governmental sector in Georgia was in an almost embryonic stage of development as only a few civil rights organizations were active.

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<sup>103</sup> See Companjen, F.J. (2004) for more details on motives of establishment and on their activities.

In this situation the idea of establishing an NGO that would primarily focus on the defense of civil rights, particularly freedom of speech came into existence. While defense of human rights remained to be a top priority for the institute, time by time, it has extended its focus to various fields.<sup>104</sup> One of these fields was the freedom of belief.

The first protest to denounce religious violence was carried out by the Institute on October 19, 1999. The Liberty Institute protested against religious extremism expressed by certain (ex-communicated) priests of the Georgian Orthodox Church. Through all kinds of action and TV appearances The Liberty Institute encouraged public discussion, introducing new, modern language and concepts in these debates. The Liberty Institute always swiftly reacted on/to every fact of violation of the freedom of belief and carried two cases to the constitutional court. The Liberty Institute reacted and denounced the attack on the Baptist Church by the police, the attack on the congregation of the Evangelist Church and the Jehovah Witnesses. It is noteworthy that the public sentiment towards the above-mentioned religious groups in general, was rather negative. Therefore defending these groups reflected badly on the Liberty Institute. The latter however did receive support from the democratic part of society and most NGOs.

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<sup>104</sup> [www.liberty.ge](http://www.liberty.ge)

During the same period the activists of the organization G. Bokeria, D. Zurabishvili, G. Targamadze, L. Ramishvili and S. Subari frequently appeared in media, harshly criticizing existing political leadership with special focus on corruption and human rights violation.

Since 2001 together with the students' movement the LI carried out the anticorruption campaign at the Tbilisi Ivane Javakhishvili State University. In the frame of the campaign /a survey was held, according to which the corrupt faculties and lecturers were publicly named. The members of the movement investigated the facts of abuse of University funds. Materials found by the Liberty Institute were handed to the Anticorruption Council and to the Prosecutor's Office.<sup>105</sup>

The Liberty Institute encouraged the development of youth movements such as independent student's self-governing bodies within the Universities and created civil liberties youth network throughout the country. The Liberty Institute also encouraged the youth movement “Kmara” (mentioned earlier). In total the Liberty Institute provided 800 activists with practical trainings.<sup>106</sup>

The activity of the Liberty Institute increased during the pre-election period. The organization actively supported political

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<sup>105</sup> Ibid.

<sup>106</sup> Ibid.

opposition, in particular M. Saakashvili and Z. Zhvania, and openly exposed the corruption and mismanagement of the existing government. The role of the Liberty Institute during the onset of the Rose revolution is obvious, and is accordingly reflected in the sociological survey.

### **The Georgian Young Lawyers' Association (GYLA)**

GYLA was founded on September 9th, 1994 and was soon officially registered as a non-profit, non-governmental organization. GYLA is a professional, membership-based organization with nearly 600 members. It was established as a union of professional lawyers, dedicated to reforming the poor reputation of the legal profession in Georgia. With pride in their professionalism and with an eye on their objective, this intrepid union of lawyers spearheaded the development of Georgian legal practice, by teaching legal skills, defending human rights, encouraging the growth of civil society and advancing the rule of law. Over the years, GYLA has pursued several initiatives:

Provide free legal aid system;

Offer legal training and civil education;

Draft and lobby Georgian legislation;

Represent citizens in court and carry out strategic litigation;

Develop lawyer's professional skills;

Encourage a robust civil society;

Promote transparency and access to public information.<sup>107</sup>

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<sup>107</sup> [www.gyla.ge](http://www.gyla.ge)



According to different sociological surveys GYLA is one of the well-known NGOs. During the pre-election period and after the GYLA representatives and especially its Chairman, by that time Mrs. T. Khidasheli, became one of the “faces” of the opposition-oriented NGOs.

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Let’s end this chapter with the assessment of manifested and latent functions of Georgian NGO sector that was given by sociologist Zaza Piralishvili in his interview:

In my opinion, NGO sector has three main functions under the existing reality. It has always facilitated the adequate development of social linguistics of the modern world. In this respect, much has been done indeed. NGOs were introducing elements of rationalism to our social linguistics even when the whole society spoke with national-utopian and national- fascist terms.

The second, also very important function was and still is the accumulation of the huge intellectual potential and intellectual capital. Through their relationships with international organizations, NGO representatives adopted a liberal and democratic paradigm and became the epicenter of this paradigm themselves. It is largely the merit of the NGO sector that the new generation has been brought up with the spirit of human rights and freedom.

## **Conclusion**

What can we conclude up to now with regard to the role and function of civil society in Georgia in view of the way it developed in the decade before the Rose Revolution? Reviewing the material so far ordered in the institutionalization, defense and mobilisation phase, we agree with the Georgian sociologist Zaza Piralishvili who in the expert-interview concluded that the NGO sector had the following function:

1) It has facilitated the adequate development of social linguistics of the modern world. NGOs were introducing elements of rationalism to our social linguistics even when the whole society was speaking with national-utopian and national-fascist terms. This was an important part of the institutionalization phase, the setting up of the NGO, the training, the learning to write project-proposals, and the tuning in to donor-discourses, as we have mentioned in both the introduction and in this overview. The Georgian Young Lawyers Association and The International Fair Elections Society with their relatively large number of members and volunteers played an important role in helping to institutionalize judicial and democratic language.

But more functions can be distinguished from our overview:

2) The second, also very important function was and still is the accumulation of the huge intellectual potential and intellectual

capital. Through their relationships with international organizations, NGO representatives adopted a liberal and democratic paradigm and became the epicenter of this paradigm themselves. It is largely the merit of the NGO sector that a new generation has been brought up with the spirit of human rights and freedom. Especially the Liberty Institute heralded the phase of defense of Human Rights such as Freedom of Speech and Freedom of Belief. Many NGO leaders followed at some point trainings abroad increasing their knowledge in one way or the other.

3) The Ten Steps, Kmara, and Alpe helped deligitimize the Shevardnadze government through their actions. As we saw, especially Kmara worked as a catalyst and ushered the masses into the mobilisation phase. The fact that the Ten Steps Program and the Kmara movement were supported by a large number of NGOs, (especially Alpe and the Liberty Institute) in our opinion shows that these NGOs are part of a continuous formation. As they grew and specialized themselves these NGOs contributed significantly to different phases of civil society in Georgia.

By November 2003 there was a kind of tetrarchy in Georgia: central authorities in Tbilisi, *de facto* authorities in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and an ‘unruly feudal’ Aslan Abashidze’s regime in the Ajara Autonomous Republic. Reduction of this foursome to three may be considered as an efficient outcome of the Rose Revolution. However, the role of civil society in surmounting the

Aslan Abashidze regime was of a different character than described in Chapter 4.

## **Chapter Four. The Ajara Case**

In the Soviet period there were three autonomies in Georgia: the autonomous republics of Abkhazeti and Ajara and the autonomous region of South Ossetia. During the independence movement from the ex-Soviet Union, separatist movements re-rose in Abkhazeti and South Ossetia. These developed into armed conflicts. The regions de facto left the jurisdiction of the central Georgian government and currently are in the position of unrecognized countries, which is still the main problem of internal and foreign policy of the present Georgian government.

As to Ajara, its history in 1991-2003 was characterized by separatism, although in a much more moderate form than in the other autonomous regions, while the ethnic factor did not work here: the autonomous republic of Ajara was established in the Soviet period, according to a religious and not an ethnic feature – the majority of Ajarians are Georgian Muslims with a strong Georgian identity. Despite this, the leader of Ajara, Aslan Abashidze, who came to state power at the recommendation of Zviad Gamsakhurdia (the first president of Georgia), adhered to the policy of feudal separatism. Officially he always declared the idea of territorial integrity of Georgia, but in reality he managed to limit the power of the central government in Ajara. He established an authoritarian-clannish regime, which was economically based on the control over the Batumi port and the Sarpi custom-house, and politically – on the Russian military base located in Batumi.

The relationship between Tbilisi and Batumi periodically became strained, with leaders exchanging sharp statements, but the status quo did not change: Tbilisi always overlooked the rigging of the election in Ajara, as a result of which the political party of A. Abashidze called “Renaissance”, was permanently represented in the Georgian parliament. It should be mentioned that A. Abashidze himself, who was a Member of Parliament never attended a single session. As far as is publicly known he never even came to Tbilisi. Aslan Abashidze almost unanimously

remained the leader of Ajara. Abashidze arrested some of his opponents; many of them were forced to leave Ajara, others were often “reminded” about their families (this method of intimidation was broadly used, even towards some of our respondents).

Any oppositional view was strictly persecuted. As far back as in 1993 Abashidze had a harsh reaction to the first issue of an oppositional newspaper: the newspaper was immediately blocked, at the same time the whole sales network was closed, so that it became difficult for the population of Ajara to buy even official press published in Tbilisi. The only source of information for Ajarians became several central TV channels. But watching TV also became problematic. Because of the atmosphere of total intimidation people watched central TV channels almost secretly (we and our friends, who often spent our holidays in Ajara, often witnessed our hosts switching the TV to another channel or lowering the sound when they noticed a neighbor approaching).

After the elections on the 2<sup>nd</sup> of November 2003, right after the beginning of the “Rose revolution”, the opposition started activities in Ajara. After the resignation of E. Shevardnadze (November 23) and appointing the pre-term election, A. Abashidze openly withstood the victorious opposition. He declared that Ajara should not participate in the coming election and then refused to recognize the results of the presidential

election of January 5, 2004. This was followed by protest actions against Abashidze, mainly in Batumi: the public organization “Our Ajara” was established. Supporters of Abashidze gathered at the Choloki River, which is the administrative border of Ajara. The confrontation became more and more strained from day to day. Several times force was used against the meetings of the opposition. The conflict reached its peak on the 3<sup>rd</sup> of May, when at Abashidze’s order the boundary bridges of Ajara were exploded. In response to this action, the Georgian Prime Minister and one of the leaders of opposition, Zurab Zhvania, accompanied by a small group of people, crossed Choloki on foot. The local population enthusiastically accepted this. On the 6<sup>th</sup> of May, when it became clear that the Russian military staff based in Ajara remained neutral, A. Ababshidze left Ajara and flew to Moscow. Abashidze’s regime failed and this considerably strengthened the position of M. Saakashvili and his party.

During the Abashidze’s regime it was obviously impossible to develop civil society in the region. However, some non-governmental organizations were still established in this period and they even carried out some activities.

Levan Gogadze, president of the non-governmental union of young scientists “Intellect” tell us:

Our organization was established in 1998. It unites young scientists and specialists. We did not have any difficulties in

establishing our organization. Although, we were warned that we needed Aslan's (Abashidze's) preliminary approval and we should start operating only after receiving his consent. Our position was to legally establish an NGO without any informal consent of anybody. We went to the Court, collected all the necessary documents and established our organization. To our surprise there were no obstacles or delay in the process. In the beginning we were a small, little known organization. Later, due to our activities and programs we gained some authority and expanded the area of business. We had rather interesting and large-scale programs: educational programs – on internet and computerization. This was one direction of our work; the other was to support the development of non-governmental, i.e. civil sector. We based our activities on the statement: civil society must be so developed and active that it should be able to choose its government. This is why, when the revolutionary processes started we did not join any political movement. Despite that "Our Ajara" was a public organization, we still did not join it, because it united a lot of political forces. We wanted NGOs and generally non-governmental movement to be apolitical. This is why we established a separate movement of NGOs, named "For the bright future". During a number of years we carried out projects in Ajara. I would like to specially mention the community mobilization program accomplished together with Care International. Fifty communities established in Ajara were the result of common work of the two organizations: The Black Sea Eco-Academy and "Intellect". We had some more programs with those fifty communities: educational programs for electors – trainings and procedural courses conducted every time before the elections. We offered the communities to join our movement and most of them accepted our offer.

The Association "For the bright future" had to explain to society what was actually going on in Ajara. This was not a direct appeal to revolution; however, their activities indirectly implied such appeal. They had explanatory discussions within the communities. In that period the authority of Aslan Abashidze was still great. This was trust in one person, his power and



invincibility. The Association “For the Bright Future” worked in two directions: first to unmask the existing government, to explain what they in reality are and where they lead the country, and then to explain why it is good when the people elect their own government, how to achieve this, etc. They also started the signatures campaign. They collected up to twenty-two thousand signatures with the request to discredit the existing Supreme Council and to appoint a pre-term election. Then the political process developed in such a way that these signatures were no longer necessary, the initiative was taken by “Our Ajara”. However, the fact remains that the signatures were actually collected.

The research team believes that the interview above gives a certain view of the evolution of the civil sector in Ajara. We shall also give the extracts from the interviews with several more Ajarian respondents, which will supplement the fore-quoted and better illustrate the social and political situation from November 2003 to May 6, 2004.

Ruslan Baramidze, head of the press service at the Batumi State University:

During those events I was a post-graduate student at a research institute and was simultaneously working in the business sector. Processes in Ajara started together with the events in Tbilisi. When people started gathering at meetings, this had an effect in Ajara. Certain activity became visible by December, when Abashidze declared that the region would not participate in the election. This considerably strained the situation and it

became obvious who was on the side of opposition and who was on the side of Abashidze. People in state establishments were paid to participate in the meetings, some of them were brought to Tbilisi. Participation in the meetings was equal to the governmental order. The situation was the same starting from the meetings in Tbilisi. After the revolution people started to gather by the Choloki River in quite an organized manner<sup>108</sup>.

At that moment people did not understand why all this was happening. Abashidze's authority was big at that time and quite a large number of people supported him. Abashidze was the alpha and omega, everything was connected to him. Those people who were in close relations and collaborated with him, gathered at Choloki. They never stated that they supported Abashidze, but this was obvious anyway.

Question: Whom do you believe those people were protecting? Abashidze? Their families? Ajara?

David Jejiadze – activist of “Our Ajara”: It may seem strange, but in this case it was just a returning of labour. Labour granted by Abashidze was being returned to him by the people who supported him at that time. This is a question of great importance in Ajara. Some of them even today state that they acted like real men when they stayed with Abashidze till the very last moment until he got into the plane and left.

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<sup>108</sup> The Choloki River is an administrative border of Ajara.

Ruslan Baramidze: It was at that time when opposition became more active, especially the parties: Republican Party, which had confronted Abashidze for a long time, and “Our Ajara”, which had actively worked and the office of which was several times looted. Apart of that, non-governmental sector, particularly public organizations, also stirred up. For example “Apsaros”, which was not an NGO but a public organization uniting young people. Unlike other groups, “Apsaros” successfully undertook the informational mission. It often expressed oppositional views through cooperation with different TV companies. There were also students and lectors who struggled firstly for independence of the University, secondly for the resigning of Nuri Verdzadze, rector of the University, and finally against the existing regime. Studies stopped at schools. It seemed that everything froze and all were expecting something bad to happen.

At the same time there were some small NGOs operated by one person. Unlike the NGOs in Tbilisi, such organizations in Ajara were rather weak. Young Lawyers Association and “Fair Elections” were both represented in Ajara, however here they were much weaker than in Tbilisi.

In that period the so-called alternative NGOs also started to appear. They stated that they were non-governmental organizations, gave several interviews a day to the Ajarian TV, obviously at Abashidze’s order.

There was only one oppositional newspaper “Batumelebi”, which was permanently oppressed. Editorial staff consisted mostly of women, mainly for security reasons – they thought that this way they would protect the office from looting. This did protect the office, although not always.

At the same time, there was an attempt to involve an Islamic factor. Mufti (Qamashidze) openly supported Abashidze. Some of his statements irritated even the local believers. On the 6<sup>th</sup> of May, in the morning, a group of Moslems dressed in Moslem clothes, came to the meeting and declared that they did not support Abashidze and separatism. This naturally caused great ovation, while all understood the place, role and importance of Moslems in Ajara. In the result Mufti was resigned and the new Mufti was appointed in August. Currently he remains at his post. In contrast to Tbilisi, religious factor played a certain role in Ajara. It is difficult to estimate the importance of this factor; however its role was evident. The reason for mentioning this factor is that the factor of Islam has always been important in Ajara and it became obvious when it was decided to involve it. As for the Orthodox Church in Ajara, I cannot recollect that it ever fixed its position, just like in Tbilisi.

In the evening of the 4<sup>th</sup> of May the victory of opposition became evident. I was going to go out with my friends. We were just one

or two minutes late and when finally went out into the street, we saw a troop running before us, leaving the place after breaking up the meeting in front of the University. They quickly ran by, broke up the meeting, got into the buses and left. On the following day such facts did not happen. On the 5<sup>th</sup> of May people went out into the street and on the 6<sup>th</sup> of May the revolution took place. Many people gathered in the street on the 6<sup>th</sup> of May, including those who were previously hesitating. Situation clarified very soon. Even such people who had much to lose turned to our side. Then the police turned to people. First the police detachments were standing opposite to the people. Suddenly they started turning their backs to them, showing thus that they were going to protect their people and not to oppose to them. It looked like a scene in a film...

Kakhaber Guchmanidze, one of the founders and leaders of public-political movement “Apsaros”:

After the “Rose revolution” NGOs like us started appearing in the result of the protest against Aslan Abashidze, after he declared that Ajara would not participate in the election. Registration at that time was possible only through the Court and actually was impossible. We had to go underground.

Tite Aroshidze, founder and leader of “Apsaros”:

Different NGOs operated at that time: The Young Lawyers Association, The Young Economists

Association, and Centers for Human Rights Protection represented by NGOs. But all of them were apolitical. Before establishing our organization we had contacts with the Young Economists Association. Like us, this organization did not intend to get involved in politics. (...) From the very beginning we actively participated in the actions of protest. Our first step was distribution of leaflets. Our friends helped us in publishing. We distributed them in public places. The leaflets contained appeal to participate in the election with the purpose to end up with Abashidze's regime.

K. Guchmanidze: Our organization was established before “Our Ajara” and “Democratic Ajara”. It can be said that we stimulated the creation of other oppositional unions.

T. Aroshidze:

I shall tell you how it all began. Information that Ajara is not going to participate in the election reached Tbilisi. Our friends in Batumi – students studying in Tbilisi expressed their protest via Rustavi2 TV channel. The response to their protest was repressions and threats to fire their parents from their jobs. However the protest was still expressed. Afterwards, upon arrival in Tbilisi we coordinated our activities and decided to establish an organization. (...) Everything was made at our own expense. It happened only once that “Our Ajara” granted GEL 200 to each regional organization. Sometimes we even could not communicate, because had no funds to pay for the mobile phones.

Inga Khodeishvili, activist of the students' movement: “Our Ajara” was not yet established when we collected signatures for the support of presidential election in Batumi. This was the will

of citizens and not of some political parties. I believe the Students' Union played an important role in this process. The vast majority were students. I would also like to mention "Apsaros", "Women's Society for Peace and Democracy". I was a member of this organization. But still the students played the main role. (...) All of us had telephone numbers of "Rustavi2" and "Imedi" to contact them in emergency cases.

David Jejiadze: This was adrenaline. The main thing was that we had our functions (...) I shall never forget the euphoria on the evening of revolution and the following morning ...

Based on the above data we can conclude:

- In 1991-2003, due to the isolationism and autocratic regime in Ajara, the development of public sector was complicated.
- Free media was destroyed in 1993; only in the end of 2003, right after the beginning of revolutionary processes in Tbilisi, an oppositional newspaper "Batumelebi" was established.
- From the view of institutional development, the existing NGOs were approximately on the third level (According to G. Nodia<sup>109</sup>) (decisions are mainly made by the head of the organization, the board is not clearly identified, the duties and functions of the members are not clearly

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<sup>109</sup> Nodia G., *Civic Society Development in Georgia: Achievements and Challenges, Policy Papers*. CIPDD, Tbilisi, 2005, p.25-26.

defined, weak strategic planning, lack of financial and human resources, gaps in financing)

Before 2003, NGOs followed the “doctrine of indifference to politics”, shared by the leading Georgian NGOs till 2001.

## **Chapter Five. Experts on Key Points of the Rose Revolution**

This chapter outlines the results of our analysis organized into two sub-sections:

- Part 1: Data of experts on general questions regarding the Rose Revolution
- Part 2: Data of experts only on those questions that referred to the role of the civil society in the Rose Revolution



The word “expert” in this case is of a generic character. The respondents were not chosen as specialists of any particular field, but they are individuals who were actively involved in the unfolding of events towards the revolution. These people often appeared in the media and public space and had information about the events: politicians of various platforms, the representatives of the previous government, political analysts and the representatives of mass media and the non-governmental sector.

The selection of experts occurred according to the following: the members of the research team compiled lists individually and combined them afterwards. In addition, at the end of each interview the respondent was asked to name those individuals, who in their opinion would be able to give significant information for our research (snowball method). Overall, 51 respondents were interviewed.

After coding and analyzing the transcripts of the respondents’ interviews we can divide their opinions into 5 groups:

1. The “Shevardnadze Group” is composed of those respondents who were significant members of the “Citizens Union Georgia” (the CUG, a political party led by Ed. Shevardnadze), occupied high governmental positions, and were members of the electoral coalition

united under the CUG, the Citizens Union Georgia. In addition, the above-mentioned group included E. Shevardnadze himself.

2. The “Rose Group” united the active participants of the Rose Revolution, who nowadays represent governmental structures and are supporters of the current political platform. The politicians who occupied governmental positions under Shevardnadze, later took the side of the opposition and preserved their positions in the new government, were also placed in the “Rose Group” category.
3. The “New Opposition”: current members of Parliament, politicians and representatives of the non-governmental sector who were actively involved in the “Rose Revolution”, but later opposed M. Saakashvili and the “National Movement”.
4. The “Double Opposition”: politicians who were opposing the Shevardnadze government, but did not support the Rose Revolution and are members of the current opposition.
5. The “Independents”: experts and journalists who did not openly support any political side.

The analysis of interviews illustrates that judgments of the respondents are directly related to their political opinions, or partisanship, as referred in the terminology of social psychology<sup>110</sup>. The collected data proves to be a good illustration of the patterns in social psychology and thus, in our opinion, has significant scientific value.

In order to distinguish between different interpretations of the events, it is worthwhile to discuss the relationship between the four groups (the group “independents” will not be discussed here since they did not express explicit trends).

It is significant to note that till 2001 “young reformists”, Zurab Zhvania and Mikheil Saakashvili were active members of the Shevardnadze team, controlling the economic bloc of the executive branch and they had an enormous impact on the image of governmental party, the Citizens Union Georgia. In 2001, during the governmental crisis period (the details of which will not be reviewed here), when the reformists and the government could not reach consensus concerning the candidates on the position of law enforcement structure heads, Zhvania and Saakashvili left the CUG. They both joined the opposition, pushing other opposition parties to the background. These parties were the “New Rights” and the “Labor Party”, referred to as the “double opposition” in this document.

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<sup>110</sup> Ross, L., Nisbett, R. *The person and the situation: Perspectives of social*

The “double opposition” perceives the separation of Zhvania and Saakashvili as an in-party diverge of the CUG and the “New Reformists” (“Rose Group” in our document) as tactical, not as a principal opposition to Shevardnadze. Moreover, they are viewed as political successors of Shevardnadze (this opinion is highlighted in the media as well as in our interviews on various occasions) who “unrightfully” (this is our hypothesis) took away the status of the “core opposition” from them, placing the emphasis on the problems signified by the latter, such as corruption, clan principle, cadre politics, etc.

*It can not be noted that the above mentioned themes used by the “Rose Group” to discredit the Shevardnadze government, were in fact highlighted earlier in the speeches of the representatives of the “Labor Party” and the “New Rights” (or the “double opposition”). However, the criticism from the “Rose Group” was received with much greater response in society. This was due to their highly energetic campaign and also to the well known social psychological effect stating that criticism provokes more trust when the “critic” is associated with the object of criticism (e.g. a policeman criticizing the police department)<sup>111</sup>.*

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*psychology*. NY.: McGraw-Hill, 1999, Ch. 3.

<sup>111</sup> Eagly, A., Wood, W., Chaiken, S. (1978). Causal inferences about communicators and their effect on opinion change. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 36, 424-435.

For the “Shevardnadze team”, the “Rose Group” was composed of “renegades” who employed high political positions to establish relationships with Western partners, (the US in the first place).

The group referred to as the “New Opposition” in our analysis, the majority of whose members came to politics from the non-governmental sector, from 2001 was allied to M. Saakashvili and Z. Zhvania considering them as politicians of democratic orientation. The “New Opposition” actively participated in the election process and the vast majority of its members entered the new parliament through the elections of January 4, 2004. Several months later they consequently formed an opposition fraction accusing M. Saakashvili and his team of authoritarianism and of violation of Human Rights.

As for the “Rose Group”, it has the winner position: the leading political party that managed to mobilize people against the old regime, gave rise to a successful revolution without any bloodshed, is still highly ranked in Georgia. Below we present the table that shows the relationships between parties before the revolution (the first symbol) and after the revolution (second symbol):

Table 6: Relationships between groups before (1st symbol) and after (2nd symbol) the RR

	“Rose Group”	“Shevardnadze Group”	“Double Opposition”	“New Opposition”	“Independents”
“Rose Group”	X	--	--	+ -	0
“Shevardnadze Group”	--	X	--	--	0
“Double Opposition”	--	--	X	--	0
“New Opposition”	+ -	--	--	X	0
“Independents”	0	0	0	0	X

The following table presents the status of the distinguished groups before and after Revolution. (+ Indicates the position of power and – refers to the opposition status)

Table 7: Status of the groups in Table 6 before and after the Rose Revolution

	Before Revolution	After Revolution
“Rose Group”	-	+
“Shevardnadze Group”	+	-
“Double Opposition”	-	-
“New Opposition”	-	-
“Independents”	0	0

As illustrated above, the political positions, the relationships before the revolution and afterwards, also the political status in pre/post revolution period correlates positively with the evaluation of key moments of the Rose Revolution by the representatives of certain groups.

## **The pre-Revolutionary Period**

This theme was in fact the only one, the evaluation of which was practically similar by the representatives of each group, regardless of the position occupied and regardless of the societal status. The respondents expressed an uniform opinion that in the pre-Revolutionary period the country was characterized by stagnation. Serious social and economic problems were accumulated and no measures were taken to restore the territorial integrity of the country. Total corruption disrupted all levels of the government. The authorities were fully paralyzed and nothing was developing. No measures were taken even to attempt the elimination of existent problems. The population was desperate and nobody expected positive changes from the side of the government. The people were fed up with Shevardnadze. The vast majority of Georgia's population lost trust in the government. It is not surprising that in such a situation, one expected elections to be rigged. This expectation was taken a step further by the propaganda of the opposition parties, which also predicted election results would be falsified.

However, in spite of this consensus, a very small, but still psychologically significant difference can still be noted between the various groups. The members of the Shevardnadze group emphasize the "human factor" (Shevardnadze's age, "dual

standards” of some of his team members, etc.) or relatively insignificant details, whereas the representatives of the other groups accentuate the systemic crisis of the political establishment of that period.

## **The Organization of the Revolution**

In this section the opinions and evaluations of experts differ greatly. Three core positions were distinguished:

1. The Revolution did not have an organized character. The processes developed in a spontaneous manner and the activities of the next day were only planned on a previous day was defended by the members of the “Rose Group” and by members of the “New Opposition”.
2. The Revolution was only organized internally, in the country. The leaders were the representatives of the opposition, i.e Saakashvili, Burjanadze and Zhvania were mostly the representatives of the “Rose Group”. Several representatives of other groups shared this point of view as well.
3. The Revolution had an organized character and external forces managed the processes. This view is shared by people from the “New Opposition” and by the “Shevardnadze team”. For example it is pointed out that Soros openly declared to change the Shevardnadze government. Or one refers to the consultations held



between the US and Russia. Shevardnadze himself claims he was told, that Miles [the US ambassador] played a negative role. “As I know every Ambassador left the Hall and only he stayed and took pictures. But this is not enough to accuse a person. The administration was done by the internal political powers with support of certain external political forces.” Also some “independent journalists” refer to external powers being involved.

### **The Financing Issue**

The question regarding the financing of the Rose Revolution also provoked differences in opinion. Here also three main positions can be distinguished regarding not only the source of financing but its quantity as well.

1. There was no targeted financing. There was some assistance and a few minor donations: for example water and food for the protesters and a couple of small grants (Soros support, “Kmara” financing). The “Rose Group” and some “independent experts” defend this point of view.
2. Financing came solely from the local sources is also supported by members of the “Rose Group”;
3. Financing was targeted and the vast amount was received from external sources and international organizations was supported by the “Shevardnadze

team” and by the “New Opposition” and the “Double Opposition” pointing to Soros (mainly), and to a lesser extent also to Russia and businessmen: pointing to some members of the “Rose Group” who were known to be in Russia to collect money. The amount mentioned most often is between the 200 and 300 thousand dollars.

### **Post-Revolutionary Perspectives**

Here also two different positions can be distinguished:

1. The revolution gave rise to significant changes and democratic development
2. The revolution did not meet people’s expectations, for a certain group used it to come to power.

This section also presents specific opinions, or if the respondent wanted to additionally state something and was not granted this opportunity during the interview.

#### **The revolution gave rise to significant changes and democratic development**

The representatives of the Rose Group generally share this opinion. Their answers can be unified under the uniform theme that the Revolution was a positive event after which wide

perspectives were opened for the country both internally, as well as on the global arena (NATO, territorial integrity and such).

**Position: The revolution did not meet people's expectations, for a certain group used it to come to power.**

The representatives of "New Opposition" view the Revolution itself as a positive event (we need to recall that they were the members of "Rose Group" at the time of Revolution) but think that the "Rose Group" and especially, M. Saakashvili assumed absolute power. He is moving the country into the wrong direction: "The system is the same, the methods are the same as in times of Shevardnadze". Also for the "Shevardnadze Group" nothing has changed after the Revolution and there are no improvements. The new government appropriated Shevardnadze's achievements. The representatives of the "Double Opposition" view the Revolution negatively and place the emphasis on human factors (lack of competence, non-receptiveness to criticism, emotional instability, etc.). In their opinion the Constitution was adapted to fit the individuals (i.e. give absolute power to the President).

Our mentality will be democratic the day that we will elect a president with a percentage of 50 +1 and that this president will respect this choice. The parliament will not be controlled by a single political power but several political powers will be represented. Otherwise even the most active political power goes idle, and a one-party government is established.

The table further down illustrates the positions of the political groups (trends) during the key moments of the Rose Revolution.

First of all, it is important to discuss two main sides involved in a revolution:

the "Shevardnadze Team" and the "Rose Group" (We need to consider them as players of a "zero-sum game" where the winning position of one player automatically means the loss of the other). As expected they express the most polar opposite views about the Revolution. For the "Shevardnadze Team", the preparation for Revolution was long planned and involved great financial resources. The events were basically run by individuals from foreign countries who occupied high positions. As for the "Rose Group" they were the simple implementers. The Revolution itself did not bring any benefit for Georgia.

Table 8: Positions of political groups during key moments of the Rose Revolution

	<i>Predisposition for Revolution</i>	<i>Organization and administration of Revolution</i>	<i>Financing of Revolution</i>	<i>The role of non-governmental sector in the Revolution</i>	<i>Post Revolution Perspectives</i>
"Rose Group"	System Crisis	Spontaneous; By the "Rose Group"	Small ; county resources	Not very important	Absolutely positive
"Shevardnadze"	Human factor	Long term planning in	Large ;	No explicit trends	Worsening or no change

<i>Team</i>		advance; External powers	Foreign Countries		
<i>“Double Opposition”</i>	System Crisis	Moderate position	Moderate Position	Quite important	Negative, because of incapability of the new government
<i>“New Opposition”</i>	System Crisis	Spontaneous; By the “Rose Group”	Small , country resources	Very Important	Negative, due to the wrong political direction of the new government
<i>Independents</i>	System Crisis	No explicit trends	No explicit trends	No explicit trends	Moderate position

*It is worthwhile to draw attention to the differences in opinions expressed on one of the happiest characteristics of the revolution that was the development of the events without bloodshed. “Shevardnadze Team” views their own goodwill as its main reason. Shevardnadze himself justifies his resignation by the desire to avoid bloodshed. The evaluation about the same event proposed by the “Rose Group” is provided below.*

Here the psychological context is the most evident: self-justification and preservation of the self ----- by diminishing the rival and switching the focus to blame the “Third Party”.

In case of the “Rose Group”, a long-term preparation and financing from external sources is totally rejected. Spontaneity is highlighted and the main theme carried out is that nobody

desired the revolution but that the Shevardnadze regime itself determined the sequence of actions first by forging the results of the elections. This was followed by their refusal to abolish these election results. Finally Shevardnadze sealed his own fate by forging an alliance with Mr. Aslan Abashidze (expressed by bringing a couple of thousand people from Adjara to Tbilisi and organizing the manifestation to “protect” Shevardnadze). As noted by various representatives of “Rose Group” and “New Opposition”, this fact provoked serious irritation amongst the supporters of the opposition. According to the version of the “Rose Group”, all of these events determined the responsive steps of the opposition appeal to the people, actions of protest and forcing Shevardnadze to resign. All these were implemented by an energetic, not very large political group that used the masses of tired people. The utilized resources were minimal but enough to win the elections. Today this political group has the support of international community and leads the country towards the way of progressive reforms.

*Why did not bloodshed take place? On the one hand, the mentality and organization of those who came out in the streets were quite high. On the other hand, nobody trusted Shevardnadze regime, police supported people and even if Shevardnadze wanted to, he would not have been able to use force.*

Thus, partisanship and the results of the revolution determine the interpretation of the events by the two major players: highlighting pluses and hiding minuses are in accordance with the principles of social psychology. However, certain differences can still be observed in the “Interpretation strategy” determined by the real outcomes of the revolution. “Rose Group” emphasizes its strengths but doesn’t attempt to overestimate the power of the Shevardnadze Team, whereas the latter attributes empowerment of the former to the financial, intellectual and organizational resources of the foreign countries.

The evaluations of the two other groups fall under the same principles. “The New Opposition “ basically agrees with the “Rose Group” in interpreting the events of the Revolution but recognizes some external participation in organization and funding of the revolution. In addition, it attributes greater role to the civic sector. As for the “Double Opposition” who opposes both actors, expresses “balanced negativism” about the both sides.

The question is: can we discuss the real matter of events basing our judgment on the information derived from actual participants of those events? As we saw, it is quite difficult in our case since the judgments are totally different. Maybe it would be more appropriate to base our judgment on the data collected from the “independents”. But there is no unity even here and “hidden

partisanship” bears its impact. The second alternative is to propose that the reality lies somewhere in the mid-point of polar opposites. We hold this position thus realizing that this Hypothesis lacks proofs. To sum up this chapter we would like to cite an Englishman who stated : “when you listen to the witnesses of the same road accident in the court, you quit to trust Historians”<sup>112</sup>.

## ***Part 2. Expert opinion on the role of civil society and the media during the Revolution***

Generally revolutions happen when the political rivalry escalates to the point that it passes the scope of the political elite and encompasses the wide masses of society. The escalation of the moment, as a rule, results into the bloodshed. This is why even the most progressive revolutions are evaluated negatively by the history. The exception to this rule are the so called “Velvet revolutions” where bloodshed did not occur. Their number in the history is limited and this is why there is not much knowledge about those internal mechanisms that result into progressive peaceful transition from one political reality to the other. The “Rose Revolution” is among the number of such revolutions – although still time needs to tell whether anything changed fundamentally and if so in which direction: towards democracy or autocracy. It is clear that one of the characteristics of this

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<sup>112</sup> Душенко, К. В., Слабости сильного пола. Афоризмы о мужчинах и мужских



Velvet (or Rose) Revolution is that Civil Society in terms of NGO leaders and Media had a role. Our goal is to gain more insight precisely in this role of civil society and the Rose Revolution.

In Part 2 of this chapter we present what ‘experts’ from different backgrounds and affiliation said about the role of civil society towards and during the revolution. We asked these experts questions such as: *“Was there an impact of non-governmental organizations on the public awareness?”* *“What was the role played by non-governmental organizations in the successful implementation of the revolution?”* *“Which non-governmental organizations participated actively in the unfolding processes?”* *“What was the role of the mass media in the developments and in the formation of public opinion?”* These taped interviews we broke down into statements on civil society. We analyzed these statements from three perspectives:

1. A structural point of view of civil society, its specific actors and relations among them: the micro-systems of actors. The actors are media<sup>113</sup> and non-governmental organizations<sup>114</sup>. Specific individuals also appear in this micro-structural analysis. The structural analysis also partially entails the macro-system that encompasses civil society. Civil society is part of the

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занятиях. М., ЭКСМО-Пресс, 2000, с. 249

<sup>113</sup> Micro-system: Rustavi 2; state channel. 9th channel

<sup>114</sup> Micro-system: Liberty Institute , Kmara, Alpe and etc.

Georgian state, as a component of a macro-system together with the population, government and other subjects of this state.

2. The functional analysis of the system: On the one hand, it entails the analysis of civil society relations (motivation and actions) with other actors in Georgia. On the other hand, it presents the analysis of the relation of other actors of micro-system to civil society.

3. Finally, a part of the statements concerns the historical development of civil society.


The statements were classified according to the above-mentioned systemic categories that were grouped in three phases. These groups were distinguished according to the generalization of the mentioned actors.<sup>115</sup> In the first phase, only those statements were analyzed in systemic terms that referred to the actor in such generic terms as “civil society”, “Public sector”, “non-governmental organization”, “Mass media/media”, etc. In the second phase, such statements were analyzed in systemic terms where the concrete subjects were mentioned as actors: “Rustavi 2”, “Kitsmarishvili”, “State Television”, “9<sup>th</sup> Channel”, “The Liberty Institute”, “Alpe”, “Young Lawyers Association”, etc.

In the third phase, the statements drawn from the previous two phases were summed up in systemic categories. Overall, the

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<sup>115</sup> . E.g. General-non-governmental organizations; specific – The Liberty Institute.

analysis of the data derived from experts was conducted according to the following scheme:



system analyses >>> expert statements

general actors

concrete

Both systemic categories and specific and general categories of actors were drawn to group the statements of experts (Overall 128 statements)

### **The analysis of expert statements**

#### **General civic subjects**

This stage of analysis focuses on those statements that contain general categories which denote the whole system i.e. “civil society” and its components (non-governmental organizations, Mass media).

## **Structural analysis**

The list of actors of civil society that was provided by experts as an answer to the question “*Which non-governmental organizations took an active part in the developed processes?*” is presented in the table #1. (See appendix –1). It is apparent from the table that not all the actors of civil society are perceived as having equal weight in the processes of revolution. 20 actors were named, 7 of which were mentioned once, 5 were mentioned twice. The top three of the expert rating looks as follows: 32 out of 35 experts named “The Liberty Institute”, 24 named “The Georgian Young Lawyers Association” and 14 named “Kmara”. It is important to note that more non governmental organizations were named in answer to this direct question than on the other questions connected to systemic relations.

We analyzed the statements provided along the lines of two parameters: The attitude towards the content and the relation of the content to the social role and function of civil society or its components.

As previously mentioned, “groups that possess civic awareness, protect the interests of the citizens in relation to the government and play the mediating role between the citizens and the government” constitute the civil society.

The points were attributed to both parameters (See attachment #1 to view the rule of score attribution) . Later the general trends were discussed based on the average number of these points.

## **Functional analysis**

Notwithstanding the fact that a direct question of “what was the motivation of the groups involved in Rose Revolution” has not been posed, a certain part of the interviewed experts spoke about the motivation of civil actors, primarily, in the non-governmental sector. Regrettably, the material is scarce: most experts are reluctant to speak about the motivation. As demonstrated by the data presented in the attachments (tables ## 2 and 6) the motivation of actions of “civil society” and other general subjects does not attract much of expert attention. We could only place three statements in this category.

Two neutral experts (see attachment #1; “code of experts”) critically evaluate the motivation of the civil actors (table #2) considering that they were oriented towards grant allocation and that the political motivation was just a mask. One loyal expert states (attachment #1 the ‘code of experts’) that this sector was “clean, straightforward and open.” The average measure of the attitude derived from the statement is negative: - 0.3.

In table #6 the adequacy of motivation of “civil society” and other general subjects to its social function in one case was estimated by the score 2 because the author of the statement maintained that the position of NGOs was a mask (or the NGOs had a different goal than what civil society should have theoretically). The adequacy of civil society motivation to

personal role was measured by the average score of 1.3.

It is apparent from the data that the experts discussed the actions and relations of civic sector with more enthusiasm (61 statement, see table #3). The neutral description of events is provided in the main part of statements. Only 4 statements provoke negative response and 12 statements –positive response with regard to the processes of revolution.

The negative relation is displayed in the discussions of those experts who hold critical or neutral positions. The positive attitude is demonstrated in the judgment of those who were loyal towards the Revolution during the revolution period itself. The average score of the attitudes displayed in the statement is +0.13. The average weight of the attitude is positive due to the fact that most of the information was provided by the experts with loyal position to President Shevardnadze.

The average number of points of the civil society action adequacy to its functions equals to 1.19 and is greater than 1 (see table #7). This indicates that according to the content of the statements civil society performed its functions and did even more than demanded by its social role. The score 2 was attributed to the statements that had this content. This score was attributed to 19 statements out of 60. (E.g. the statements with the score 2 contained those that indicated that civil society provided ideological basis and plans for future reforms for the group of revolution; Directed, planned, organized and financed political processes; Negotiated with external players, etc.) The

actions described in these statements compose the function of political organization and by its fulfillment the civic sector widens its functions.

Only three statements claimed that civic sector is inefficient and did not play any role in revolutionary processes (2 statements), or destroyed Georgia. The authors of these statements were in the past and still are the experts that have a critical or neutral position. Another three statements maintained that the civic sector played a partial role. All of the three experts were loyal to the revolution during its implementation, the two of which critically evaluate the group of the revolution now. The other statements indicate that the civic sector effectively performed its function. All of the statements of this kind were scored by 1 (See the list of expert statements below to completely view all of the statements) Regardless of the large quantity of these statements the average measure of function performance exceeded 1 that points out that for the loyal experts (they provide the majority of statements) widening of the function of civil society is more or less acceptable.

There is less number of those statements that reflect the relation of other subjects to the public sector (table #4). One out of the 7 statements shows positive attitude of the expert (who was and is still loyal to the revolutionary group). Two statements demonstrate negative attitude (the authors are and were critical to the revolutionary group). The rest of the statements do not indicate the direct attitude . The average score of the attitudes in

these 7 statements equals to -0.14. As the codes of experts show, 4 authors out of the 7 statements maintain the loyal position to the revolutionary group, but the average still displays the negative attitude.

In relation with the function, score 2 was attributed to 4 out of 7 statements (see table #8) In relation to civil society ,other actors often hold the position more relevant for the relation with the political or commercial subjects than non governmental or media subjects. “A lot of money was spent on it”, “Political sides negotiated with it. It was used as an instrument and now it is under pressure (or is not independent)”. There were 2 authors of such statements that were critical to the revolution, one of them is neutral and one is loyal.

The other statements (that attributed 1 score and the authors of which were loyal to the revolutionary group) reflect those opinions of different actors towards the civil society that are adequate to civic sector role. Generally, the average measure of assessing the relation of others to the civic sector is greater than 1 (specifically 1.14)

## **Historical Analysis**

Keeping in mind that no particular question was posed about the stages of development of civil society or the third sector, experts spoke on that subject while responding to the question: “Has the public consciousness changed in the last decade, and if it did, did



it happen under the influence of civil society?” The experts devote very little attention to the history and development of the civic sector. There are only two statements on this subject and both display the negative position (table #5). The expert holding critical position maintains that the NGOs of the revolution period are “governmentals” today. This indicates that their interests go beyond adequate standards. (For this reason the score 2 was attributed to this position). The expert holding a loyal position maintains that there is no civil society in Georgia, which reflects that the existing forms of civil sector cannot perform its functions. (Points: 1. see table #9).

Finally, the opinions of experts about the civil society can be viewed as the following list of statements.

About the motivation of general civic subjects (“civil society” and its components) during revolution:

L – experts loyal to the Revolutionary groups

C – experts critical to the Revolutionary groups

N – experts with neutral attitude to the RG.

Author’s code ‘A’ denotes the dynamics of his/her political orientation. We use threefold combination of the abovementioned symbols, where the I position denotes the author’s attitude towards a revolutionary group in pre-revolution period; II position – during the RR; and III position – after the Rose revolution. Codes are given in the 2<sup>nd</sup> sections of the tables.

Experts' attitude 'A' is denoted with: {-1} – negative; {0} – neutral, and {1} – positive. attitude expressed in the statement is denoted with figures given in the 3<sup>rd</sup> section of the table.

Figures apprise the connection between the idea and the social function of the Civil society – F. Numeral {-1} is used when the statement shows that actor performed its function insufficiently; {0} – when the actor failed to perform its function; {0.5} – when, according to the statement, the function was performed partly; {2} – when the actor (i.e. NGO) performs another actor's (i.e. party organization's) function. Appraisal of statement's correlation with the social function is given in the 4<sup>th</sup> section of the table.

(This encoding is valid for every table below. See more details about the coding system in the appendix 1.)

Civil society during revolution was clean, straightforward and open	E=LLC	A=1	F=1
The position of the most active NGOs was a fake	E=NNN	A=- 1	F=2
NGOs are grant-oriented	E=NNN	A=- 1	F=1

About the actions and relation of general civic subjects (“civil society’ and its components) to the other actors of society:

NGOs destroyed Georgia	E=CCC	A= -1	F=-1
Media (and Rustavi 2) were biased	E=CCC	A= -1	F=1
Many journalists gathered at V. Maglaperidze’s place and planned the revolution.	E=CCC	A=0	F=2
I (Shevardnadze) never thought the NGOs and media kept threatening positions against me.	E=CCC	A=0	F=1
Media conducted PR campaign for Saakashvili	E=CCC	A=0	F=2
Media negotiated both with the government and with the opposition	E=CCC	A=0	F=2
The impact of NGOs was especially great in the regions	E=CCN	A=0	F=1
Media had enormous role in the formation of public opinion	E=CCN	A=0	F=1
NGOs directed civic education and taught ABC of the democracy	E=CCN	A=1	F=1
The non governmental sector created and	E=CLC	A=0	F=

developed the expectations in the population that there would be changes			1
NGOs did not play any significant role	E=CLC	A=0	F=0.5
Civic sector allocated funds (for revolution).	E=CLC	A=0	F=2
The TV favored the representatives of NGOs	E=CLC	A=0	F=1
Media played an important role in creating the adequate picture. Opinions differed greatly. Everybody knows who holds what orientation and this made possible to draw average conclusions	E=CLC	A=1	F=1
Civic sector made the opposition more humane and played the important role	E=CLC	A=1	F=1
Civic sector managed to bear an impact on public opinion	E=CLL	A=0	F=1
Media was an organized instrument to implement everything	E=CNN	A=0	F=2
Regardless of how the non governmental sector was created, It played more important role in public opinion formation than parties and government	E=CNN	A=0	F=2

Media brainwashed the population	E=LLC	A= -1	F=1
NGOs were significant players in allocating funds, developing the plan, implementation and organization	E=LLC	A=0	F=2
NGOs organized everything	E=LLC	A=0	F=2
NGOs created ideological basis	E=LLC	A=0	F=1
The leaders of NGOs organized meetings with the embassies and the representatives of foreign countries	E=LLC	A=0	F=2
The members of NGOs sat in televisions and created ideological basis of revolution	E=LLC	A=0	F=2
NGOs had an impact on the formation of public opinion	E=LLC	A=0	F=1
NGOs had education programs that helped the development of democracy but they were not widespread and did not bring about qualitative changes	E=LLC	A=0	F=0.5
NGOs were the leaders in comparison to the political parties	E=LLC	A=0	F=2
Media worked a lot for communications	E=LLC	A=0	F=1

The well known members of the society stood at the street meetings and gave an example to the people	E=LLC	A=0	F=1
NGOs and “Kmara” represented public opinion and had the function of the catalyst	E=LLC	A=1	F=1
NGOs formed democratic and civic mentality in Georgia	E=LLC	A=1	F=1
NGOs had decisive role in the sphere of civic education	E=LLC	A=1	F=1
Media said what people wanted them to say	E=LLC	A=1	F=1
The mobilization of the people and protection from violence was done through media	E=LLC	A=1	F=1
NGOs objectively created democratic impulses through media	E=LLC	A=1	F=1
Civil society worked towards the actualization of the following themes during revolution: corruption, human rights, the incapability of the government, lack of the rule of law, difficult social background, lost territories, elections.	E=LLL	A=0	F=1

NGOs had an impact on opposition	E=LLL	A=0	F=2
Non governmental sector played vital role	E=LLL	A=0	F=1
Non governmental sector had a serious impact on the formation of public opinion	E=LLL	A=0	F=1
Non governmental sector assisted the organization of the revolution	E=LLL	A=0	F=2
NGOs stood by the side of the opposition to the end	E=LLL	A=0	F=2
Certain part of NGOs were actively involved in directing revolution	E=LLL	A=0	F=2
NGOs formed public opinion	E=LLL	A=0	F=1
NGOs created practical philosophy for the civil society	E=LLL	A=0	F=1
NGOs had an input in the formation of public opinion	E=LLL	A=0	F=1
NGOs had partial impact	E=LLL	A=0	F=0.5
The information about faking the election results was spread by the NGOs	E=LLL	A=0	F=1

Media determined everything	E=LLL	A=0	F=1
Media created public opinion	E=LLL	A=0	F=1
Media played an important role, even decisive.	E=LLL	A=0	F=1
The organization of the revolution was totally done by the NGOs	E=LLL	A=0	F=2
The main action and input of NGOs was to bring democratic reforms on the agenda	E=LLL	A=1	F=2
Media provided objective information	E=LLL	A=1	F=1
Media promoted that the situation of panic and disorder was not created	E=LLL	A=1	F=1
All channels but Rustavi-2 threatened the population with war	E=NLL	A=0	F=1
NGOs brainwashed the population	E=NNN	A= -1	=1
NGOs did not play the significant role	E=NNN	A=0	F=-1
Media played an important role. It voiced opposition	E=NNN	A=0	F=2



Media and especially television played an important role in mobilizing the population.	E=NNN	A=0	F=1
Opposition and media had negotiations	E=NNN	A=0	F=2
Civil society did not play any role	E=NNN	A=0	F=-1

About the relation of other actors with the general subjects (civil society and its components).

NGOs promoted democratic values. This is why they were funded by the foreign donors	E=LLL	A=1	F=1
The representatives of NGOs were very popular among people in the end.	E=LLC	A=0	F=1
There was civic sector with its completely legal structure and financing	E=LLL	A=0	F=1
A lot of money was spent on them	E=NNN	A=0	F=2
Opposition had negotiations with the media	E=LLL	A=0	F=2
NGOs were used as an instrument by	E=CCC	A=	F=

politicians		-1	2
Media was free during my (Shevardnadze) times (is not free now)	E=CCC	A=-1	F=-1

### The evolution of general civic subjects

NGOs transformed into “governmentals”	E=CCC	A= -1	F= 2
There is no established civil society in Georgia	E=LLL	A= -1	F= -1

### Analysis of Concrete Civil Society Subjects

Most of the statements referred to some of the representatives of the civil society (in other words, representatives of NGO sector and the media). This factor once again indicates, that all members of civil society, according to the experts’ opinions, were not equally involved in the revolutionary related processes (or, a concept of NGO is associated with persons whom they know. In most cases these are the NGO leaders). However, as was shown above, in some cases the experts attribute support to the revolutionary processes to the whole society. We singled out those statements which deal with the given subjects of the civil society and categorized them according to 3 categories: “Rustavi -2”, “Public TV” and “other actors of civil society”.

### Rustavi -2

Tables 2 and 4 show the data on the motivation of Rustavi -2 TV (The expert's interest is low here, just 5 statements). In the statements prepared by the experts who are marked with loyalty to the revolution group there is a vivid positive attitude. The attitude is absent in three statements. The statements of the experts whose attitude is critical, the level of criticism is more or less vivid. The average evaluation of the attitude depicted in the statement is +0.17 (Table 2).

Only two statements out of total 6 say that, according to the loyal experts, the motivation of the abovementioned TV Company corresponds to the role of the free media. The experts say that they did a really good job without any pushing (Table 6). The motivations mentioned in the rest of the statements, are said to have gone further outside the abovementioned role. They also say that the reason for Rustavi 2 being radical, was that they were aware of the looming future for the company unless the revolution took place; that Kitsmarishvili wanted to come to the authority etc. Score 2 is assigned to the similar statements. Their authors list the experts both with critical and loyal attitude. The average score of the Rustavi 2 motivation relevance to its function is 1.67 which is more than that of the civil society (which was 1.3). This means that, according to the experts, within the civil society system Rustavi-2 had the highest political motivation.

Tables 3 and 7 include the data on actions by Rustavi 2 and the related persons. The number is the highest of all the definite

actors – 28 and 23 of which read the neutral attitude while 1 of them shows positive attitude to the activities of Rustavi-2 and 4 give the negative attitude (the authors of the latter statements share one common feature – currently their attitude is critical to the revolution group). These data are interesting in the context of the attitude to the civil society being positive, that is 0.13 (in both cases the number of the statement is not small). It is clear that the experts, even unconsciously (based on the fact that 20 authors out of 28 show positive attitude to the revolution group) think more critically of Rustavi-2 than of the civil society.

Activities described in 17 regulations out of 28 fit to a more or less extent in the media functions, as long as the experts consider Rustavi -2 to be the example of journalism which gave grounds for its success, it worked 22 hours per day; succeeded in mobilizing large number of people and helped maintain the revolution spirit etc. Statement 11 shows the activities which do not fit in with the free media standards. More precisely, the statement says that, Rustavi- 2 and the Liberty Institute were decision-makers and that Rustavi- 2 was the body of the revolution, its public headquarter and the leader of the Revolution etc. The description of such type of activities was scored by 2. Among the two-score regulation authors, there are only three who had been and still hold the liberal attitude to the Revolution group. Other respondents share the position rather critical towards the revolutionary group.

Tables 4 and 8 show the data that refers to the relation of other

actors towards Rustavi-2. There are only 5 statements. None of these statement shows the authors' attitude (Table 4). As for the attitude of other actors to Rustavi -2, all of them are beyond the scope of media relations and are scored by 2 (for example, they say that there were ongoing negotiations with Rustavi 2 involving the Government, that the opposition invested big sum, that the Government offered money etc). 3 out of 5 authors had been and still are loyal to the Revolution group. The indicator of function relevance is the highest here – 2 (Table 8).

As a conclusion the list of the experts' opinion regarding Rustavi 2 is as follows:

On its motivation :

Rustavi 2 worked openly	E=LLL	A=1	F=1
Rustavi 2 did a good job and without any pushing	E=LLL	A=1	F=1
Rustavi 2 was in the opposition from the beginning. Or they knew that there would be risks unless the revolution took the place, so they were too radical	E=LLL	A=0	F=2
Rustavi 2 simply fought against Shevardnadze purposefully	E=CCC	A=0	F=2
Rustavi 2 had always been on bad terms with Shevardnadze while they kept good	E=LLL	A=0	F=2

relations with Zhvania and then with Saakashvili			
Kitsmarishvili wanted to come to authority	E=CCC	A= - 1	F= 2

On the actions by Rustavi 2 and the persons related to it -

Rustavi 2 was the example of civil journalism	E=LLL	A= 1	F= 1
There would not have been a revolution without Rustavi 2. It worked for 22 hours per day	E=LLL	A= 0	F= 1
Rustavi 2 significantly facilitated the success	E=LLL	A= 0	F= 1
Rustavi 2 was the standing subject of the Revolution	E=LLL	A= 0	F= 0
Rustavi 2 was the body of the Revolution, its public headquarters	E=LLL	A= 0	F= 2
Rustavi 2 was the source of information	E=LLL	A= 0	F= 0

for everybody		0	1
All other media was anti-revolutionary (i.e. Rustavi 2 was revolutionary)	E=LLL	A= 0	F= 2
Rustavi 2 ... was very radical	E=LLL	A= 0	F= 1
Rustavi 2 was one of the moving forces	E=LLL	A= 0	F= 0
Rustavi 2 mobilized people	E=LLL	A= 0	F= 1
Rustavi 2 often dictated further steps to the leaders	E=LLL	A= 0	F= 2
Rustavi 2 was very influential	E=LLL	A= 0	F= 1
Rustavi 2 played the key role	E=LLL	A= 0	F= 1
E. Khoperia called for actions	E=LLC	A= 0	F= 2
Rustavi 2 managed to mobilize people and maintain the spirit of revolution, it was a moving force	E=LLC	A= 0	F= 0
Rustavi 2 served the opposition	E=LLC	A= 0	F= 2
Rustavi 2 was the play with the weight of a	E=LLC	A= 0	F= 2

political party		0	0
Rustavi 2 was the active participant of the Revolution	E=LLC	A= 0	F= 0
Rustavi 2 worked unilaterally	E=LLC	A= -1	F= 1
Rustavi 2 and the Nationals held the same attitude. They were conspired	E=LLC	A= -1	F= 2
Rustavi 2 organized the revolution	E=CLC	A= 0	F= 2
The public opinion would not have been formed had not been there Rustavi 2.	E=CLC	A= 0	F= 1
Rustavi 2 was one of the creators of the Revolution	E=CLC	A= 0	F= 0
Rustavi 2 was the leader of the Revolution	E=CLC	A= 0	F= 2
Rustavi 2 (Kitsmarishvili) bargained with both sides to support the one who would pay more	E=CLC	A= -1	F= 2
“Freedom institute” and “Rustavi 2” where the decision makers (in the revolution processes)	E=CCC	A= 0	F= 2
Rustavi 2 was a party TV	E=CCC	A= 0	F= 2



Rustavi 2 reported the meeting of 5000 as though the whole Georgia was there	E=CCC	A= -1	F= 1
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On relations of other members of society with Rustavi 2

The negotiations were held with Rustavi 2 as with a key player	E=LLL	A= 0	F= 2
The opposition invested a lot of money in Rustavi 2	E=CLC	A= 0	F= 2
Rustavi 2 was provided with guarantees from the opposition	E=LLL	A= 0	F= 2
The opposition talked to Channel 1 officially but dealt with Rustavi 2.	E=CCC	A= 0	F= 2
The government offered Rustavi 2 lots of money	E=LLL	A= 0	F= 2

There is no structural and evolution analysis provided as the experts' materials did not cover any statement relevant to these categories.

**The State TV Channel**

Tables 3 and 7 show the data on the actions of the State Television and of the persons related to it. The number of statements, only five, is already an indicator of the experts'

attitude while three of them express a negative attitude by those experts who show loyal attitude to the Revolution (Table 3). In whole, average attitude is negative – (-0.6) – the most negative in all.

If we consider the function of the national media to support the national policy, in this case, according to the statement, TV-1 channel practically failed to fulfill its function (Table 7). There is only one case when it meets the function of the national media – “the first channel fulfilled the tasks”, “under-reported the number of people”. The rest of the statements intensified the failure to fulfill the obligations – “it worked even for the opposition”, “there was no point in its work” and so on. Relevance to the function is evaluated as -0.6 (this is the only negative average weight in regards to the function in the material. (See Table 7).

The tables 4 and 8 show the data on just two statements, which deals with the relations of other actors with the national TV channel. Both authors reveal critical attitude to the revolution group. The activities given by these statements do not meet the media relation standards – “both Government and opposition pressed on the national TV” (Table 8).

In general, the list of the statements regarding the national TV looks as follows:

Actions by the national TV and the persons related to it:

The first channel worked even for the opposition	E=LLL	A= 0	F= -1
National media helped to popularize Saakashvili	E=CCC	A= 0	F= -1
K. Kandiashvili made the population sleep	E=LLC	A= -1	F= -1
Fulfilled the tasks of the opposition (under-reported the number of people at the rallies)	E=LLL	A= -1	F= 1
The work was pointless	E=LLL	A= -1	F= -1

#### Relations of other actors with the national TV

Both government and the opposition influenced the official TV	CCC	0	2
Zhvania weakened the state TV	CNN	0	2

#### Other Members of the Civil Society

The tables 2 and 6 show just one statement to describe the motifs of *Kmara* and other non-governmental bodies – that is to make the population see the true face of the government – in experts’ view - and accelerate the processes. The expert has an loyal

attitude (Table 2). However, “process acceleration” motif is more relevant to that of political organization and therefore score 2 was given (Table 6).

Tables 3 and 7 show the data on the activities of the definite representatives of the civil society. The attitude is not shown in two statements (out of total five) while the rest of the statements reveal the positive attitude (table 3). The scores to denote attitude are average (+ 0.6).

The two experts whose attitude is critical, describe the activities, which are more relevant to a political organization than NGO – develop the plan for the revolution, financial support to the opposition and so on. The statements were given two scores in terms of relevance to the public activities and function. The authors of the remaining three statements say that the actors played well and were given one score. In general, the average score for relevance with functions is 1.4 (Table 7).

Tables 4 and 8 show one statement which deals with the specific civil subjects. The attitude of the author is negative (Table 4), while the attitude to the NGOs described by him does not correspond to their functions – the experts thinks that they were fed to organize revolution. The statement is evaluated by 2 scores (Table 8).

Tables 5 – 9 list the data on the development of the specific member of the civil society. They say “Young Lawyers did not turn out to be lucky enough to become governmental”. This

quote shows the author’s negative attitude to NGOs generally (Table 5).

In general, the statements of the experts on the specific members of the civil society (other than Rustavi 2 and national TV channel) are as follows:

On their motive:

CS and <i>Kmara</i> were to show the population the true face of the Georgian government and accelerate the processes	E=LLC	A= 1	F= 2
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On concrete subjects of civil society (besides Rustavi 2 and National TV):

The plan was developed by the Liberty Institute	E=CCC	A= 0	F= 2
The Liberty Institute, GYLA and <i>ALPE</i> supported the opposition financially and organized meetings etc.	E=CLC	A= 0	F= 2
“Green Wave” was pro-revolution and not only by words, but as well by music (They played rock music).	E=LLL	A= 1	F= 1
NGO sector developed democratic and liberal mentality – (media, Liberty Institute, GYLA, <i>ALPE</i> )	E=CNN	A= 1	F= 1

Channel 9 was impartial	E=CLC	A= 1	F= 1
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On the relations between the other members of the civil society and the specific subject (other than Rustavi 2 and National TV).

Most of the NGOs received financial support from Soros, the NGOs were fed by revolution. Those who were financed from the neutral sources held the neutral attitude.	E= CCC	A= -1	F= 2
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Evolution of the specific member of the civil society (other than Rustavi 2 and National TV).

<i>Young Lawyers</i> were ‘not lucky’ enough (they failed to become “governmentals”).	E=CCC	A= -1	F=1
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Combined data of the civil society and its specific actors.

Tables 2-9 show the combined data on the civil society (in general) and its specific actors under the systemic parameters. We are going to discuss the attitudes revealed through the parameters.

Table 2 once again proves that, the experts were not much interested in the motives of the actors as there are only 10 statements. However, motivation of Rustavi 2 seems to be of

more interest for them. Such attitude of the experts gives the ground to assume that they were less oriented on explaining the civil society's activities and were focusing on description. The attitude revealed through the discussion on the civil society motivation is positive: +0.11.

While discussing the activities of the civil society (Table 3), there is a marked negative attitude to the Rustavi 2 and the national TV. In general, the positive attitude gained slight prevalence.. The attitude of other actors to the civil society is of insignificant interest for the experts (perhaps absence of orientation accounts for this fact). The average weight of the attitude is negative – (-0.13). While discussing the civil society development (Table 5) the expert's interest remains even lower (just three statements) and contains basically negative attitudes (-1.0). There is no point in discussing these data because of small amount of the materials involved.

As regards the function of the civil society for the purpose of revolution, the experts' statements reveal the following picture. Table 6 shows that the correlation of the civil society's function with its motivation is evaluated by 16 scores. If not consider the single statement which gives 2 scores, we can see that Rustavi 2 has the biggest weight in this regard. Its average indicator is highest above 1 which gives the ground to assume that it was most politically motivated.

As for the relevance of the function and activities (Table 3), here both, civil society in general and Rustavi 2 had gone beyond

their functions. The average data were influenced by negative evaluation of the relevance of national TV with its function. The average weight is +1.55.

Almost similar score is given to the attitude of other actors to the civil society which makes us think that other actors (mainly political actors) pushed the civil society to step out of its scope. There is a big number of 2-score data in this table. However, their small number does not allow us to carry out reliable analysis (Table 8).

The experts drew the least attention to the development of the civil society. There are only three statements on this issue (Table 9). The average score is 0.

In general, it should be noted that the attitude of experts is not similar to that of different actors of the civil society. Presumably, the general attitude to the civil society rests upon the attitude to the NGOs rather than that of the media. (Experts are quite critical towards the TV channels and they have not even mentioned the printed press). Similarly, the negative attitude is noticeable to the relations of the politicians towards the civil society.

The relevance of the civil sector to its functions is also interesting an issue. If we judge by the expert's statements, in almost all aspects discussed (motivation, action, relations with other actors) the civil society steps out of its scope (or it is made to do so). All revolutions are marked by such behavior by the social groups. Especially those groups that are involved in the



revolution and serve as a basis for it, often overstep their scopes of functions. According to T. Pane, in the transitional periods, the civil society opposes existing regimes and broadens its scope of action.<sup>116</sup>

Based on the above mentioned, we can assume, that the analysis of the experts material corroborated to the hypothesis posed in the beginning. In the experts' opinion, the civil society (NGOs and media) was one of the factors for organizing the revolution (regardless the experts' attitudes to their roles whether negative or positive). They were the ones whose social constructs created the spirit of revolution. However, development of the constructs was not the civil society's only contribution to the Revolution and not only the analysis of materials, but also quotations corroborate to this statement.

### **Categorizing statements according to the experts' political views**

The analysis revealed that the experts of similar political orientation gave similar statements. To find out the influence of the experts' political orientation on their judgment, the statements were grouped with consideration of the experts' stance.

The annex includes the tables, which group the statements under

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<sup>116</sup> Offe C. , *Modernity and State: East, West*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996.

codes (#10-20). The frequency and average weights are combined in the Table 18. As can be seen, the average attitude is negative in the statements of those authors, who had been and still are neutral (NNN ), or had been and still are critical to the revolution group (CCC). The positive attitude was absent in other statements of this group. In the statements of other authors, the positive attitude is revealed on the frequency level and the average weight of the positive attitude is larger than that of the negative. Therefore, it can be concluded, that the expert's political views influenced his or her statements when these views remained unchanged regardless the changes of the situation (before the Revolution, during the Revolution, after the Revolution). The number of such statement is  $9+21=30$  which constitutes 23.4% of the whole material. Similarly, it can be assumed, that the political orientation affects those who had been and still are of loyal attitude to the revolution group (LLL). The number of such statements constitutes the 36.7% of the total number (in other words, more than the other two categories). It is noteworthy that unlike the other two groups, the statements under this group contradicts to its own political orientation (i.e. expressing negative attitude). In the column of -1 (frequency) it can be seen that, the experts of loyal political orientation produced the statements that included negative attitudes (in 6.38% of the cases). These factors account for the total average weight being practically neutral.

As a conclusion, we can say that expert's attitude towards the

revolution group, affects his or her judgment in those cases, where orientation is of statistical nature. However, the final results of this survey were not affected by the experts' orientation. This can be explained by the fact that the criticism was not unfamiliar to the loyal experts, and selection of the experts having different attitudes was on a parity basis and therefore different positions neutralized each other reflecting on the average importance of the attitude.

In the context of the aforementioned conclusion, it is interesting to find out the relation of the civil society to its function. As seen from the appropriate table (#29), the experts evaluated this indicator by 1.26 score. In other words, the experts think that the civil society had been broadening the scope of its function during the survey. If we are more oriented on those cases, where the number of statements is not small, 2 score evaluations are set most frequently by those, who had been and still are neutral (NNN) or critical (CLC, CCC). At the same time, the negative evaluation -1, that the civil society failed to fulfill its functions, is the most frequent with regularly neutral (NNN) and negative (CCC) and critical experts. It is worth noting that, percentage of the frequency of this response in the first group is higher than in the other group.

The results show that, the neutral and critical experts underlined the fact that the civil society had broadened its scope of function unlike the loyal experts, who considered that the civil society acted within the scope of its functions. These tendencies point

out that all of the experts, regardless their political orientation, considered it less acceptable that the civil society step out of its scope. Despite this fact, the results showed that the civil society “supported” the Revolution more than it was required by its function. This result gives grounds to assume that the experts’ evaluation was more or less impartial to describe the reality and that the civil society was indeed the active social strata for the Rose Revolution.

**Thus the general analysis of the expert statements can be summarized as follows.**

Most of the experts in spite of their political bias, acknowledge the role of civil society in the RR as important; especially that of TV in general and of Rustavi-2 in particular. The latter, according to their evaluation, performed as an active participant.

The role of NGOs, as an active part of the civil society was considered as similarly important by the experts; especially that of the Liberty Institute and the Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association.

The experts’ answers depended greatly on their political sympathies and bias. Emphasizing this or that event, evaluation of political figures, revolutionary factors, perspectives, etc. is in strict concordance with social-psychological appropriateness (party bias, Contrast-assimilation effect, dissonance reduction).

Neutral and critically minded experts insisted on the civil society surpassing its functions, while the loyal ones tried to prove that it stayed within its limits.

Of the two major components of civil society (NGOs and mass media), it is the mass media that have been attributed a role of particular importance in the Rose Revolution by the experts we interviewed. As indicated by many experts, the mass media became a major weapon of the revolution. It is worth noting that the authorities (Shevardnadze) also managed mass media. The question arises – why the media were providing the messages of the opposition apparently more efficient or convincing to the people, than the media providing information by and from the government. The media content analysis in Chapter 6 was carried out to address this question.

## **Chapter Six. Mass Media before and during the Rose Revolution**

### **Content analysis of the printed media**

Media strategies can be studied based on both electronic and printed media. In every country, the printed media have a higher degree of independence in comparison with the electronic. In Georgia, apart from that, the printed media were first to gain independence. Hence, the printed media will presumably show the nature of media strategy more clearly. It should also be mentioned that the printed media can be better described quantitatively. This is why, we decided to analyze the printed media with the help of quantitative method of content analysis and to study the electronic media strategy on the basis of expert research.

We determined the criteria and chose 3 newspapers for the analysis:

- *24 hours* – an independent newspaper that expressed interests of the opposition of that time. The newspaper had common editorship with the oppositional TV channel “Rustavi 2” (Rustavi 2 even used the TV studio, specially

arranged in the editorial office of *24 hours*). Thus, presumably, the *24 hours* newspaper followed the same general strategy as Rustavi 2.

- “The Republic of Georgia” – newspaper that reflected the position of government at that time (now it is an independent organ) and was managed by the same state structures as the state TV channel. Thus, presumably, the analysis of the “Republic of Georgia” can reveal the specific features of the general informational policy of the government.
- “The Weekly palette” – the most highly rated independent digest newspaper of that time, without a clear political orientation. The analysis of this newspaper will help to reveal the media strategy, when not influenced by political forces.

The following textual indices were selected for the content analysis:

- The actor of an article, i.e. subject (a person or social institution) referred to in an article;
- The topic of an article, referred to by the actor or concerning the actor (critics or support);
- The manner / genre (ordinary narrative, grotesque, humor) used by the actor to develop the topic;
- The attitude (positive or negative) to each actor.

Each textual index was divided into specific subject units: for example, a certain addressee (e.g. executive power) is accused (e.g. of corruption) and this is made in some manner (e.g. plain text, comparison or sarcasm). A sentence or phrase was selected as a search unit for the content analysis.

We analyzed every article concerning the elections, corruption, the development of democratic processes, human rights (these issues were mainly discussed at the meetings in the days of revolution). At the same time we fixed the date of publication, author and volume of the article, format of the newspaper and the place of the article in it. We also established a coding system. The analysis covered the period of September, October and November, 2003 (the period directly preceding and covering the Rose Revolution).

The project was mainly focused on civil society. However, we also studied the characteristics of other actors (persons and organizations) of the Rose Revolution. This was done with the purpose, firstly, to see the place of civil society in the total system of media processes. We studied common features and differences with the other actors without proper consideration of other factors. The analysis of only the “civil society” actor may lead to a wrong conclusion regarding the role and media representations of this actor. Secondly, by means of studying the frequencies of actors and topics mentioned in order to reveal the information strategy followed by the media during the period of the revolution.



## **Main results**

The main parameter of the analysis is the frequency of actors and topics mentioned in the selected media publications. The logic of data processing and the percentage rate of frequencies are given in the Attachment # 2. The percentages show the ratio of absolute numbers to the number of sentences in the total database, which means that the percentages indicate the share of each frequency in the total database of all the three named newspapers.

### **24 hours**

We begin our analysis with *24 hours*, the newspaper of oppositional orientation. First we shall see the total frequencies of all the actors and then – each frequency separately (Table #1). It is clearly shown from the numbers indicating the total frequencies that:

- Frequencies of actors trend to increase as the revolution approaches, particularly in November (Table #7 shows that the sum of indexes of changes is the largest in November - 9.82). This indicates the political activity and synchronism of the rhythm of events.

- Generally, the frequency of negative appraisals of the actors increases as November approaches. In November the index of changes in negative appraisals reaches 8.776, which fills the major part of the total index. This means that in *24 hours* all the actors were mentioned more frequently as the revolution approached, but that the allusions were mainly negative.
- The frequency of positive appraisals also increases in November, but it is still much smaller in comparison with the frequency of negative appraisals. The rate of growth is also much lower. The relative index of changes in November is 1.04 (Table #7).

Presumably, in November, the growth of frequency was typical to those actors who were considered more important for the political processes. The frequency of insignificant actors either does not increase or reduces. Based on the criteria of the November changes (Table #7), we can conclude that:

- According to *24 hours*, the following actors were considered insignificant for the revolution: “the governmental block”, “Burjanadze”, “Zhvania” and generally “the opposition”.

According to *24 hours*, significant actors were considered to be: “Shevardnadze”, “the government”, “Abashidze”, “the radical opposition”, “*kmara*”, “Devdariani”, “NGOs”, “Saakashvili”,

“Rustavi-2” and “the mass media” (actors are listed according to the reduction of the November index of changes).

In the total sum of frequencies (Table #1), the negative appraisals (53.1%) 11.3 times exceed the positive (4.69%). At the same time, it should be mentioned that the percentages in our data indicate the share of index in the total database. This means that the negative appraisals published in *24 hours* comprise more than half of all the data from the three newspapers. The largest difference between the frequencies of negative and positive appraisals is seen in October, before the elections. **This encourages us to suppose that the forgery of the election results was not the key motive for creating a revolutionary spirit. This spirit of revolution had appeared well before the elections.**

- The negative appraisals of the governmental actors significantly exceed the positive (government – by 368.6, Abashidze – by 25.5, governmental block – by 18.6, Shevardnadze – by 14.4, Devdariani – by 2.27). It is remarkable that the negative appraisals of the opposition also exceed the positive (general opposition – by 8.1, Zhvania – by 3.2, Saakashvili – by 1.35).
- “Burjanadze” forms an exception to the rule of negativism (positive appraisals exceed the negative by 1.98). The same applies to the “radical opposition” (positive appraisals exceed the negative by 2.4).

- Such primacy of negative appraisals over the positive means that the information strategy of *24 hours* engendered the creation of a general negativistic climate, i.e. the encouragement of an electorate inclined to protest. Apparently this strategy did not aim to offer better political alternatives. It simply spread negativism starting and increasing before the elections. (The same result was received on the basis of the electronic media analysis).

While the putting down of the government was a key factor in creating a revolutionary spirit, let us see its relation to the declared reason of protest. **The declared reason for revolutionary protest were the forged election results.** Logically reasoning, one might expect the frequency of mentioning Mrs N. Devdariani's name, the chairman of the Election Committee, to increase dramatically in the following period in comparison with the other actors. The frequency of negative appraisals of her person does actually increase, but in November these comprise only 5% of the total of negative appraisals of the "government". The November index of changes results in just 0.19 in negative appraisals of Devdariani, and - 0.11 in positive appraisals, while, for example, the November index of changes in negative appraisals of Shevardnadze results in 4.3. Although the negative appraisals of the Chairman of the Election Committee are less high than one might expect in view of the rigged elections, it should be mentioned that in September the positive appraisals of Mrs N. Devdariani almost twice

exceeded the negative. In other words the decrease in popularity is significant in view of where she came from.

Yet, the lack of consistency between the forged election results and high protest against the Chairman of the Election Committee as reflected in the media, could suggest that the infringement of the election process was just one of various reasons to protest. Perhaps we should understand the formally given reason to protest as being the election fraud, as a “starting device”; as a legitimate discourse bundling general feelings of dissatisfaction.

**Based on the above, we suppose that: the information attack of 24 hours was not fuelled only by the election factor and that the main target of this attack was not the election committee, but rather the government of the country, especially Shevardnadze himself.**

### **The Republic of Georgia**

We shall continue our analysis with the governmental newspaper *Republic of Georgia*. Frequencies of actors also increase in this newspaper as the Rose Revolution approaches, particularly in November.

The sum of the November indexes of changes, according to the negative appraisals of actors results in 2.79 (Table #7). The index of changes according to the positive appraisals of actors is a negative figure, i.e. less than average (-2.68). As we see, the dynamics of frequencies in November is rather slow in

comparison with the oppositional newspaper *24 hours* (where this index is 8.78), but still significant in comparison with the neutral *Weekly palette* (where this index is 0.707). It is remarkable that the frequency of positive appraisals in the governmental newspaper, the main function of which is the advocacy of the government, in November is less than average, which means that this newspaper contradicted its own political goal and function.

- Based on the November index of changes we may conclude that the *Republic of Georgia* considered the following actors insignificant for the current political processes: NGOs, mass media, Abashidze, Devdariani, government, Burjanadze, Zhvania and generally opposition (their indexes are small or negative). Significant actors were considered radical opposition, Shevardnadze, “Rustavi-2”, Saakashvili and “*kmara*” - their indexes more or less exceed the average (compare with *24 hours*, where the frequency of almost all the actors increases in November).
- The above fact indicates that the governmental media took into consideration a smaller number of facts and attacked their political opponents at a narrower front than the oppositional media did. The reason may be the fact that by that time a general discourse against the government had become dominant and had become partly accepted by even by the governmental media journalists,

making them somewhat passive in their support to the government. Perhaps they performed their functions within the limits of particular governmental orders. This could explain the limited “information front” by the governmental media.

- In the *Republic of Georgia* the frequency of negative appraisals in the total number of frequencies is only 1.4 times higher than the positive (in *24 hours* – 8 times higher). If we compare the frequencies in the *Republic of Georgia* and *24 hours*, we shall see that in the *Republic of Georgia* the frequency of negative appraisals is 2.8 times lower and the frequency of positive appraisals is 2.7 times higher than in *24 hours*.
- In the appraisal of the governmental actors, the unbalance is often in favor of positive appraisals: the positive appraisals of Shevardnadze are 14.15 times more frequent than the negative. It should also be mentioned that this unbalance reduces as the revolution approaches, although it should have, on the contrary, increased due to the orientation of the newspaper. From the governmental actors only “Devdariani” and the “governmental block” have a small positive balance, while the frequency of negative appraisals of the “government” increases.
- **Based on the above we may conclude that the information strategy of the newspaper was to support**

**just Shevardnadze and not the government as a whole (while the oppositional 24 hours attacked the whole governmental front, including Shevardnadze).**

- The *Republic of Georgia* was critical to all the oppositional actors, except for the “general opposition”, where the frequency of positive appraisals 1.7 times exceeds the negative. This element indicates that the governmental media sometimes acted in favor of the opposition (the same was mentioned by the experts). It cannot be excluded that the journalists were influenced by the stereotype (social construct) that the opposition in general is necessary and good for the country, while the oppositional media did not consider this stereotype. In view of these results we think that the governmental media policy was influenced by the instructions of the government and not so much by the actual position of journalists, which became the reason for the inconsequence in the informational strategy.
- At the same time, the informational strategy of the *Republic of Georgia* was based on demonstrating the positive features of Shevardnadze, rather than on the support to the government in total. Similarly, it criticized individual oppositional politicians rather than ‘the’ opposition in general.



- The above tendency is seen in the dynamics – ‘the’ opposition in general is not mentioned in November and the radical opposition is not mentioned in September and October, while the criticism against the government by the oppositional media reaches its maximum. The most convincing explanation of this is that the newspaper did not actually work for the government. This viewpoint is supported by the passivity of the newspaper in protection of the government and its negative appraisal of the actor - “government” (while a governmental newspaper should have ensured a positive attitude towards the government).
- These facts show that the goal and function of a governmental newspaper can be thwarted, if the civil position of the journalists diverges from the formal position of the government.
- Lack of aggressiveness, invariable frequency of the big part of actors, partial support of the initial position makes the *Republic of Georgia* different from the oppositional *24 hours*.
- It is remarkable that the governmental newspaper, unlike the oppositional, does not properly appraise the role of the civil sector in the political processes. In particular, the frequency of mentioning NGOs does not increase in November. This also means that the newspaper does not render a space to such highly rated players as NGOs,

even for the support of the government. This can be explained by the fact that the governmental media either underestimated or had no information about the popularity of NGOs or purposely rejected them.

### **The Weekly Palette**

The next subject of our analysis is the politically neutral newspaper the *Weekly Palette* and the frequencies of actors in it (Table #3).

- The total frequency of mentioning actors does not increase here as the Rose revolution approaches – in November. Frequencies in November are the same as in October and only slightly more than in September.
- The November index of changes in the negative appraisals is 0.7 (Table #7), i.e. the dynamics of the negative appraisals in November is slower here than in the politically oriented newspapers. The index of changes in positive appraisals of the actors is 0.14 in November. The degree of changes is much lower than in the oppositional *24 hours*. However, the frequency of positive appraisals still grows, unlike the *Republic of Georgia* where this frequency, on the contrary, reduces. This means that the oppositional *24 hours* and even the neutral *Weekly Palette* at a critical juncture better expressed the positive and negative issues than the governmental *Republic of Georgia*. This means that the

difference between the governmental and the oppositional media lay not only in their political positions, but also in their professionalism. It should also be mentioned that the frequency of political actors is much less than in the other two newspapers (in comparison with *24 hours* frequency of negative appraisals is 6.07 times lower and the frequency of positive appraisals – 3.5 times lower in comparison with *Republic of Georgia* where the frequency of negative appraisals is 2.1 times lower and the frequency of positive appraisals – 9.9 times lower).

- If we assume that the frequency of significant actors increases in November, while the frequency of insignificant actors remains invariable, we shall see that in the *Weekly Palette* there is almost no difference between “significant” and “insignificant” actors. It may be even concluded that all the actors are considered insignificant. It should be mentioned that the frequency of positive appraisals of NGOs increases by November.
- Frequency of negative appraisals here also exceeds the positive, but to a lower degree than in *24 hours*. “Burjanadze” is also an exception here, whose positive appraisal is 2.5 times more frequent than negative.
- Information strategy of the newspaper was a relatively passive discussion of the political processes. These

discussions bore the same tendencies as the strategy of *24 hours*.

Based on the data above we can conclude that in each of the three newspapers the increase of frequency was about a negative attitude to the government rather than about a positive appraisal of the leaders of the revolution (exception to a small degree is Saakashvili).

## **Conclusion**

- The Oppositional newspaper *24 hours* was the most active: it considered almost all the political actors significantly, the frequencies in the mentioning of actors increased as the revolution approached. Moreover, the frequency of negative appraisals increased more rapidly.
- The negative appraisals so much exceeded the positive, that we can assume the information strategy of *24 hours* to be the ‘creation’ of a general negative climate and the encouragement of a ‘protest electorate’. The strategy did not include the offering of better political alternatives. The negativity originated not only from the forged election results. It started earlier and increased before the elections. (The same result emerged from the electronic media analysis).
- The governmental newspaper was more passive. It took into consideration a smaller number of factors and

attacked its political opponents more narrowly than the oppositional media did.

- The information strategy of the *Republic of Georgia* was based on demonstrating the positive features of Shevardnadze, rather than on giving support to the government as a whole. Similarly, it criticized separate oppositionists rather than ‘the’ opposition in general.
- A lack of aggressiveness, an invariable frequency of mentioning a large part of the actors, a partial support of their own initial position makes the *Republic of Georgia* different from the oppositional *24 hours*.
- The informational strategy of the *Weekly palette* was a relatively passive discussion of the political processes. However, these discussions bore the same tendencies as the strategy of *24 hours*.

Now let us analyze the total results of the three newspapers. Common features of the information strategies can be seen from the frequencies of the total system of actors. Let us analyze this system, including positive and negative appraisals of actors in the newspapers with a different orientation. If we list the data according to the reduction of frequencies, we shall receive the actors’ ratings (Table #5).

First of all, we shall see the place of different actors in the total media space. This is evident from the total frequencies of actors in all the three newspapers (Table #4) and their ratings (Table

#5), and also the ratings of actors of different categories (governmental, oppositional or civil sector) (Table #6).

These data make clear that during significant social or political processes, the media consider political subjects noteworthy, while they themselves are initiators and vehicles of such processes and discourses. Hence, non-political subjects, including representatives of civil society, held a smaller place in media publications. One of the reasons of this tendency may be the fact that political actors at that time, unlike the civil society actors, needed “media-rating”, and mass media performed this political function. There could also be other reasons. **In particular, the journalists, presumably, found it difficult to see the influence of civil society representatives on the political processes. Let us try to check this assumption.**

The data indicate that the role of civil society should be analyzed differently according to the different actors and newspapers. We see from the total results and ratings in the three newspapers that:

- The most seldom mentioned actor is “mass media”, while the most often mentioned actor is “Rustavi-2” (Table #6). However, “Rustavi-2” has the highest frequency of negative appraisals.
- The only actor of civil society, which in total has more positive than negative appraisals, is the “NGO”.
- If we analyze each newspaper separately (Table #4), it will become clear that “NGOs” do not have negative

appraisals except for in *24 hours*, where the positive appraisals still exceed the negative.

- “Kmara” and “Rustavi-2” are always mentioned in a negative context, except for in *24 hours*, where the negative appraisals of “Kmara” still exceed the positive. “Rustavi-2” is mainly mentioned in a positive context.
- The above and many other data taken from the newspapers and interviews with experts, encourage us to think that some civil society actors (Kmara, Rustavi-2) were so politicized, that they were estimated (by the printed media) in the same way (i.e. as negative) as political organizations and not as civil society actors such as NGOs. This is why we should presume that “NGO” actors were considered the most apolitical in the civil sector. This explains the higher frequency of positive appraisals of NGOs and their low rating (as we have already mentioned, due to the strategy based on negativism, the actors estimated positively could not have high frequencies in the Georgian media).
- The interest in civil society increases in November. It is interesting to note that at this point in time, in the oppositional *24 hours*, the share of positive appraisals of civil society in the total frequency (+0.58%) is exactly the same as of the leaders of the revolution (Saakashvili, Burjanadze, Zhvania) in the same newspaper (+0.58%). This comparison

shows that from the viewpoint of this newspaper, the civil society has the same share of positive contribution to the revolutionary processes as the political authors of the revolution. Presumably, in order to obtain confidence, the media brought NGOs to the fore, which caused the increased frequency of positive appraisals of this actor.

- It is remarkable that the total frequency of civil society in *24 hours* and *The Republic of Georgia* (1.73% and 2.58%) is higher than in the *Weekly Palette* (0.3%) (Table #4). This means that the political newspapers paid much more attention to the civil sector than the neutral *Weekly palette*, hence, the civil sector in Georgia was a significant actor of the political processes, and this was acknowledged by the politicized press, which was well familiar with the revolutionary “nitty-gritty”. Thus the received data leaves no ground to assume that the journalists did not know the “value” of the civil society. It is more likely that the journalists considered the civil society a significant actor, but while politicians were in a more urgent need of intensive PR and while the accent was made on negativism, the civil society was less frequently mentioned in the press than the politicians.
- As we see from the Table #6, the total frequency of civil society actors is less that of political sector, i.e. the newspapers more often mentioned the political spectrum than the civil society.



- The highest frequency is typical to the governmental actors, especially to the “government”. It holds over one third of the total publications (32.3%) (See below).

This result firstly means that:

- Oppositional media was more active in demonstrating political actors than the governmental media. The neutral media was the most passive.
- Media strategy of the studied newspapers was to bring the accent to criticism (the share of negative appraisals in the total publications is 80.5%). The highest disbalance to the negativism was typical to the oppositional press.
- **It is remarkable that the mentioning of certain civil society representatives (Kmara, NGOs) was more important to the oppositional press than the mentioning of some leaders of the opposition (Saakashvili).**

Generally, it should be mentioned that *24 hours* considered governmental actors more important (though negatively) for the revolution than the opposition. This means that the printed media policy was totally based on negation. The same is true for the electronic media.

- In all the three newspapers the highest frequency is given to the actors “government” and “Shevardnadze”, which can be explained by the high frequency of negative

appraisals. The lowest frequency is given to “NGOs”, but unlike all the other actors (except for “Devdariani”) the frequency of positive appraisals here considerably exceeds the negative.

- If we compare the actors according to their categories (Table #6), we shall see that the frequency of governmental actors keeps 72% in the total number, 59.2% of which are the negative appraisals.
- The share of oppositional actors is 23.4%, 17.5% of which is negative.
- The share of the civil sector is only 4.69%.

The analysis of the November index of changes brings us to the interesting conclusion (Tables ## 7 and 8). As we see:

- The most dramatic changes in November are typical to the frequencies of such actors as “Shevardnadze”, “government”, “radical opposition” “generally opposition”, etc.
- The index of “NGOs” and “mass media” is considerably lower than the index of “Rustavi-2” and “Kmara”.
- **Despite the insignificant changes, “NGOs” appeared to be more relevant to the revolution than such political subjects as “Mamaladze” and “Sarishvili”. According to these data, “Rustavi-2” was more**

**important for the revolution than “Saakashvili”, and “Kmara” – more important than “Burjanadze”.**

- In the total rating of the two indexes (Table #9) the first three actors are “Shevardnadze”, “government” and “radical opposition”, and the last three actors – “mass media”, “NGOs” and “Sarishvili”.

Finally, it should be mentioned that in the newspaper, which supported the revolutionary processes, the civil society was widely covered. In particular:

- Civil society was most frequently mentioned in *24 hours*, which was the most politically active newspaper at that time;
- The manner used by the civil society or used in mentioning the civil society is ordinary narrative;
- **The negative attitude to the civil society is slightly higher than the positive. The picture changes in November;**
- According to the data of the printed media, the necessity of the revolutionary changes was proved by means of total negation of the existing situation (it was difficult to find something positive in case of change of government). This, of course, does not mean that the society did not have its positive vision. Simply, negation

appeared to be more effective in preparing of the revolutionary situation (which is not a surprise).

- In the mass media civil society mainly means the non-governmental sector, and rarely – “groups of interest”, such as “Darbazi”, which represented a wide group of intellectuals, or “Teachers’ Trade Union”, who actively worked for people’s mobilization.

These data clearly show the difference between the strategies of different media facilities with different political orientation – active negation in the oppositional media, which became still more active at the elections time; passive and selective negation of the opponents and selective support of the government in the governmental media, which became still more passive at the elections time. It is interesting if the same strategy is seen in the analysis of the topics covered by mass media at that time.

## **The Analysis of Topics**

We made a content-analysis of five topics: “professionalism” (of the government), “the past”, “honesty” (here corruption was often mentioned), “person” and “democracy” (here the elections were also discussed).

Frequencies of “professionalism” in *24 hours* are given in Table #9. As we can see:

In this newspaper the share of mentioning “professionalism” in negative context holds 23% of the total frequency in the three newspapers, while the share of mentioning it in positive context is – only1%.

In *24 hours* professionalism of the “government” is most often estimated as negative (14.8%), then comes the professionalism of the governmental block (3.4%) and Shevardnadze (2.6%).

Professionalism of Shevardnadze is most often appraised as positive (0.22%). This result reminds us of the fact established in the analysis of ratings - that an important person is often mentioned both in positive (“Whom shall we elect?”) and in negative (“Whom shall we not elect?”) contexts. **It is**

**remarkable that professionalism of “mass media” and “NGOs” is estimated as negative (0.18% and 0.09%).**

The topic “person” in the same newspaper:

The mentioning of “person” in the negative context keeps 12.1% of the total publications, positive mentioning – 1.5%. Negativism is most often related to Shevardnadze (5.7%), government (3.3%) and Abashidze (1.1%). “Person” is most often estimated as positive in case of Shevardnadze (0.34%), Burjanadze (0.31%), Devdariani (0.22%) and NGOs (0.22%). Civil sector is almost never estimated as negative.

The topic “honesty” in *24 hours*:

Mentioning of “honesty” in the negative context holds 10.5% of the total publications, positive mentioning – 1.08%. This parameter is most often used in the criticism of the government

(4.8%) and Shevardnadze (3.8%). Positive appraisal according to this parameter is most often given to radical opposition (0.47%), Shevardnadze (0.16%) and Rustavi-2 (0.16%). From the civil sector, lack of honesty is most often attributed to mass media (0.25%), most seldom – to NGOs (0.02%).

The topic “past” in the same newspaper:

“Past” is mentioned in the negative context in 5.4% of the total publications, in the positive context – in 0.74%. Negativism is most often related to Shevardnadze (2.27%) and government (2.2%). Positive appraisal according to this parameter is most often connected to Shevardnadze (0.36%) and radical opposition (0.29%). From the civil sector only “Kmara” is mentioned in relation to this topic, but always in the negative context (0.22%). Topic “democracy” deserves a special attention – revolution took place under this name.

In the oppositional *24 hours* mentioning of “democracy” in the negative context holds only 1.7% of the total publications, positive mentioning – 0.38%. According to this parameter negative appraisal is most often given to the government (0.43%), Abashidze (0.4%), Shevardnadze (0.29%) and “Kmara” (0.22%). Positive appraisal is most often given to Saakashvili (0.13%), Shevardnadze (0.11%) and Burjanadze (0.09%).

Topic “professionalism” in *The Republic of Georgia*

Holds 17.2% of total frequencies, 10.2% of which are in the negative context. According to this parameter, most often negative appraisal is given to “generally opposition” (4.0%),

“government” (1.7%), “Burjanadze” (1.3%) and “Zhvania” (1.0%). Positive appraisal is most often given to “Shevardnadze” (4.3%), “government” (1.2%) and “governmental block” (0.65%). From the civil sector only the professionalism of NGOs is estimated positively (0.18%), in other groups negative appraisals prevail.

Topic “person” in this newspaper:

Holds 5.5% of total frequencies, 3.7% of which are in the negative context. Negative appraisal is most often given to “Saakashvili” (1.1%), “Zhvania” (0.9%) and “Burjanadze” (0.27%). Positive appraisal of “person” is most often related to “Shevardnadze” (1.5%) and “Devdariani” (0.13%). Civil sector was not given a single positive appraisal, only NGOs have no negative appraisals.

Topic “honesty” in this newspaper:

Holds 5.12% of the total publications, 5.1% of which is in the negative context. Negative estimations are most often given to the “honesty” of radical opposition (1.3%) and Burjanadze (1.0%). All the subjects of civil sector are estimated as negative except for the NGOs.

Topic “past” holds even a smaller place in this newspaper:

4.3% of the total publications, 2.7% of which is in the negative context. Negative appraisals are most often given to the “past” of radical opposition (1.0%). Positive appraisals are most often given to the “past” of Shevardnadze (1.5%). All the subjects of civil sector are estimated as negative except for the NGOs.

“Democracy” in this newspaper holds:

Only 0.07% of the total publications and only in the positive context and in relation only to Shevardnadze.

Topic “professionalism” in the *Weekly Palette* holds:

3.9% of the total publications, 3.6% of which is in the negative context. Negative appraisal is most often given to the professionalism of the government (1.7%) and Shevardnadze (0.69%). Small but more frequent positive appraisals are given to the professionalism of NGOs.

Topic “person” in this newspaper:

Holds only 1.7% of the total publications, 1.5% of which is in the negative context. According to this parameter, estimations are most often given to Shevardnadze, of which 0.43% are negative and 0.13% - positive. Civil sector is not mentioned at all.

Topic “honesty” in the same newspaper:

Holds 2.8% of the total publications, 2.4% of which is in the negative context. According to this parameter, negative estimations are most often given to Shevardnadze (0.81%), government (0.81%) and Zhvania (0.25%). Positive estimations are most often given to Saakashvili (0.11%). Civil sector is not mentioned at all.

Topic “past” in the same newspaper:



Holds 0.99% of the total publications, 0.95% of which is in the negative context. According to this parameter, negative estimations are most often given to “government” (0.27%), “radical opposition” (0.22%) and Shevardnadze (0.20%). Positive estimations are most often given to Burjanadze (0.04%). From the civil sector a small amount of negative appraisals is given to “Kmara” (0.04%) and “Rustavi-2” (0.11%). Other subjects are not mentioned at all.

Topic “democracy” in the same newspaper:

Holds 0.69% of the total publications, 0.58% of which is in the negative context. According to this parameter, negative estimations are most often given to Shevardnadze (0.45%) and government (0.13%). Positive estimations are most often given to Shevardnadze (0.11%). Civil sector in relation to “democracy” is not mentioned at all.

If we compare the newspapers we shall see that:

“Professionalism” is most often discussed in *24 hours* and mostly from the critical viewpoint (Table #24). Most seldom this topic is discussed in the *Weekly palette*. *The Republic of Georgia* discussed this topic mainly from a positive point of view.

The same distribution is seen with the “person”. However, the frequency of this topic is lower than of “professionalism”.

“Honesty”, both from the positive and negative viewpoints is most often mentioned in *24 hours*. Positive appraisals are most seldom given in *The Republic of Georgia*.

Frequency of “past” is low, however, the frequency of negative appraisals is distributed in the same way. Positive appraisals are most frequent in *The Republic of Georgia*.

“Democracy” has the lowest frequency in all the newspapers (Table #28). The highest frequency is typical to *24 hours*, the lowest – to *The Republic of Georgia*, however here it appears only in the positive context and in relation to Shevardnadze.

In all the three newspapers the highest frequency refers to “professionalism” in the negative context (Table #29), then to the “person” and “honesty”. **Based on this we can conclude that disability and corruption of the government were the actually mentioned reasons for the revolution.** This is confirmed by the rating of topics (Table #30); however the small difference is seen in the index of topic relevancy (Tables ## 31, 32). It is interesting that despite the great importance, the index of professionalism reduces by November, while the critical appraisal of the past increases. Its value is the largest (especially in the *24 hours*). This means that the oppositional propaganda together with the increase of a revolutionary spirit, shifted from criticizing the lack of professionalism to criticizing the past. Finally, based on the analysis of topics in the newspapers we conclude that:

The main cause of the revolution mentioned was the lack of professionalism in the government;

The topic of democracy was not important at that time;

Democracy is not associated with the civic sector!

This picture makes us conclude that the declared and ulterior motives of the revolution were different. As we see, democracy under the name of which the revolution took place, was of a minor interest to the media. The same phenomenon applies to the low frequency in which Devdariani is mentioned, while the declared reason of the revolution was the forging of election results. **The ulterior cause of the revolution may be considered the discontent with the low professionalism and past actions of the government. At the same time it should be mentioned that Shevardnadze often appeared in different topics both in the negative and positive contexts, which means that the attitude towards him was ambivalent.**

Shevardnadze was not unambiguously a negative figure even in the oppositional press, and the negativism of media cannot be explained just by the attitude to him.

Totally the analysis of the press has shown that:

The newspapers more often mentioned the political spectrum than the civil society.

The highest frequency is typical to the governmental actors, especially the “government”. It holds more than one third of the analyzed publications.

Oppositional media was more active in illustrating political actors, than the governmental media. The most passive was the neutral newspaper. Political and public actors were better covered by the oppositional *24 hours* – more than a half of the total frequency. The frequency of mentioning the actors in the

governmental *Republic of Georgia* is approximately twice as low as in *24 hours*. At the same time the frequency of mentioning the actors in the neutral *Weekly Palette* is approximately twice as low as in *The Republic of Georgia*.

The media strategy of the newspapers was to bring an accent on criticism (the sharing of negative appraisals in the total publications is 80.5%). There was a tendency in the oppositional press towards negativism.

For the oppositional newspaper it was more important to mention some subjects of the public sector (Kmara, NGOs) than some leaders of the opposition (Saakashvili).

**In terms of revolutionary processes, the governmental actors were more important for the oppositional newspaper *24 hours* than the oppositional actors.**

Negative appraisals in *24 hours* hold more than a half in the total publications of the three newspapers.

The rigged elections were not the main reason for creating a revolutionary spirit. This spirit had taken shape before the elections.

Negative appraisals of the governmental actors considerably exceed the positive. Negative appraisals of the opposition also exceed the positive, but to a smaller degree.

Exclusion from the total negativism is “Burjanadze” (positive appraisals are 1.98 times more than negative) and “radical opposition” (positive appraisals are 2.4 times more than negative).

Information strategy of the *24 hours* was to create the general climate of negativism, i.e. to establish the protest electorate. This strategy did not mean to offer better political alternatives.

Negativism in *24 hours* did not appear only as a result of the elections fraud. It started earlier and increased before the elections.

The elections factor was not the only reason of informational attack of *24 hours*. This attack was aimed not to the elections administration, but rather to the government of the country, especially to Shevardnadze.

From the public sector the least frequently mentioned actor is “mass media”, the most frequently mentioned – “Rustavi-2”. However, “Rustavi-2” is also most frequently estimated as negative.

The only actor of the public sector, which in total received more positive appraisals than negative, is “NGO”.

In every newspaper “NGOs” are mentioned only in a positive context, except for in *24 hours*, and even there positive appraisals exceed negative.

In every newspaper “Kmara” and “Rustavi-2” are mentioned only in the negative context, except for *24 hours*, and even there negative appraisals exceed positive. As for “Rustavi-2”, it is mainly estimated positively in this newspaper.

For the oppositional newspaper the positive contribution of the civil society in the revolutionary processes equals to the positive contribution of the political authors of the revolution.

Georgian public sector was a significant actor of the political processes. This was acknowledged by the politicized press, which was, unlike the *Weekly Palette* well familiar with the revolutionary “nitty- gritty”.

It is more expected that the journalists considered the civil society a significant actor, but while politicians were in a more urgent need of intensive PR and while the accent was made on negativism, the civil society was less frequently mentioned in the press than the politicians.

*24 hours* increases the frequency of all the actors as the revolution approaches, but the appraisals are mainly negative. In *24 hours* such actors as “governmental block”, “Burjanadze”, “Zhvania” and “generally opposition” were considered insignificant for the revolution. Significant were considered the actors: **“Shevardnadze”, “government” “Abashidze”, “radical opposition”, “Kmara”, “Devdariani”, “NGOs”, “Saakashvili”, “Rustavi-2” and “mass media”** (actors are listed according to the reduction of the November index of changes).

Finally it should be mentioned that in the newspaper, which was close to the revolutionary processes and supported it, the civil society held a proper place in the total system of frequencies, in particular:

Civil society was most frequently mentioned in *24 hours*, which was the most politically active newspaper at that time.

The style used by the civil society or while speaking about the civil society is usually narrative.

**The Negative attitude to the civil society is slightly higher than the positive. The picture changes in November.**

According to the data of the printed media, the necessity of the revolutionary changes was proved by means of total negation of the existing situation (it was difficult to find something positive in case of change of government). This, of course, does not mean that the society did not have its positive vision. Simply, negation appeared to be more effective in preparing revolutionary situation (which is not a surprise).

In the mass media civil society mainly means the non-governmental sector, and rarely – “groups of interest”, such as “Darbazi”, which represented a wide group of intellectuals, or “Teachers’ Trade Union”, who actively worked for the people’s mobilization.

The newspapers did not pay proper attention to the public sector. It was more important for them to create negative climate and hence, the accent on the public sector with positive image was unacceptable to them.

## **Chapter Seven. The Public Opinion on Civil Society in Georgia and on the Rose Revolution**

*The public opinion poll has been conducted throughout Georgia (excluding Abkhazia and South Ossetia region); overall 1.000 respondents were interviewed - 488 male and 512 female.*

**Methodology.** Respondents were chosen following both *quota* and *random* principles. To ensure the representative of choice, and according to the proportions given in general, quotas were determined according to size of a region, gender of respondents and age groups. As for picking up the respondents in families according to the given quotas, and to get the maximum result for random choice policy, the principle of the closest birthday date was used. In case the person would not fit the quota requirements, the interviewer had to move to the next family and would go on till the suitable respondent was found. This interval between the families was set diverse for Tbilisi (every 9<sup>th</sup> family), for other urban centers (every 7<sup>th</sup> family), and for the



villages (every 5<sup>th</sup> one). In case there was a problem of getting into contact with a family and/or a respondent, interviewer had no right to get in touch with the nearest family and would act according to the given interval. Thus the effect of maximal dispersion of the respondents and coverage of the urban centers has been achieved. Additionally, the respondents were disseminated according to the geographic points and horizontal sweep (streets and blocks), thus avoiding the possibility of duplicate visits. The quota principle has been deliberately violated in case of Ajara Autonomous Republic (at the expense of other regions, proportionally), where 100 respondents has been interviewed, giving them several additional questions concerning the events that took place there in May, 2004.


## Results and Analyses

The Expert interviews defined several factors that, in respondents' view, affected the events of November 2003 in Georgia. According to the sociological poll the factors were defined as follows:

Factors	Decisive	Important	Of minor	Of no
1. Emerging of the new political force	35,7	39,7	16,3	8,3
2. Ineffectiveness of the old regime	51,5	32	11	5,3
3. Corruption	41,1	37	15	6,8

4. Non-democratic policy of the regime	30,1	39	23	8,6
5. Arising the self-consciousness of civil society/Changing the self-consciousness of the society	27,8	33	22	17,2
6. Economic factors	50,6	35	9,4	5,4
7. Intrusion/determination of some Great Powers	55,4	30	8,8	6

The following diagram shows the factor rating (answers like *decisive* and *important unified*):



It becomes clear that the most important motor behind the Rose Revolution is attributed to the “Intrusion/determination of some Great Powers” (85.4%); the runner-up is “Ineffectiveness of the old regime” (83,5). In other words, some undefined foreign states

are ascribed with an active role, whilst the local government is accused of apathy. **We are inclined to think that this reveals a characteristic feature of Georgian mentality – external control locus,<sup>117</sup> i.e. mainly looking for the external factors when investigating the events;<sup>118</sup> to put it mildly, the so-called *self-efficacy*<sup>119</sup> level (advocating the feeling of self-competence and effectiveness) is rather low.**

Thus, the effectiveness of different actors in the Revolution was evaluated accordingly: all the above mentioned factors got rather high points, but the “Intrusion/determination of some Great Powers” was considered as the most decisive one, while “Arising the self-consciousness of civil society/Changing the self-consciousness of the public” – the least.

The Actors’ factor:

Actors	Decisive	Important	Of minor importance	Of no importance
1. Political parties/movements	41,8	38,9	13,8	5,5
2. NGOs	21,8	41,6	27,5	9

<sup>117</sup> Rotter, J.B. (1966). Generalized expectancies for internal versus external control of reinforcement. *Psychological monographs*, 80, whole issue.


<sup>118</sup> Goodwin, R., Allen, P., Nizharadze, G., Emelyanova, T., Dedkova, N., Saenko, Yu., Bugrova, I. (2002) Fatalism, Social Support and Mental Health in Four Former Soviet Cultures. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*. Vol.28, No.9, 1166-1171.

<sup>119</sup> Bandura, A. (1993). Perceived self-efficacy in cognitive development and functioning. *Educational psychologist*, 28, 117-148.

3. Mass-media	50,8	37	9,3	2,9
4. The Orthodox Church	11,9	19,2	27,3	41,5
5. Trade unions	5,3	10,1	23,7	60,9
6. International funds and organizations	39,2	37,4	15	8,4
7. Great Powers abroad	52,3	34	8,9	4,8

**The following diagram shows the rating of the actors allegedly involved:**

*(answers like decisive and important unified)*



Thus, mass media and especially TV, got the highest evaluation. It seems that the live broadcast of the events turned to be something new and quite effective for the society; the evaluation of the Great Powers' and foreign funds/organizations' alleged activities is still rather high, which once again points to the external locus-control. Political forces held the third position.

Evaluation of the NGO activity is also high enough – 63% of the respondents put it as *important* or even *decisive*. The question '*What NGO activities impressed you most (made to change your mind, pushed you into action, etc.) during the RR period?*' was responded as follows:

NGO activists' TV appearances	25,8%
Revealing the fact of breaching the elections	34,4%
Mass protest rallies	45,3%

Thus, we can assume that hypothetically, NGOs played significant role in revealing the facts of falsifying the elections and more or less influenced the general opinion of the public.

In the respondents' view, among those that took their share in the RR (figures amounted to 200), the following come first:

<i>The 'Kmara' organization</i>	17,59
Liberty Institute	12,18
Soros Foundation	7,71

G.Bokeria (Liberty Institute rep.)	7,44
T.Khidasheli (GYLA)	2,17
T. Tutberdze ('Kmara' rep.)	2,17
GYLA	2,03

---

Results are no surprise: 'Kmara' activities were quite new in this form for Georgian reality (graffiti on the pavements, pun with words like StShevado – a kind of anagram with the President's surname, deciphering as "*Sheva Step Down*", etc.) and all that presented in a rather eye-catching way. Representatives of other organizations, most frequently mentioned by the respondents, were also bolstering up the events through TV appearances and other media issues. The only exception was the Soros Foundation (Open Society – Georgia Foundation) that comparatively seldom boosted their position, though many held the firm opinion (and stay with it even now) that Mr. G. Soros financed the Rose Revolution personally. Thus, the result amplifies the opinion that the NGO sector activity in criticizing the regime played a decisive role in "delegitimizing" it.

The request to name the printed production that had influenced somebody personally for a period during and/ prior to the Revolution, the answers were as follows:

<i>Newspaper/magazine</i>	Most important	Important	Unimportant / (of minor importance)
<b><i>Kviris Palitra</i></b>	16,2	53,4	30,4
<i>Sarke</i>	5,1	45,8	49,2
<i>Asaval-dasavali</i>	20,4	59,3	20,4
<i>Alia</i>	8,3	60,4	31,3
<i>24 Saati</i>	11,1	72,2	16,7

Thus, printed media issues were evaluated basically as *important* tools; but incomparably higher rate of influence was credited to TV, especially to the radically oppositional Rustavi-2 Channel:

<b><i>TVs</i></b>	Most important	Important	Unimportant / (of minor importance)
Imedi	31,1	54,4	14,2

Rustavi 2	60,7	37,2	2,1
Channel I	4,7	29,2	66,0

As we see, Imedi TV, that held more self-restrained attitude, got lesser votes; but notably, up to the poll time, its rating surpassed that of the Rustavi-2's.<sup>120</sup> Rating of the government-controlled Channel-I is the lowest.

Among the broadcast programmes that “affected smb. personally”, two of them went rather ahead:

‘Curieri’ ~ (Rustavi-2)	52,30%
‘Cronika~ (Imedi)	19,80%

Among the Civil sector (NGOs, journalists, trade unions, interest groups) representatives that were the most influential personally, were named

E. Khopheria	<i>(TV journalist, Rustavi-2)</i>	19,9
I. Grigolia	<i>(TV journalist, Channel ‘Mze’)</i>	18,7
Z. Chiaberashvili	<i>(ISFED)</i>	13,3
N. Lezhava	<i>(TV journalist, Rustavi-2)</i>	10,0

<sup>120</sup> [www.iccn.ge](http://www.iccn.ge)



T. Khidasheli	(GYLA)	7,5
G. Bokeria	(Liberty Institute)	6,2

Results given, as well as the next one below, also confirms the hypothesis about significant influence of the NGOs on public mentality.

Q.: Did the Civil sector representatives show any considerable activity in your town/region/village/settlement through the period of/before the RR?

Yes	38,8
No	36,5
No idea/Find it hard to answer	24,7

Summing up this section, we may conclude that the civic sector is strongly associated with the Rose Revolution through its participation in the revolutionary processes. Electronic media comes first, and especially Rustavi-2 TV Company. The role of the NGOs was also highly evaluated, and as runner ups of the opposition leaders (M.Saakashvili, Z.Zhvania, N.Burdzhanadze), TV journalists and NGO representatives were named as the most prominent persons.

## The Public's view of Civic sector

### *Trust in various institutions*

	Absolute trust	Take on trust	Neither this, nor that	Can't have a trust	Have no trust	No answer
The President of Georgia	13,7	32,2	29,9	11,8	12,4	0,9
The Parliament of Georgia	2,8	13,1	29,6	29,3	25,1	0,3
The Government of Georgia	3,8	18,3	31,4	26,7	19,7	0,4
The Judicial authority	1,9	12	22,1	26,6	37,4	0,9
The Independent media	9,2	40,4	33,9	9,4	7,1	0,2
The Orthodox Church	63,3	23,7	6,7	3,4	2,8	1,9
The NGOs	3,3	24,3	37,5	19,7	15,2	3,1

The Trade unions	2,4	13	20,7	23,3	40,6	5,9
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**Summed up answers given on the diagram:**

Trust in Institutions (answers like *absolute trust* and *just take on trust* unified):

The Orthodox Church -----  
-----4,41

The Independent media -----  
-----3,35

The President of Georgia -----  
-----3,23

The NGOs -----  
2,81

The Government -----2,60

The Parliament ----- 2,39

The Judicial authority ----- 2,14

The Trade unions ----- 2,13

It is clear that the Church gets the singularly highest rate of trust, but even so, the Independent media acting as a runner up, speaks for itself. The president still holds his rating, and as for the NGOs, though one step behind, they've fixed their place in the society.

Down below we present the poll results of 2002<sup>121</sup>, which has been carried through a bit different assessment, nevertheless gives a good chance for comparison.

#	Structures	Positive (%)	Negative (%)	Uncertain (%)
1.	Parliament of Georgia	9.6	89.1	1.4
2.	Mass media	69.3	28.1	2.6
3.	NGO sector	45.9	41.3	12.8
4.	Government of Georgia	9.0	89.8	1.3
5.	Private business sector	54.8	37.3	7.8
6.	International financial orgs (World Bank, IMF)	44.8	32.6	22.7
7.	Georgian Orthodox Church	85.4	9.6	5.1

We can see that the “Trust Profile” is almost identical (President’s column was excluded from 2002 poll).

<sup>121</sup> I. Kachkachishvili, L.Mezvrishvili. Sociological Research on the Attitude of Local Population, Teachers/Lecturers, and Manufacturers to the NGO sector (November 2002 sociological quantitative research results analyses). *Strategic Research and Development Center*, Tbilisi, 2003, p.9.

*Request to mention familiar organizations representing the civil society sector, gave the results as follows (totally 200 nominations):*

One NGO at minimum	32%
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Several NGOs	55.6%
Donor organizations	11.3%
Various (Political, Media, Business organizations)	33.1%

Most frequently mentioned organizations (in absolute numbers):

GYLA	165
Liberty Institute	143
‘Kmara’	32
Former Political Prisoners for Human Rights	25
Human Rights organizations (no naming)	14

*(It should be noted that ICCN, the organization that carried on this research, has been named twice). ISFED was not mentioned frequently – less than 4%.*

All in all, the results let us presume that public society in Georgia, generally speaking, is quite aware of the existence of civil sector here, though by and large, evaluation of its

representative organizations' activity influence over the State is no way satisfactory (see below):

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<b><i>They have major influence</i></b>	<b>20,8</b>
<i>They have minor influence</i>	52,1
<i>They have no influence</i>	18,6
<i>Do not know</i>	8,5

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Let us present the results of the 2002 poll<sup>122</sup>:

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Affects greatly	5.8%
Affects more or less considerably	24.9%
Affects inconsiderably	42.2%
Does not affect at all	18.0%
Hard to say	9.1%

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*Though, at the same time, most of the respondents consider it important to promote the civil sector: below we present the*

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<sup>122</sup> Kachkachishvili, I., L.Mezvrishvili, Sociological Research on the Attitude of Local Population, Teachers/Lecturers, and Manufacturers to the NGO sector (November 2002 sociological quantitative research results analyses). *Strategic Research and Development Center*, Tbilisi, 2003, p.24.

*answer ratio for the question 'how important it is for the State to promote the civic sector and its activities?'*

Very important	31,0
Important	45,0
Scarcely important	10,7
Unimportant	5,7
No idea	7,4

*Thus, the civic sector development and its active role is considered to be a serious point for the 76% of the respondents, though 52% of them view Government's activity as a major one. 48% consider it vital for democracy to promote the civil sector.*

*At the same time, civic sector is not believed to be an attractive one for employment. Most would prefer to work for budget-financed organizations (it seems that Soviet-time mentality is still prevailing here – many think of these organizations as a steady source of salary):*

*Q.: If the salary were same, where would you prefer to work?*

Budgetary organization	27,3
Private sector	25,3
Governmental structures	11,3
Civic sector organizations	6
Political party	2,1

Anywhere	27,9
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*Information about the Civic sector is available from TV for the 85,4% of the respondents, 30% gets it from the papers. 1,9% pointed that they themselves work for civic sector.*

### ***Non-governmental organizations***

*Next section of the questionnaire dealt directly with NGOs: What NGOs are you acquainted with? Here are the most frequently named organizations (in absolute numbers):*

GYLA	200
Liberty Institute	187
Equality Institute <sup>123</sup>	64
Soros fund	53
‘Kmara’	51
Former Political Prisoners for Human Rights	28

*As we see, there are named mostly the same organizations, as they were when questioning about the civic sector.*

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<sup>123</sup> Organization opposing the power that is; emerged after the Rose Revolution.



*In 2002 poll questionnaire there were put some conflicting statements and the respondents had to show their preferences. We decided to duplicate several of them. Here are the results:*

<i>NGOs promote democratic tendencies in the society</i>	71,7
<i>NGOs plant chaos and disorder in our society</i>	28,3

*So to say, most of the respondents advocate the NGOs*

Owe to the NGOs people get chance to defend their rights, bring about their interests	51,1
NGOs give people sheer promises, actually they are good for nothing	48,8

*Here the question was about the population’s opinion of how the NGOs performed their main function of “giving a helping hand’. Actually, the ratio is up to 50/50. In spite of the fact, or maybe because of that, we assume that trust in the NGOs sector in Georgia is pretty high.*

The NGOs promote progressive ideas in our society	56,4
NGOs don’t care for national values/ethnic identity and propagate	43,6

alien views	
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*Notably, more than half of the respondents consider the NGOs to be the kind of “promoters” of new ideas/values in our society, and take it as positive message.*

*Three previous diagrams we can consider as the proof that public opinion generally agrees with the abovementioned hypothesis: NGOs promote democratic values and their message is acceptable.*

*Next question aimed at finding out what is the population’s idea of manifest and latent functions of the NGOs.*

NGOs in Georgia by and large fulfill their declared functions (human rights watch, environmental protection, educational programs, etc.)	45,9
NGOs in Georgia are worried only about snatching grants, none of them care for public interests.	54,1

Actually, the table indicates the reputation held by NGOs in our society. 54,9% of the respondents assess this reputation as negative while 45,9% considers it positive. We do think that this index is not bad as almost half of the respondents consider the NGOs’ activity positively.

If your rights were breached, whom would you call for help out?

	Would apply	More Yes than No.	More No, than Yes.	Wouldn't apply
1. Ombudsman	29,6	32,2	12,4	25,8
2. Court of Law	16,4	29	15,7	38,9
3. Parliamentary Committee for Human	13,9	24,3	19,3	42,5
4. Human rights watch NGOs	16,7	30,1	19,2	34,1
5. Mass media	18,4	29,2	18,7	33,7
6. Oppositional parties	5,6	13,8	18,6	62,1
7. Criminal authorities	5,7	7,8	11	75,5
8. Friends/relatives	66,4	24,7	3,3	5,5
9. Party in power	12,2	19,3	17,1	47,4

The result speaks for itself: this high percentage of a hypothetic appellation to some friends/relatives reveals that Georgian culture may be characterized as a small-group oriented collectivistic one.<sup>124</sup>

<sup>124</sup> Nizharadze, G., 'Georgian Culture: Fundamental Characteristics'. R.Sakvarelidze, G. Goshadze (Ed.), 'Chubini' – *Movement for Better Future*. Tbilisi, 2002, pp. 24-37.


According to the given rating, the manifest function of the last three institutions (Ombudsman, Mass media, NGOs) is to set control over Government's activities; and somehow, that shows people's trust in them – on the backdrop of having little trust in Governmental (especially, judicial) structures.

**Q.:** *Did you ever collaborate with Non-governmental organizations?*

I did.	5,2%
As a volunteer	2,5%
Participated in trainings/seminars	5,0%
Asked for consultancy	2,5%
Availed of humanitarian aid	2,0%
Beneficiary for target-oriented aid (micro-loans for small business promotion)	1,9%
No contact	86,1%

As we see, 13,9% of the respondents, this or that way, had contacted with the NGOs. 7,7% worked for either of them, 7,5% got consulting aid/advice, and 3,9% of them benefited financially. We take into consideration that the figures of the upper six sections in whole surpass the 100% limit, but this 8% (taken as a minimum) indicates the NGO sector influence for good (In 2002 the data was 5,8%)<sup>125</sup>. It's interesting to present the dynamics of volunteer participation in NGO activities, year on year:

The diagram points to the increased activity of the NGO sector in 2003 that to our view, is in close connection with 2003 elections and the ‘Rose Revolution’ (the same is shown in the training/seminar participating section of the above diagram). In comparison, we present charity aid dynamics annually:



### Summing up basic results and the Conclusion

The Mass media actor role rate in the Rose Revolution is to be evaluated as the highest.

The NGO sector is characterized positively (promoting democratic tendencies in the society; defending people’s rights, promoting progressive ideas in our society etc.) by prevailing part of the population.

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<sup>125</sup> Nodia, G. ‘Civil Society Development in Georgia: Achievements and Challenges’. Tbilisi, CIPPD, 2005, (in Georgian), p. 46.

The Mass media and the NGO sector are far more trusted in the human rights watch sphere than that of Judiciary.

A considerable part of the population is well informed about the NGOs.

A Majority evaluates the NGO activities affecting the events and processes in the state as ‘scarcely influential’.

The role of NGOs in the RR is considered to be important since civil society played an active role in the political progress.

The level of civic mentality, the self-efficacy among the population is not sufficiently high, and the “Will of Great Powers” was named as decisive factor for the Rose Revolution.

According to the public opinion poll results, we may assume that in the public sensuousness civic sector, especially the mass media, played a significant role, however, the role of NGOs is also considered to be important. This came to the fore in the expert interviews and through content analysis results. We can also conclude that the existence of civil society is recognized by public and its mission as well as activities are positively evaluated.

We presume that the NGO sector rating wholly depends on its future activity. Here two things are to be considered at a time: the reputation already gained (competence and trustworthiness) on the one hand, and eye-catching, real results – on the other. Both of these are relevant to the discourse.

## **Chapter Eight. The Analysis of the Electronic Media**

It is difficult to overestimate the role of media in the transforming society, as of the most important part of the civil society. During the large-scale historical changes, apart of all the other, we encounter the process of destruction of traditional system of identities and formation of new identities. All this firstly reflects on media and it can be even said that the processes themselves are comprehended by means of media. On the one hand, media reflects the dynamics of establishment of new paradigms, and on the other hand, media itself, as a part of social system, has influence on these paradigms and their establishment processes, by means of performing adaptation, purposefulness, integration and regulation functions.

Electronic media is worth paying attention to at least because in such epochs, by reason of rapid dissemination, its share in the construction of information space is far too large. And in some cases it totally possesses and manages this space.

During our latest history it became clear that the new historical situation means the new medial communication structure, the functional connection of which with the other parts of social system often suffers the lack of certainty. It becomes difficult to

determine what media is: a political or social instrument or just an independent historical subject. During the past years we observed the creation of media, which on the one hand had to give voice to the public by means of processing and giving distinctness to everything what happened in the society and thus clarify the current processes and present them to the average social agent. It was not just reflecting the processes but was definitely also an interpreter, and in some cases even the source of provoking certain processes.

In the transforming society media naturally cannot be limited by the function of just creating the communication space. It appears in the role of the fourth power, at least because it inevitably is creative – no matter if we use this term in the positive or negative connotation. Communication space already means the paradigm certainty and we shall not exaggerate if we say that it also means the rules of the game for different branches of government or separate politicians.

Hence, the transition period gives extraordinary possibilities to media and especially electronic mass media, to obtain and perform apart of the function of creating communication space, also creative functions and, as we see from our latest history, to involve even the signs and symbols of political figures into the “communication ecstasy” (J. Bodriare), which is especially sharply perceived in such epochs. It is this ecstasy that takes the electronic media out of the limits of civil society and makes it a real and most important political subject.



Constructing of adequate communication space and determining of its functions is one of the main tasks of the present-day civil development. From the certain viewpoint, we can estimate the quality of civil development according to what media is in this society: a mouthpiece of the government or opposition, political subject with a high degree of independency and influence, or it is that very communication space, where the public consensus should be achieved.

In the transforming society, where, by reason of abrupt changes, there is yet lack of trust to the new institutions, and their traditions are not established, and where these institutions are always associated with certain persons or processes, the role of electronic media is especially important. This is why, in such epochs positive or negative creative abilities of media become especially obvious. It can create political actors; turn the old actors into caricatures or negative social symbols. Furthermore, Georgian media is often blamed in purposeful creation of critical situations by means of “bombing” the public and using the technologies of managing the public emotions.

There is also one feature typical to the society of transition period. We have already touched it when we mentioned the communications ecstasy: it is the feeling of informational hunger, caused by rapidly changing situations and hard social problems, which makes an average person totally dependent upon the electronic mass media. At this time political culture and historical customs are not yet adequate to the requirements of the

particular historical situation. The first cannot “catch up” with the second. This causes a strong temptation to exaggerate the role of mass media, as of the instrument of management of the public spirit, which makes this inadequacy and distance still larger. The society becomes totally dependant upon not only the information provided by mass media, but also upon the interpretation of this information. With a certain degree of exaggeration we can say that by means of skillful manipulations of public emotions by electronic mass media, an average person begins to identify his own “voice” with the one of mass media. From this viewpoint media starts talking instead of an average person and even substitutes this person. In the other words, electronic media “draws” an average social agent into its linguistics and supplies him with “what to say”.

Such functional place of electronic mass media will pull back the pure political arsenal of the political parties, such as their programs and lobbying strategies, and will bring to the forefront the problem of their media portraits. This problem is typical not only to Georgia or other countries of post-soviet area. According to different estimations, the choice of the present-day electorate is so much determined by the information flows, that this put the ideological and conceptual part of politics in prison of image-making and PR technologies. If this process is relatively latent in the countries with the developed informational traditions, in the countries with young democracy the problem of control over

media and especially electronic media becomes one of the most important political problems<sup>126</sup>.

## **Statistics**

If we summarize all the data, we shall see that in 1999-2003 informational-conceptual attitude to the printed media was typical to the 2-6% of the population. The major part of the population was oriented to electronic media, especially TV. The share of television in establishment of informational space and the system of communications was very large and according to different estimations, varied from 56 to 61%.

Public opinion poll conducted by the non-governmental organization “Anti-Corruption International Center” targeted to the corruption problem, also included the questions about the people’s trust to different medias. The results were as follows:

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<sup>126</sup> We would like to express our gratitude to Mr. Niko Oniani, Head of Anti-Corruption International Center for providing the statistics, to Mr. Beqa Chedia, whose Ph.D. thesis *Role of mass media in the transforming political systems* helped us in adjusting a number of facts and recollecting the details of pre-revolutionary situation, and also to experts who provided considerable help: Valerian Gorgiladze, Lela Iakobishvili, Laura Kutubidze, Emzar Jgerenaia, Demur Giorkhelidze, Ramaz Sakvarelidze, Ia Antadze, Tamar Chikovani, Nato Oniani and Tamar Tsagareishvili.

	I channel	Rustavi 2	Caucasia	Ajara TV	9 channel	New generation	Resonance	Alia	New version	Asaval-dasavali	Republic of Georgia	Weekly palette
1. Press and TV fairly illustrate the current processes X	28.5	59.1	7.6	8.6	6.4	20.5	19.1	20.1	17.0	20.5	9.0	3.5
2. Press an TV are mainly seeking for sensations and express the interests of different corrupted clans	44.4	14.4	15.6	20.3	12.5	13.8	14.4	17.0	16.0	13.3	21.4	0.8
3. I don't know	19.1	24.0	60.0	55.6	63.9	51.5	50.7	49.7	55.4	51.5	53.2	

As we see from the above data, the respondents mainly watched the I channel and Rustavi-2. Although, approximately 30% of the respondents knew also the other TV channels or newspapers and magazines, but their share in the media space construction was still small. The role of radio stations and internet publications was also small. According to the different data, the role of radio stations was more of a background and mostly promoted

emotional spirits and attitude. Although the respondents rarely marked the role of “Radio 101” in creation of their political attitudes, almost all the experts confirmed the great importance of emotional messages delivered by this radio station. Unfortunately, we could not obtain the data which would statistically confirm this influence. However, we believe that the experts’ opinion certainly cannot be disregarded.

For the description of the pre-revolutionary situation the following data is also important. In the situation when corruption was the main political category of the politically active part of the population, it is important to know what degree of corruption was attributed to different professions. We believe that the results received from the same research give a clear picture of this:

#		Corrupted		Not corrupted	
		Frequency	Percentage	Frequency	Percentage
Q. 29.1	State officials	421	86.4	35	7.2
Q. 29.2	Entrepreneurs	242	49.7	161	33.1
Q. 29.3	Tradesmen	256	52.6	142	29.2
Q. 29.4	Politicians	384	78.9	47	9.7
Q. 29.5	Intellectuals	133	27.3	271	55.6
Q. 29.6	Farmers (peasants)	105	21.6	197	61.0
Q. 29.7	Policemen	397	81.5	37	7.6

Q. 29.8	Doctors	311	63.9	85	17.5
Q. 29.9	Teachers	133	27.3	276	56.7
Q. 29.10	Customs officers	397	81.5	29	6.0
Q. 29.11	Tax inspectors	388	79.9	25	5.1
Q. 29.12	Journalists	116	23.8	285	58.5
Q. 29.13	I don't know	21		4.3	

As we see, according to the public opinion, journalists represent one of the least corrupted professions. Less corrupted are only farmers.

Here we should mention the following circumstance. According to the results of the public opinion poll conducted in 2002 by the Philosophic Society of Georgia, 69.9% of respondents perceived the accusation in corruption as grave, but only 7.5% knew the meaning of this word. This is quite an important index of our social reality and it once again confirms the prevailing role of emotional and symbolic elements in the political life of post soviet Georgia. This circumstance already indirectly confirms the assumption of experts that the emotional background created with the help of comic programs of Radio 101 was not less important than the direct political propaganda.

At the order of “Gallup” institute in 2004, the Georgian sociological service “IPM” interviewed 1500 respondents all over Georgia and received the following picture of ratings:

1. Media – 84%
2. Church – 82%
3. Presidential office – 73%
4. Government – 57%
5. Parliament – 54%
6. Army – 45%
7. National bank – 32%
8. Political parties – 32%
9. Educational system – 27%
10. Trade Unions – 11%<sup>127</sup>

The similar researches were conducted by other organizations and these data have been confirmed to a more or less degree.

When we asked the experts about the adequacy of the poll, some of them presumed that it cannot be excluded that in the situation of political euphoria of 2004, these data express the degree of emotional linkage rather than trust. It is really remarkable that Orthodox Church keeps the second place, although it has never shifted to the second place in all the known researches. Even in

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<sup>127</sup> IRI. USAID, BALTIC Surveys The Gallup Organization, IPM. GEORGIAN NATIONAL VOTERS STUDY. FEBRUARY, 2004. We have used the data provided by Mr. Beqa Chedia in his Ph.D. thesis *Role of mass media in the transforming political system*.

the period of revolution it held the leading position and was always several points ahead of the presidential institute. We think that this circumstance indicates the emotional linkage existing in the post-revolutionary situation.

Generally it can be said that the pre-revolutionary electronic media was totally integrated in politics and was often perceived as a PR attachment to a certain political force, while it totally depended on the financial injections of the latter. If Shevardnadze's government financed the state TV channel in average by 12-15 million Lari and, what is equally important, did not control the expenses, in case of other TV channels the source of financing was unknown and thus was always a subject of gossips.

Only one of the interviewed experts did not confirm the fact that there was a high degree of corruption in the pre-revolutionary Georgian mass media. The fact of corruption was very well known to the journalists and politicians. From this viewpoint, situation was especially grave during several months before the elections. With the purpose of gripping the whole media space, the political powers tried to obtain control over the printed and electronic media by means of either direct bribery or indirectly – with the help of grants, expensive advertisement orders, etc.

It often ran into absurdity. Now it is difficult to remember all those media facilities that appeared before the elections with the purpose of not just political propaganda but also of money-laundering for the certain groups operating within the sphere of



influence of each political force. In the same way more and more sociological services appeared, which were designed to conceal the embezzlement of funds contributed to the political parties. This phenomenon was relatively rare for the electronic media, while it required considerable investments, but it was quite customary to the printed media. Now it is difficult to name all those phantom newspapers, the major part of which existed only for several weeks and produced an impression to the political parties that everything was in order on the informational battlefield.

In that period electronic media was more involved in offering talk-shows and TV topics to the potential clients. According to the experts, it often happened that the same electronic media facility offered its services to the two opposite political forces. Before the local elections in 1999 it became known about the scandal caused by the effort of one influential TV Company to work simultaneously on the governmental block and its main competitor “Union of renaissance”.

It is obvious that such negative tendencies were and still are to a considerable degree due to the scarcity of the Georgian media market. Circulations of Georgian printed publications are too small to ensure independent operations, while the area of electronic media is too small to ensure high income from advertisements.

## **Rustavi-2**

The growth of Rustavi-2 is associated with the end of 90s. We can name several facts that promoted the success of this company. The first one was the attempt to deprive them from the frequency in 1994, which brought the public attention to the young and developing TV Company.<sup>128</sup> The journalists of other media facilities at that time supported the company and thus, willingly or not, contributed to the increase of its recognizability.

The second fact was the elimination of the Russian TV companies from the Georgian advertising market, based on the changes in the Tax Code in 1996. Zurab Zhvania was an initiator of these changes. Considering the naturalness of shifting a large segment of advertising market to Rustavi-2, we can presume that by that time the alliance between the TV Company and young reformers of the governing party was already the given fact. The last and probably the most important fact was the capture of the Rustavi-2 office by the State Security in 2001, which caused the demonstrations of protest in Tbilisi and finally was the reason of changes in the executive power. These demonstrations showed that Rustavi-2 represented the voices of the major part of average people and conceptually secured them. By this time Rustavi-2 finally had the image of television that protected public interests and stood against the corrupted power.

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<sup>128</sup> For history of Rustavi 2 see also Companjen 2004, Chapter 6.

It is interesting that neither during these events, nor after them, nobody ever put up a question if the accusation in concealing taxes in the amount of several million Lari, which was the reason of why the State security got interested in Rustavi-2, was fair. The prevailing opinion at that time and afterwards was that the government tried to suppress the oppositional TV by means of financial tricks. It was remained unnoticed that after the revolution, Erosi Kintsmarishvili, General Director of Rustavi-2 put up a question of the bankruptcy of the company, which released him from taxes.

In the result of all the above we received the picture, which had a strong effect on the development of political processes in 2003: two large TV companies were established – I channel and Rustavi-2. At first sight they served to different purposes. The third television “Imedi”, in the conditions of confrontation and public excitement managed to keep the audience with the help of high quality technical equipment and professionalism. Its relatively balanced position was mainly unacceptable for the audience, which preferred bright, easily perceivable and understandable information and the kind of conceptual picture offered by Rustavi-2. The messages developed by this TV channel, which were announced during the informational programs, were on the following day transferred to the newspapers almost unchanged. Furthermore, Rustavi-2 also created the value hierarchy of events, repeated afterwards not only by the printed, but also by other electronic media facilities.

Leaders of Rustavi-2 possessed not only the technical equipment, but unlike the equally equipped I channel, also the knowledge of informational war strategy. By means of aggressive tone, professional manipulation with the signs system and adventurism inherent to journalists, they achieved the position of unexampled creator of public opinion. The influence of the Rustavi-2 journalists on the creation of pre-revolutionary situation was so tangible that the November events in 2003 were several times called “TV virtual revolution” in the Georgian press. The inspirer of Rustavi-2 Erosi Kintsmarishvili was always perceived beside the famous revolutionary trio: Burjanadze, Saakashvili and Zhvania, and was considered as important as any of the members of this trio.

After the revolution the presenters of this TV openly called themselves the creators of the rose revolution, which was several times the reason of frustration with foreign respondents, who pointed out that the television could not be a creator of revolution.

Indeed, they proved to have the ability and technical capacity to model not only persons, but also, what is more important, certain situations, and to prompt to the average people what was worth their attention.

At the same time, it was obvious that Rustavi-2 itself became one of the political actors of the revolution and its troubadour. Here we shall remind you about the two facts that took place on the day of elections, which we believe shall clearly illustrate how the

leaders of this TV company understood their functions in the current political processes. The first of them was showing in the information program “Courier” on the 3<sup>rd</sup> of November at 9:00 and 12:00, of a young man with his back to the camera, who stated that he knew how to delete the marking. This plot was repeated several times and we can definitely state that it served as an attempt to provoke distrust to the elections. The second fact – in the afternoon on the 3<sup>rd</sup> of November Rustavi-2 several times showed Saakashvili who was appealing to the population to go out into the streets and to protect their votes, while the government was going to forge the results of the elections. We believe this fact can be considered as indirect, but rather effective political propaganda, although any propaganda on the day of elections is prohibited by the law. If we add a number of so called uncompleted topics, when the television accused in corruption one of the state officials or just any person who had alternative opinion, or just improperly used his /her name, the situation shall become clear. This was the reason of the idea in the pre-revolutionary period to establish the institute of press ombudsman. It should protect those people who became the victims of the informational war.

From the general viewpoint, Rustavi-2 as the leading media facility was the reason of the two vicious phenomena that appeared in the Georgian media space: 1) uncompleted topics when some sensational information or accusation is not later confirmed, and media takes advantage of the fact that the

tradition of protection from media with the help of legal instruments is yet weak, and 2) secret shooting when the film produced an impression that the principle of inviolability of private life was infringed. (By the way, this was also typical for the printed media. Such newspapers as “Alia”, “Georgian times” and others often mercilessly used these technologies to emerge scandal topics).

We believe that the problem of restraining the media within the limits of law is familiar even to the countries with the developed media-culture, such as USA, Canada and west European countries. However, while the large historical experience has created traditional mechanisms and even moral, which prevents media from becoming a political actor and this process there is more latent, in Georgia and other countries with young democracy, especially in the post soviet area, there is a big deficit of such traditional standards. Furthermore, while the free media means uncontrolled media, even a single mentioning of possible public control caused rough negative reaction and in an infantile way excluded corporative ethos and responsibility. The opponents pointed out to the circumstance that the idea of public control would always serve as a cloak over some kind of political control.

This is why, despite the fact that during the last years of Shevardnadze’s governance the idea of press ombudsman arose several times, which meant that press ombudsman would estimate media from the view of protection of human rights,

presumption of innocence, etc., which even at that time in the conditions of active political struggle seemed inevitable, this idea was not supported even by relatively neutral and politically unengaged journalists. The idea that any kind of control in the post soviet society, where people were not used to live in the free environment, would cause negative results, appeared to be prevailing: the ombudsman would become just an additional instrument of political battles and the idea would be primordially abortive. Such institute would also be inconvenient for those journalists who were known for their alliance with political groups. Press ombudsman would cause at least psychological discomfort in their business of “PR security” of certain political clans.

Experts recollect that such institution was still imperceptibly established before the revolution, under the leadership of a person who was in close relations with Saakashvili and Zhvania. If we remember Zhvania’s political methods, we may presume that such secret existence of this institution was designed for the purpose of international organizations. In case of serious claim against the media facility operating within his sphere of influence, press ombudsman would fill the niche, which otherwise could have been filled by other forces beyond his control.

Finally the situation of that time was not ready to accept this idea.

## **Shevardnadze's Media Policy**

Establishment of this kind of electronic and generally media space to a large degree owed to the fact that Shevardnadze was not familiar with the modern strategies of informational war and with the category of image, which almost totally determines the politician's person. Till the end of his governance he had a soviet attitude to media. It seemed that he sincerely believed that a single article or TV program would change the whole political panorama, especially if it was delivered by the governmental media channels, because he trusted that in the second half of 90s and in the beginning of the XXI century average people had the same infantile and confiding attitude to the governmental media as the soviet people. Such disregard of image technologies finally had a negative result on his authority and the authority of his political circle. Opposition methodically and orderly took in hand media facilities and created negative personalities from him and his political circle. Disturbed by the oppositional media, Shevardnadze got more and more inappropriate to the informational situation. Finally many people took advantage of this and misled him by offering different simple ways out.

An interesting example of this is the history of "People's newspaper", one of the numerous phantom organs mentioned above. This newspaper was hardly known to public and even to the journalists. It was a governmental newspaper with circulation of several hundred, or maybe even less than a hundred. The newspaper was distributed at the governmental sessions and the



members of the government accepted it with pleasure. The newspaper was designed to produce an impression that everything in the country was in order and the governmental media adequately resisted the TV activity of the opposition.

Together with the “Republic of Georgia” and governmental TV channel, this newspaper created the hermetic informational space, where the real picture of public spirits and social processes could not penetrate. And this is not all. These media facilities became instruments in the hands of the members of government and other people in close relation with the government, who used them firstly to remain in Shevardnadze’s field of vision and secondly to control the flow of information to him. This is why, these media facilities were hermetic not only in the part of informational paradigms, but also in the part of those personalities who created and managed this information. As we said, it was weaved with the help of state electronic media, several governmental printed media facilities and those channels that reached the President. These channels meant numerous services preparing digests and analytical releases for the President, and press service at the state chancellery, which decided what information and in which form should have been delivered to the President. Any attempt to break through this hermetic informational space was immediately stopped by Shevardnadze’s environment and the people who tried to do this were banished from the government. People surrounding Shevardnadze easily studied his informational taste and quickly

learned how to benefit from it. As for the oppositional press, there was every sign certifying that Shevardnadze trusted it was “biased”. The situation remained the same till the last months of his governance, until the time when two months before the revolution at the governmental session he had to admit the total ineffectiveness of the governmental media strategy.

Thus, the informational war had not only obvious and manifested, but also a latent form. This is why it often seemed – especially during the last two years of his governance – that Shevardnadze did not possess the full information about the social processes, and when he realized what was going on, it was too late to improve the situation, especially since Shevardnadze did not have any instruments of informational facilities by that time (the opinion that it was of no prestige to collaborate with the government already prevailed) or any consolidated team of confederates. Most of the people surrounding him appeared to be far too little devoted to the state interests.

Erosion of the government was visible almost at every governmental level. Even in the State Chancellery office many people openly stated that they were not going to sacrifice their carrier to Shevardnadze. This is why it was impossible to speak about the common informational strategy. Mainly there were different groups of people united around separate leaders who tried to obtain control over the state or independent media, firstly over the I channel. The leaders of the channel found this situation most beneficial.

It is obvious that the leaders of opposition were most interested to maintain this hermetic informational space, because this to a considerable degree contributed to impropriety of Shevardnadze's speeches and decisions. This is why it would be logical to assume that the opposition openly or secretly supported this situation.

We shall not speak about the real reasons of failure of Shevardnadze's government. The significant part of experts confirmed our view that his governance was perceived by many western leaders as the transition period that would ensure elementary conditions for the creation of democratic structures and for operating of basic state institutions: parliament, executive government, legal system. What was equally important, it was Shevardnadze's government that should have ensured the creation of independent public sector and mass media. But it was also evident that during Shevardnadze's governance the full operation of these institutions would be impossible, because the social base of this political actor was represented by the former soviet communist and economic nomenclature, which stood far from the democratic interests and considered the new situation as an opportunity to retain power and establish new links of corruption.

During the interviews of experts conducted in 2002 our respondents at different times estimated the share of former soviet nomenclature around Shevardnadze as 30 – 60%. The situation became still more difficult when many politicians of the

new generation moved to the opposition. Shevardnadze's HR policy was more and more inclined to the old types of politicians, customary to him and in the result there was an unnaturally large and losing amount of old faces around him. This to a great degree determined the public distrust to Shevardnadze's government.

### **The First Channel of the Georgian Television**

First channel of the Georgian television or state television totally fit into the limits of Shevardnadze's media policy, although Shevardnadze often expressed his discontent with it. After Rustavi-2 captured a large segment of informational space, the leaders of this channel faced a dilemma. If they continued to perform the functions of state television, which was understood by the government as protection of the existing power from accusations and demonstration of its success, the TV would lose its rating and turn into an odious figure, similar to the several cases mentioned above. At the same time, if the Television started showing the negative spirit of the population, in such case either the leaders of the TV would lose their posts or the government would lose interest in this TV Company and this could give a chance to those who promised the government to improve the informational panorama by means of substituting the I channel.

Such dissonance already determined the decrease of its rating. Although there were several attempts to offer alternatives to the

TV debates and talk-shows of Rustavi-2, their ratings always fell behind the ratings of Rustavi-1. Besides, the lists of the invited guests were always approved by the leaders of the channel, according to their political interests and current situation in the state chancellery. This obviously reduced the quality of the programs. At the same time, the leaders of the channel took advantage of the fact that the people surrounding Shevardnadze tried to improve their public image and to stop showing new faces through mass media. The above process was best seen in the night shows of Koka Kandiashvili. The latter could not compete with the high tone of Rustavi-1 and first tried to become an instrument of calming the public passions (he invited to the studio well known politicians and their family members and in the home environment tried to create an idyllic picture) and then turned into a caricature of such instrument. If in the beginning he caused some interest, later as the public excitement increased his program became less and less contextual.

The state channel for a short time attempted to take an initiative off the sensational program of Rustavi-1 “60 minutes”, which played an important role in promoting the topic of corruption. They offered a new program “The wall”, which was, however, limited to the description of the general situation in the area of corruption and did not mention certain offenders. Such program initially was doomed to failure. However, it is evident that the leaders of the channel have managed to demonstrate to Shevardnadze their activity.

Generally, it should be said that the I channel proved to be incapable to resist the spirit of protest in the informational space. This of course, had both objective and human reasons. Objective reason was the current social and political situation, while the wish of the leaders of the channel to protect political interests and gain personal benefit, together with disability of Shevardnadze's media policy also contributed to the failure of the channel.

### **The Coding of Media Space**

Now we shall discuss the system of messages used by Rustavi-2 in its social engineering and which became a corner stone of the informational war. The issue mainly covers the coding system offered to the audience in the form of certain features, which were designed to turn into the common conception and the project of the near future in the minds of average people.

In the other words, we shall discuss the coding system, by means of which the situation in the country was first described as pre-revolutionary, then as revolutionary and finally as post-revolutionary. In the last case Rustavi-2 even coded itself when declared that it was the “television of victorious people”.

From the late 90s it was already evident that Rustavi-2, together with several other newspapers and radio stations started to construct the revolutionary communication space. They permanently disseminated the spirit of fear and despair. One

expert, in the private conversation remembered how regularly, at least once a month the television transmitted information about the cases of dog attacks and hence, the danger of epidemic of rabies. The expert was sure that such information had the definite purpose to spread panic among the population, as well as aggression towards the government because of its passivity.

Panic information about the Chinese flu or AIDS was also quite regularly transmitted, as well as astrological prognosis, which predicted extreme excavation of the situation and new political establishment in the near future.

For the same purposes the television used ordinary criminal events and even gossips about the possible offences by some state officials.

Finally it can be said that the total activity of this television before the revolution took the form of the system of further emotional and conceptual codes<sup>129</sup>.

Georgia – inconsistent state. Eduard Shevardnadze considered his most significant accomplishment to be the creation of state institutions and associations after the political chaos in the first half of the 90s. According to the results of the research conducted in 1998 by the Anti-Corruption International Center, 67.5% of respondents shared the view that there were definitely certain achievements in state development. The oppositional message finally established by the end of 2000s - “Georgia –

inconsistent state” was aimed against this main achievement of Shevardnadze. Thus he was deprived of what made him acceptable for many average citizens.

The fact that during a year and a half before the revolution Mikheil Saakashvili permanently appeared in front of the state symbols, also served as emotional support of this message. He was to represent the way of rescue and the future of Georgia. Pessimism and defeat, which was always associated by Rustavi-2 with Shevardnadze, was to be substituted by optimism and battle spirit in case of Saakashvili.

From this view it would be interesting to remember the day when the Georgian football team won the match with the Russian team in 2003. In the Rustavi-2 transmissions Saakashvili always appeared among the happy fans, who, what is remarkable, appealed to the people to go out into the street and demonstrate their strength to the government.

Dictatorship and totalitarianism. Semantic and emotional background here is created by demonstrating that before the elections the government was already unlawfully using those administrative resources, which it did not have a right to use. Sensitivity of the Georgian population to this message was not high. It was designed more for international organizations and western political groups. NGOs played the leading role in the dissemination of this message.

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<sup>129</sup> We used the data of expert poll conducted by us in the end of 2002 within the framework of the Institute of Caucasus Public Strategies.



The establishment of this code was also promoted by several scandal power actions taken by the fundamentalist ecclesiastic Basil Mkalavlishvili and his group against the religious minorities. Passive response of the government to these actions caused that Shevardnadze began to represent a portrait of the politician who secretly sympathized with authoritarian and fundamentalist religions. This was a very significant attachment to the message “dictatorship and totalitarianism”. Unlawful methods of governance, corruption and persecution of religious minorities became those three features, according to which foreign experts were to estimate the situation in the country.

Incapable government. It was permanently demonstrated that the government was unable to solve the problems of the Georgian population. The message was developed by means of such topics as insolent robbery of ordinary people by the corrupted officials, humiliating position of Georgians in Abkhazia and Samachablo and the adjacent regions, criminal facts, etc. The activity of journalists sometimes passed all the bounds and they made conclusion on disability and incapacity of the government right after the publication of each criminal fact.

Boring and odious government. This message was being developed for quite a long time first by radio 105 and then by radio 101 and animated films “Dardubala” and “Our yard” on Rustavi-2. In all of these comic films Shevardnadze was shown as a week-headed old man, who could not solve the simplest

problems and who was totally dependent on the crooked, amoral and uncultured people surrounding him.

At the same time the television invited those representatives of the government who were poor polemicists and nonintellectual persons, the negative attitude to whom had been prepared in advance or who themselves gave the sound grounds for such attitude. In the period before the revolution Rustavi-2 did not invite or put in an unequal position those people who supported Shevardnadze or had a balanced political position.

There is one interesting detail. The last State Minister of Shevardnadze's government, who at the same time was the head of the governmental block in the elections, got acquainted with the results of public opinion poll several months before the elections. These results demonstrated that those representatives of the government, who often appeared on TV, had a very low rating with the public. One of the most important results of the poll was that these people could not be perceived as an alternative to the future revolutionary leaders and that it was necessary to substitute them with new and more trustworthy faces. The only result of this story was that soon alternative polls appeared, which showed the opposite results, according to which the allocation of powers in the chancellery seemed to be more appropriate.

Police regime. Criminal government. In the pre-revolutionary period the police regime in the country became a frequent subject of discussions. Rustavi-2 often emphasized arbitrariness of the

police and blamed it for its incapacity to improve the criminogenic situation. All this was aimed, apart of other things, to paralyze the police and the law machinery.

“Criminal government” was the message that was treated with special care. After the murder of Giorgi Sanaia this message was used for the attempt to excavate public commotion. Although mass public disturbances did not start at that time, the message still left an emotional track in the average people.

Simultaneously, public opinion was being prepared for the future events by the oppositional press by means of publishing the scenario of “velvet: revolution (*24 hours*, 18 April), as well as different astrological and foreteller’s prognosis, effective for the certain category of the population.

For the first time foretellers were used for the purpose of establishing the public opinion in 1998, when 15000 copies of the book by a less known Georgian foreteller was published. The book forecasted inevitable victory of the “Citizens Union” in the coming parliamentary elections and Zurab Zhvania was named as the future president.

The vast majority of the interviewed experts confirm that falsification of elections in the situation of underdeveloped political culture in Georgia became a synonym of the protest charge resulting from both objective and human factors (the most important of which was the hyper activity of electronic media).

Today we already see clear symptoms that electronic media loses the power it had before the rose revolution. Georgian political groups and the general public are now better prepared to limit the hyperactivity of media.

This is a very important aspect of historical experience obtained during the last years. If this process continues, the Georgian media will be able to finally determine its functional place among the other subjects of the society. We believe that during several years before the rose revolution the Georgian electronic media passed a rather difficult way of activity, which was often inappropriate of its primary destination, and today it already tries to find its place with new functionality.

	predisposition- ---for Revolution	Organization and administration of Revolution	Financing of Revolution	The role of non- governmt sector in the RR	Post Revolution Perspectives
“Rose Group”	System Crisis	Spontaneous; By the “Rose Group”	Small; country resources	Not very important	Absolutely positive
“Shevardnadze Team”	Human factor	Long term planning in advance; Ex- ternal powers	Large; Foreign Countries	No explicit trends	Worsening or no change
“Double Opposition”	System Crisis	Moderate position	Moderate Position	Quite important	Negative, because of incapability of the new government

“New Opposition”	System Crisis	Spontaneous; By the “Rose Group”	Small, country resources	Very Important	Negative, due to the wrong pol. direction of the new government
Independents	System Crisis	No explicit trends	No explicit trends	No explicit trends	Moderate position

First of all, it is important to discuss two main sides involved in revolution:

”Shevardnadze Team” and the “Rose Group” (We need to consider them as players of a “zero-sum game” where the winning position of one player automatically means the loss of the other). As expected they express the most polar opposite views about the Revolution. For “Shevardnadze Team”, the preparation for Revolution was long planned and involved great financial resources. The events were basically run by the individuals from foreign countries who occupied high positions. As for the “Rose Group” they were the simple implementers. The Revolution itself did not bring any benefit for Georgia.

*It is worthwhile to draw attention at the differences in opinions expressed about one of the happiest characteristics of the revolution that was the development of the events without bloodshed. The “Shevardnadze Team” views their own goodwill as its main reason. Shevardnadze himself justifies his resignation by the desire to avoid bloodshed. The evaluation about the same event proposed by the “Rose Group” is provided below*

Here the psychological context is the most evident: self-justification and preservation of the self by diminishing the rival and switching the focus to blame the “Third Party”.

In case of the “Rose Group”, long term preparation and financing from external sources is totally rejected. Spontaneity is highlighted and the main theme carried out is that nobody desired revolution but Shevardnadze regime itself determined the sequence of actions by falsifying the results of the elections then by the refusal to abolish its results, and finally by entering the alliance with Mr. Aslan Abashidze (expressed by bringing couple thousand people from Adjara to Tbilisi and organizing the manifestation to “protect” Shevardnadze) As noted by various representatives of “Rose Group” and “New Opposition” this fact provoked serious irritation amongst the supporters of opposition. According to version of the “Rose Group”, all of these events determined the response steps of the opposition: appeal to the people, actions of protest and forcing Shevardnadze to resign. All these were implemented by energetic, not very numerous political group that used the masses of tired people. The utilized resources were minimal but enough to win the elections. Today this political group has the support of international community and leads the country towards the way of progressive reforms.

*Why did not bloodshed take place? On the one hand, the mentality and organization of those who came out in the streets were quite high. On the other hand, nobody trusted the Shevardnadze regime, the police supported people and even if*

*Shevardnadze had wanted to, he would not have been able to use force.*

Thus, partisanship and the results of the revolution determine the interpretation of the events by the two major players: highlighting pluses and hiding minuses are in accordance with the principles of social psychology. However, certain differences can still be observed in the “Interpretation strategy” determined by the real outcomes of the revolution. “Rose Group” emphasizes its strengths but doesn’t attempt to overestimate the power of the Shevardnadze Team, whereas the latter attributes empowerment of the former to the financial, intellectual and organizational resources of the foreign countries.

The evaluations of the two other groups fall under the same principles. “The New Opposition “ basically agrees with the “Rose Group” in interpreting the events of the Revolution but recognizes some external participation in organization and funding of the revolution. In addition, it attributes greater role to the civic sector. As for the “Double Opposition” who opposes both actors, expresses “balanced negativism” about the both sides.

The question is: can we discuss the real matter of events basing our judgement on the information derived from actual participants of those events? As we saw, it is quite difficult in our case since the judgements are totally different. Maybe it would be more appropriate to base our judgement on the data collected from the “independents”. But there is no unity even

here and “hidden partisanship” bears its impact. The second alternative is to propose that the reality lies somewhere in the mid point of polar opposites. We hold this position thus realizing that this Hypothesis lacks proofs. To sum up this chapter we would like to cite an Englishman who stated: “When you listen to the witnesses of the same road accident in the court, you quit to trust Historians”<sup>130</sup>

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<sup>130</sup> cited



## Chapter Nine. “Blank Spots”

### The Georgian Church and the Patriarchy

According to the poll in 2003, the Georgian Orthodox Church had the highest confidence with the population in comparison with other public institutions<sup>131</sup>, as well as Ilia the II, the Patriarchy of Georgia – in comparison with other public figures<sup>132</sup>. But during the revolutionary processes the Church and its hierarchs retreated into the shadow. When the street actions started in Tbilisi, the Patriarchy appeared on TV with the appeal to both parties of the conflict, not to use force. That was all. The Church never participated in the well-known events, at least not openly.

In this situation the inactivity of the Church never became a subject of public debate. However, on the day of the culmination, on the 23<sup>rd</sup> of November, one thing happened, or, to be more precise, did not happen. This thing is the reason of many discussions today. According to the tradition, the Patriarchy of Georgia always attended the first session of each new parliament, where he prayed and blessed the legislative body. This tradition

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<sup>131</sup> See for example, “Urban population of Georgia about the religious issues” by G. Nizharadze, E. Jgerenaia, J. Kachkachishvili, R. Mshvidobadze, G. Khutsishvili. V: N. Lezhava (ed.) *Role of Orthodox religion in the countries and societies of Georgia and Russia*. Tbilisi, Fund of Heinrich Belle, 2004, 104-121

<sup>132</sup> Ibidem

was breached on the 23<sup>rd</sup> of November; the Patriarchy did not come to the parliament. Experts often stated in their interviews that in case the Patriarchy had come to the parliament, the events might have developed in a different way. The opposition might have forborne from rushing into the hall. Certainly, it is useless now to argue about what might have happened, but the reason of the Patriarchy not attending the parliamentary session is still unclear and is explained in different ways. The experts name several reasons:

1. Neutrality was the principal position of the Church, which is its traditional position with respect to politics.

“The role of Georgian Church was actually neutral; this was best illustrated when the Patriarchy did not come to the opening of the parliamentary session... He saw the tension and did not appear publicly to support the government; he just stepped away and held the neutral position. Generally, such behavior in conflict situations is customary for the Georgian Church... We all remember the times of Gamsakhurdia and after him, when the Church did not get involved in the political events and did not support either party. This is a tradition of our country” (D. Zurabishvili, Member of Parliament, during the revolution a representative of Liberty Institute).

2. Not coming to the parliamentary session demonstrated his support to the opposition.

“...The Church took the side of the opposition and demonstrated this by not coming to the parliamentary session...” (Vakhtang Khmaladze, Member of Parliament).

3. The Patriarchy did not come to the session for personal reasons.

This viewpoint was expressed by a member of E. Shevardnadze’s team, V. Lortkipanidze, who considers Shevardnadze’s incapability and inappropriateness to be the main factor of the Rose revolution:

The Patriarchy is a clever and wise man, if I have a right to estimate him. He was trying to contact Shevardnadze on the phone but did not succeed. After that he called me. We had a one-hour talk; he wanted to arrange a meeting of Shevardnadze with the opposition. I passed the Patriarchy’s words to Shevardnadze, but he categorically refused to follow his suggestion. Can you call this an appropriate behavior?! The Patriarchy was offended and this was the reason why he did not come to the parliamentary session on the following day...

Finally, E. Shevardnadze’s comment:

I have never called the Patriarch, he used to come himself. He did not appear on that day, but actually he did not attend all sessions, he came only to the important ones. However, I shall frankly say that the Patriarchy

would never act against me. I know him as well as my five fingers. We were friends.

We cannot exclude that E. Shevardnadze to the very last moment was waiting for Ilia the II and for this reason he extended his introductory speech before the inauguration of the parliament. We know that he did not manage to complete his speech – the opposition rushed into the hall.

However, there is also a different view, namely of L. Berdzenishvili, (Member of Parliament, Republican Party) who believes that perhaps E. Shevardnadze procrastinated and prolonged his speech knowing that the masses were to rush into the Parliament building sooner or later, and he preferred ending his presidential career before the inauguration of the parliament rather than being ousted after having been installed.

But still, why did the Patriarchy not come to the session?

### **Igor Ivanov's visit**

On the 23<sup>rd</sup> of November, on the day of revolution, early in the morning, Igor Ivanov, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia unexpectedly arrived in Tbilisi (interesting detail: according to the member of Z. Zhvania's team, when Z. Zhvania was told that Ivanov

had arrived, the first question he asked was: “Which Ivanov?!” The point is that in the Russian government of that time, apart of Igor Ivanov there was also Serguei Ivanov, Minister of Defense, with the reputation of a being a “hawk”).

I. Ivanov met with E. Shevardnadze and the leaders of the opposition. After that he flew to Batumi to meet with Abashidze. He was in Batumi when he learned about the events in Tbilisi. We do not know whether he met Abashidze in Batumi. The only thing we know is that on the same day he returned to Moscow.

It is not difficult to guess that I. Ivanov had arrived with a certain mission. However, it is not yet clear what that mission was. The majority of the interviewed experts could not answer this question. E. Shevardnadze did not wish to answer it. A more or less clear view on this point was expressed by V. Lortkipanidze, member of Shevardnadze’s team:

I can tell you about the conversation between Igor Ivanov and myself. He told me that he was going to leave the same day and asked me to arrange a meeting with Shevardnadze as soon as possible. I was the first person he met with in Georgia. Our meeting lasted almost to 6 a.m. He said that the decision of sending him to Georgia was spontaneous. He was having supper together with President Putin, the wives were also present. Putin asked

him to fly to Tbilisi. He immediately got on a plane and together with his wife flew to Tbilisi. These are at least his words. First he went to Krtsanisi (residence of E. Shevardnadze) and then to the Rustaveli avenue, to the house of parliament. Probably this was agreed, because all the three leaders of opposition (M. Saakashvili, Z. Zhvania and N. Burjanadze) were already there. Ivanov met Shevardnadze and then came to the opposition to perform the role of a mediator.

According to V. Lortkipanidze (approximately the same version was repeated by Irina Saraishvili-Chanturia, one of the leaders of Shevardnadze's coalition), Ivanov had agreed with Shevardnadze the following proposal to the opposition: the meeting should break up, the results of the election would stay in force, but in several months pre-term parliamentary and presidential elections would be appointed. The opposition offered an alternative: the meeting should break up, the results of the election would be cancelled and Shevardnadze would remain at his post until the pre-term parliamentary and presidential elections. After that M. Saakashvili and Z. Zhvania had a meeting with Shevardnadze (without Ivanov) and apparently came to an agreement. Ivanov considered his mission fulfilled and left for Batumi. As we know, the events in Tbilisi after that developed in an unexpected way.

There is one strange point here: why Ivanov left for Batumi? It was clear that if the parties had come to an agreement, Abashidze could not have interfered.

On the 23<sup>rd</sup> of November 2006, in the documentary dedicated to the Rose revolution called “The three weeks of November”, the direct participants of the events (V. Rcheulishvili – one of the leaders of Shevardnadze’s coalition, P. Mamradze – Head of the Chancellery) mentioned one interesting detail: according to Ivanov’s plan, in the period before the pre-term election Aslan Abashidze would be appointed a Prime Minister. This would obviously give him a chance to win the presidential election. The pro-Russian policy of Abashidze would be very convenient to Russia in case the latter became a president.

Presumably, the question of appointing Abashidze to the post of Prime Minister was agreed by Ivanov only with Shevardnadze; the leaders of opposition learned about this later and this factor determined the following events. In such case the purpose of Ivanov’s visit to Batumi becomes clear.

We are not quite sure that the events developed exactly as described. But one thing is clear: the mission of Igor Ivanov, whatever it was, failed.



# **Final Conclusions**

## **The Rose Revolution and Civil Society**

The Georgian revolution could be attributed to a set of social phenomena labeled “an uprising of the civil society” by democratic transition theories. The success of the revolution stemmed from the high activity level of three components of civic society. Out of these three, the political opposition (1) that has not been the focus of our research, led the process, the mass media (2) played a crucial role in the delegitimation of the existing regime and the mobilization of public protest, and NGOs (3) were directly involved in the organization of mass protest actions, education of groups of public and their preparation.

## **General Results**

The research was conducted using three methods: expert interviews, polling, and content analysis. Despite some differences, these three yielded more or less similar results. It turned out that there was a discourse in the Georgian society according to which civil society was basically perceived as the non-governmental sector. The data obtained show that the public is aware of the non-governmental sector and mostly holds a

positive attitude towards it. The mass media is perceived separately from the non-governmental sector. The level of trust related to the mass media is high and the only institution that is superior to it in terms of trust is the Georgian Orthodox Church. In the context of the revolution, the mass media is thought to be one of the main actors (irrespective of the attitude held towards it). This is basically true for Rustavi 2. The role of the non-governmental sector in the revolution is perceived as less important compared to that of the mass media and the political organizations. However, the public demonstrates a high level of awareness of the role in question.

The fact that the revolutionary masses were mobilized under slogans stressing the government's impotence and its corrupt nature, but not under economic slogans – poverty, social hardship, etc. – indicates that a certain level of social awareness (not entirely reducible to basic human needs) was achieved in Georgia by that time. Part of our respondents (cf. sociological poll), including some of the experts, underline that the non-governmental sector has played a significant role in this process of gaining social awareness. For sure, economic hardships influenced the masses' involvement in the events, but it is an important observation that the political slogans prevailed at rallies over economic ones. This in our opinion confirms to some extent the assumption of the raised public awareness.

## **The Main Hypothesis and Other Hypotheses**

According to the main hypothesis, *in 1993-2003, the elements of civic awareness were formed in the Georgian society under the influence of the free media and the non-governmental sector, which made the Rose Revolution a large scale, non-violent national action, aimed against the violation of civic rights by the authorities and resulting in the change of stagnated regime.*

*According to other hypotheses,* representatives of the non-governmental sector took part in the following activities carried out during the Rose Revolution:

- Pointing to fraud during the elections;
- Influencing the public opinion;
- Actions directed at the criticism of the authorities and their delegitimization;
- Organizing individual protest actions;
- Ensuring an organized and a peaceful character of protest actions;
- Working together with the mass media, as an organizer of protest actions and a contributor to the mobilization of society.

The results obtained make it possible to conclude that the preliminary assumptions and working hypotheses have been substantiated.

## **The Main Results of the Expert Interviews**

The experts' responses were largely dependent on party affiliation and political sympathies. The emphasis on the events, the evaluation of political figures, the factors of revolution and further perspectives fully agree with social-psychological regularities (partization, contrast–assimilation effect, dissonance reduction). Most experts, irrespective of their political stand, evaluate the role of the civic sector in the Rose Revolution as important. This is basically true for the television, and, in particular, Rustavi 2. The majority of experts think that Rustavi 2 was an important player during the revolution. The role of NGOs was considered important as well. The respondents often mentioned the Liberty Institute and the Georgian Young Lawyers' Association. It was repeatedly said that other organizations also played a significant role, even though their contribution was not so visible.

The results show that the experts holding a neutral position as well as critically disposed experts emphasized that the civil society went beyond its functions, whereas the experts with a positive attitude towards the Rose Revolution were trying to demonstrate that the civil society had been acting within the limits of its functions.

The Main Results of the Press Content Analysis are that:

- The information strategy of printed media was the creation of a negative atmosphere in relation to the situation in the country and the formation of a protest electorate, which was achieved through discrediting of the authorities.
- The main target for delegitimization was E. Shevardnadze, and, to a smaller extent, his team or the team's individual members. For instance, the press was less interested in the authorities' electoral block, the executive power, etc. This was reflected in the main slogan of the revolution "Georgia without Shevardnadze."
- For the printed media, the most frequent target for negation was the "unprofessionalism" and "corruptness" of the authorities.
- The declared reason of the revolution, the "elections fraud", acted as a trigger.
- The governmental media used fewer weapons to attack and was no longer able to fulfill its function. The reason is that the inevitability of Shevardnadze's resignation became a dominantly accepted "social construct", and even the government media fell under

its influence. It acted only within the limits of the assignments given by the authorities.

- For the printed media the civic society was basically represented by NGOs.
- With a minor exception, the printed media positively evaluated the civic sector, and, in particular, NGOs. NGOs had a special place and function in the newspapers' information strategies – in case of need they were used to influence public opinion as neutral, unbiased, non-politicized and uncorrupted actors. At the same time, the opposition parties played the role of the main actor.
- With the approaching revolution, the printed media became more oriented on the civic sector. The frequency of its appearance in the media increased.
- Differently from the opposition press, the governmental press appealed to the civic sector less often, which indicates that Shevardnadze's team underestimated its potential.

### **The Main Results of the Sociological Survey**

The main results of the sociological survey enable us to conclude that out of the actors within the country, the mass media's role in the Rose Revolution is evaluated as most important. At the same time, the majority of the population positively evaluates the

NGOs. It has to be noted that in the field of the protection of human rights the population trusts the media and the non-government sector more than the court. A large segment of population is aware of non-government organizations. On the whole, the majority evaluates the impact of NGO activity on the country's developments as follows: "They do have influence, but very little". On the other hand, the role of NGOs in the Rose Revolution has been rather highly evaluated. It has to be emphasized that public awareness and self-efficacy – although present – is not well developed. Respondents most often name the "will of foreign states" as the main factor in the Rose Revolution. This part of research also shows many interesting trends and details, which fall under the main assumptions.

### **The Role of the Civic Sector in the Ajara Events (Spring 2004)**

*(According to the NGO and civic sector representatives participating in the survey)*

In 1991-2003 the development of civil society was hindered by the isolationist and autocratic regime in Ajara. The free media were annihilated in 1993. The opposition newspaper *Batumelebi* was only released at the end of 2003, after the beginning of revolutionary events in Tbilisi. In terms of institutional development, the existing NGOs were at the third level only (according to G. Nodia). The NGOs existing before 2003 shared the doctrine of apoliticism. After November 2003, the civic

society's activity became more intense in Ajara and reached its peak by May 2004.

## **Triangulation**

Below we summarize the similarities and differences in the results yielded by the utilization of the three research methods: semi-structured interviews with the experts, the sociological survey and the media analysis.

- The opposition parties led by M. Saakashvili, Z. Zhvania and N. Burjanadze are considered to be the main actors (within the country) of the Rose Revolution in results acquired through all three methods.
- All the experts, irrespective of their political orientation, highly evaluate the role of the mass media, and especially that of the TV company Rustavi 2, as an actor in the Rose Revolution. The sociological survey and the content analysis show the same results.
- Based on the data obtained via the three methods we can conclude that civil society in Georgia is identified with NGOs.
- The results obtained through the three methods show that the contribution of NGOs to the Rose Revolution is significant, though not of primary importance.
- The analysis of the data received through the three



methods in question makes it possible to conclude that the civic discourse does exist in Georgia and that the majority of public has as awareness of NGOs. NGOs have a certain impact on the public opinion, although it is significantly weaker than that of the church, the media, and that of individual political parties and leading political figures. On the whole, the positive attitude toward the non-government sector prevails over the negative.

- In the sociological survey, the “will of foreign states” was most frequently mentioned as the main factor of the Rose Revolution (even though the evaluation of some factors was slightly below the factor in question). The same opinion was expressed by one part of experts, who did not sympathize with the Rose Revolution. Other experts disagreed with this opinion. This theme was not covered by the selected media sources during the studied period (2003 until summer 2004). This research does not allow to draw any conclusion on the actual role of foreign actors in the Rose Revolution.

Finally, a sub-goal of this research was to bring to the fore possible characteristics of civil society in post-Soviet space. This point is incorporated in the reflection.

## Reflection

Specificity of the research done first of all manifests itself in relation between the object of the study, or *what* is studied, and the subject of *who* is the object studied by. At first sight it looks as a relation of the whole and its own part: the impact of civil society is studied by a team consisting of civil society representatives. It is obvious that the latter have inside knowledge and information hardly to be expected by outsiders. On the other hand, does this fact enlarge the margin of error, bring subjectivity into the research, or challenge the validity of the conclusions? Has it influenced the research, and if so, to what extent? Is this at all measurable? If we studied this topic anew, what would we do differently? Apart from considering the issue against the background of traditional Kantian epistemological dilemma, reflections on this specificity appear to be especially relevant and demanded in the Georgian civil society discourse. It would be hard to expect that all those issues found satisfactory answers in this tiny section of the book; therefore it is noteworthy that these are only reflections, not additional conclusions or an evaluation of the study.

How is it possible to study an event you are part of? The relation between human subjectivity and the possibility of objective

knowledge is one of the old philosophical dilemmas<sup>133</sup>. Yet, there are also objectively emerging limitations and obstacles to study. At the dawn of modern physics of elementary particles, Werner Heisenberg's famous "uncertainty principle" reflected the dilemma of studying the particles with help of devices consisting of the same kind of particles, which interact and evade proper measuring<sup>134</sup>. This seemed to be an insurmountable barrier – and a possible dead-end for natural science - until Niels Bohr managed to overcome it in his "complementarity principle": we may be able to complete the picture of the object of study by considering its seemingly uncombinable pictures as complementary to each other. This methodological approach is applicable even to the complicated and evasive nature of social phenomena and conflict situations. Positions of the parties to conflict may seem irreconcilable, but a skilled mediator gains the knowledge of the conflict issue, and gets to the proposal of a possible solution by first learning the positions and then transcending the dilemma of positions in developing an understanding of the conflict as a meta-object<sup>135</sup>. Multiple alternative truths do not contradict or exclude, but rather complement each other. This revelation teaches us to be tolerant and receptive. This also means that a study of such a complex

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<sup>133</sup> Cf. Russell, B., *Our Knowledge of the External World as a Field for Scientific Method in Philosophy*. Chicago and London: Open Court Publishing, 1914.

<sup>134</sup> For a summary of Werner Heisenberg's and the Copenhagen School ideas see in <en.wikipedia.org>

<sup>135</sup> Cf. Khutsishvili, G., *Towards an Inclusive Interpretation of Conflict*. In: *Understanding Conflict*. Tbilisi: ICCN, 1998, pp. 11-28.

phenomenon as the Georgian revolution may reach multiple explanations in different research schemes and authors' views, and they all contribute to an ultimate truth if done honestly and meticulously. It would be interesting to compare our findings and observations with those that other research groups may achieve, and we welcome any such feedback.

If it is not possible to develop a 'God's view on human affairs' by mortal researchers, it is at least methodologically justified to develop a so-called 'helicopter view', or a semi-detached view of how our epistemological position, beliefs, empirical conditions, and involvement in the object of study might possibly affect the process and its results. Involvement and sentiment that are unavoidable in assessing the events can be to a reasonable extent balanced by reflecting both over the empirical data obtained, and the tendencies that they reveal. In fact, the process of reflection has not stopped throughout the entire research process.

A combination of views *ex parte interna* and *ex parte externa* is required to provide a valid result in many cases<sup>136</sup>. If we try to detach ourselves from the research object and try to see it from an 'outside point', we can only get its one incomplete/inadequate picture, both because we can grasp only those details and aspects that are visible or manifest themselves to us, and because the

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<sup>136</sup> Cf. Khutsishvili, G., *The Problem of the Infinite in the Light of Modern Science*, Tbilisi: Academic Press, 1981, pp. 80-81.

very fact of detachment has already introduced changes in grasping of what is really not detachable. On the other hand, if we - being aware of the dangers of naive solipsism – try to grasp the picture of the object from an ‘insider point of view’, we will again be misled by how the object shows itself to an internal observer. An insider is always partial, although an outsider is not always neutral, may be – indifferent<sup>137</sup>. This is not an effect caused by subjectivity – it is rather an objective consequence of a given research framework. We realize that we mostly had to describe and assess the events from the insider point of view, yet the methodology elaborated for this book allowed to combine to a serious extent the internal and external views, and to obtain a valid picture of the phenomenon of Georgian revolution and the role of NGOs and non-governmental media in its implementation.

One of the most important findings of the research was that the media in Georgia turned out strong enough to promote, along with other actors, a discourse delegitimizing the government and opening the way for revolutionary changes. But the same exact circumstance raises a question: will the revolutionary changes be sustainable, and the cause of the revolution justified accordingly if the civil society in the post-revolutionary period weakens, the

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<sup>137</sup> Compared to the widespread opposition of ‘insider-partial’ and ‘outsider-neutral’ as a basis of choice in third-party interventions in disputes [Cf. e.g. John Paul Lederach. From War to Peace. *Conciliation Quarterly*. Winter 1991, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp.12-15.

bureaucracy proliferates, the government operates without a proper system of checks-and-balances, the independent media space shrinks, human security suffers and if the power structures benefit from the established selective justice and impunity? The masses of people showed a clear example of public awareness and organization in the November 2003 days, but in the following years this experience did not develop into concrete institutionalized systems of societal control of the country's resources and resistance to bureaucratization.

On the whole, we may say with hindsight that the assumptions were chosen and formulated well, and that the conclusions were more or less to be expected. Surprises came when we started to compare the respondents' answers to certain questions with regard to which the team had both an own view and the picture of the society's expectable reaction. It turned out that various groups of respondents revealed quite different assessments and visions of the same social events and processes. First of all, we can single out here the reaction to the question about possible foreign influence on the developments in November 2003. The so-called "rose group" – activists, organizers and supporters of mass protest – denied that a substantial foreign contribution had been done to the success of the Rose Revolution. More moderate has been the reaction of the so-called "new opposition" (please see text), while all the other groups stressed the substantial role

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of the external actors (namely, the USA), and tended to think that the revolution had been designed, planned and financed from the outside.

In different parts of this book we already touched upon the subject of what is special about the Georgian civil society, compared to other post-Soviet states and to the Western world. The data obtained from the research indicated that in Georgia civil society is mostly associated with non-governmental organizations. It often required a separate reminder or explanation from an interviewer that the independent mass media or churches also belong to civil society. It was even more difficult for most respondents to associate civil society with, for example, trade unions, as the latter have been practically inactive in Georgia. Also the order of civil society development appears to take a different course in Georgia than described in literature on civil society.<sup>138</sup> This already shows basic differences between the Georgian and Western understanding of civil society that should be further explored in future studies.

The framework of the research did not allow to touch upon, or do comparative studies to reveal similarities with or differences from other 'coloured' revolutions in the post-Soviet space, primarily, with the Ukrainian revolution that represents the most important phenomenon in this context. This is also an issue for

future research. As it became clear from the post-revolutionary development in Georgia, one of the most important questions for the future research is to study peculiarities of transfiguration of a state power from ‘people power’ to an authoritarian power, and the capacities of civil society to influence this process.

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<sup>138</sup> Chapter 3, page 50.



## **2003**

**April 14** - Couple of hundred students held a protest rally, organized by the anti-governmental youth movement Kmara (Enough), demanding the President's and government's resignation.

Protesters slammed newly established pro-Presidential election alliance and burned pictures of President Shevardnadze and State Minister Avtandil Jorbenadze, which were the leaders of this election bloc. This was the first rally of the Kmara movement. Students also said that this was a warning rally, and threatened further protests.

**June 30** - Western ambassadors accredited in Georgia, as well as the representatives of the international organizations, including the OSCE, USAID meet Parliamentary Chairperson and the leaders of the political parties beyond the closed doors to discuss parliamentary relations, scheduled for November 2.

The western diplomats submitted to the Georgian politicians list of recommendations urging for fair and democratic elections. The appeal reads that in case of failure to secure fair elections Georgia would be deprived of not only support from the international community but also economic assistance.

**July 5** - Dispatched by the U.S. President former Secretary of State James Baker delivered to the opposition and President Shevardnadze U.S.-suggested guidelines for holding free and fair Parliamentary elections, scheduled for November 2. The visit aimed at making breakthrough in the deadlock between the opposition and the government over the election code.

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<sup>139</sup> Based on the materials published by LINKS and Civil Georgia.

**July 8** - Opposition leaders met President Shevardnadze and agreed to reform the election system in accordance to the U.S.-suggested guidelines proposed by James Baker.

**July 31** - The Parliament rejected to compose the Central Election Commission on party bases – one seat to each opposition party, as it was considered by the U.S.-suggested election guidelines. The Revival and Industrialists parties received three and two seats in the commission with the support of the pro-presidential parliamentary factions. The decision caused major opposition parties' protests.

**August 6** - At least two members of the Kmara (Enough) youth anti-governmental movement were injured, as the police beat up the movement's activists, which tried to hold a protest rally in front of the Energy Ministry. The peaceful demonstration, protesting against the entry of the Russian state-owned power giant Unified Energy Systems (UES) in Georgia, was met with the police cordon near the Energy Ministry building and prevented the protesters to rally in front of the Ministry.

**August 14** - Parliament approved late on August 14 amendments to the election code, considering broad anti-fraud measures, including voter marking procedures for the parliamentary elections scheduled for November 2.

**August 16** - The United Democrats opposition party, led by Zurab Zhvania and Parliamentary Chairperson Nino Burjanadze formed an election alliance – the Burjanadze-Democrats to run for November 2 parliamentary elections.

**September 1** - President Shevardnadze appointed Nana Devdariani, Public Defender of Georgia to the post of Chairperson of the Central Election Commission. Nana Devdariani vowed to be impartial.

Nana Devdariani was among three candidates submitted to the President for approval by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe (CoE). MP Vakhtang Khmaladze and legal expert Davit

Usupashvili were the other two candidates for the CEC chairmanship post.

**September 24** - Thomas C. Adams, Acting Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia in the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs of the U.S. Department of State, met with Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze. After the talks, he said the U.S. would reduce financial aid for Georgia from 2004, because of Georgia's failure to implement economic projects and reforms.

**September 26** - Dozens were injured as a result of a clash between the supporters of the opposition National Movement party and the local authorities in the Bolnisi district of the Kvemo Kartli region in southern Georgia.

**October 2** – Nine blocs and fifties parties are registred for the 2 november Poil..

**October 4** – Preliminary voter's list made public.

**October 5** - U.S. Senator John McCain arrived in Tbilisi to assess pre-election situation in the country. He said that the November 2 parliamentary elections are of crucial importance for Georgia.

**October 7** - According to the Transparency International's (TI) annual report, issued on October 7 Georgia is among the most corrupt countries. In the latest report, Georgia was ranked 127th out of 133 countries listed.

**October 15** - The opposition National Movement party, led by Mikheil Saakashvili, warned the government that it would stage mass protest rallies in case the authorities try to rig the November 2 parliamentary elections. Inaccurate voter lists heated up debates during this period. Thousands of eligible voters were not included on the voter lists.

**October 23** - The local authorities of the Adjarian Autonomous Republic foiled today protest rally of the National Movement opposition party, causing clash between the police and the

protesters. One of the leaders of the National Movement MP Koba Davitashvili was beaten up as a result of the clash. Next day another member of the National Movement Davit Berdzenishvili was also beaten up in Adjara.

**October 24** – National movement majoritarian candidate in batumi, David Berdzenishvili, assaulted in Adjara; the attack is shown on national television.

**October 28** - Julian Peel Yates, head of the OSCE Election Observation Mission in Georgia said that up to 450 observers would monitor November 2 parliamentary elections.

**November 2** - Parliamentary elections are held in Georgia to elect new 235-seat Parliament. Simultaneously with the parliamentary elections, referendum on reduction of parliamentary seats from 235 to 150 was held.

**November 3** - International, as well as local observers condemned mass irregularities and chaos during November 2 parliamentary elections in Georgia. The OSCE observers condemned irregularities in the election process in the regions, particularly in Kutaisi and Rustavi, in the Adjara Autonomous Republic and Kvemo Kartli.

Observers from the OSCE and European Parliament stressed, that although the voters were willing to participate in the elections, a great deal of them failed to express their will due to disorganized work of polling stations, lack of training of the members of precinct election commissions and mass inaccuracies in the voter lists.

**November 3** - The parallel vote tabulation results, conducted by the election watchdog NGO International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED), as well as the exit polls surveyed the U.S. polling firm, suggest that the National Movement opposition alliance, led by Mikheil Saakashvili won the November 2 parliamentary elections. However, the preliminary results by the Central Election Commission suggested that the Shevardnadze's bloc For New Georgia led the polls.

**November 4** - The leaders of the opposition parties – the National Movement, the Burjanadze-Democrats and the Unity met to discuss joint measures to prevent the authorities from manipulating the November 2 parliamentary election results.

**November 4** - Opposition staged a mass protest rally against the ballot fraud. Opposition set an ultimatum to Shevardnadze. “Either the President should recognize the victory of the opposition in the November 2 parliamentary elections, or he should resign,” leader of the opposition National Movement Mikheil Saakashvili said at a protest rally in front of the Tbilisi Municipality.

President Shevardnadze condemned the rally, saying the “use of pressure against the government is inadmissible.”

**November 5** - The U.S. Embassy to Georgia raises concern over the Central Election Commission’s delay in providing a full and accurate vote count.

**November 7** - Nino Burjanadze, the Parliamentary Chairperson and the leader of Burjanadze-Democrats opposition alliance said she would boycott November 2 parliamentary election results. “We will not recognize results of the elections,” she said

“The elections were held with mass ballot fraud, results were totally falsified by the authorities and we are not going to cooperate with the people in the Parliament, who rigged the votes. We are not going to be the members of the Parliament, which is not elected by the Georgian people,” Nino Burjanadze said.

**November 7** - A group of armed men opened fire in the center of Zugdidi, western Georgian city, where Mikheil Saakashvili intended to hold a protest rally. Three supporters of the opposition were wounded. Saakashvili blamed the local police for the incident.

**November 7** - President Shevardnadze said in his live broadcast in the State TV Channel that the Soros Foundation funds

opposition parties in Georgia and interferes in Georgia's internal affairs.

**November 8** - The opposition renewed street protest in Tbilisi. More than 20 thousand protesters, gathered in front of the Georgian Parliament demanding from the authorities to recognize opposition's victory in the November 2 parliamentary elections. They called for President Eduard Shevardnadze's resignation if he fails to do so.

**November 9** - President Eduard Shevardnadze held a phone conversation with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin to discuss post-election developments in Georgia.

**November 9** - President Shevardnadze held talks with the opposition leaders – Mikheil Saakashvili, Nino Burjanadze and Zurab Zhvania, aiming at making the breakthrough in the political crisis. However, no agreement had been reached.

**November 10** - President Shevardnadze visited Adjarian capital Batumi and held talks with Aslan Abashidze, the head of Adjara Autonomous Republic. Shevardnadze secured Abashidze's support in the crisis, which occurred in the country after the November 2 elections.

**November 11-13** - In the wake of meeting with President Shevardnadze on November 10, head of the Adjara Autonomous Republic Aslan Abashidze visited Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia.

**November 14** - Mass protest rally held in Tbilisi. Tens of thousands of protesters, led by the opposition leaders – Mikheil Saakashvili, Nino Burjanadze and Zurab Zhvania, joined hands to form the live chain surrounding the President's office, demanding Eduard Shevardnadze's resignation. Mikheil Saakashvili called for civil disobedience to force Shevardnadze to resign.

**November 15** - President Shevardnadze held a phone conversation with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin. This was already the third conversation between the Georgian and

Russian Presidents within a week to discuss post-election situation in Georgia.

**November 17** - While President Shevardnadze was reiterating in his Monday radiobroadcast that he “will not resign,” thousands of Tbilisites stopped their cars at 11 a.m. on November 17 and blew their horns, as a sign of protest against the Shevardnadze regime and as a signal to launch a nation-wide civil disobedience campaign.

**November 18** - Lynn Pascoe, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs of the U.S. Department of State, arrived in Tbilisi and held talks with the opposition leaders, as well as with State Minister Avtandil Jorbenadze.

**November 18** - Pro-Shevardnadze rally replaced opposition outside the Parliament. While the opposition was preparing for peaceful march on the capital city from the regions, several thousand supporters of President Shevardnadze and Aslan Abashidze, the Adjarian leader, staged a rally. Several thousands of supporters of the Revival Union, led by Adjarian leader Aslan Abashidze, arrived in Tbilisi from Adjara Autonomous Republic to participate in the rally.

**November 19** - President Shevardnadze’s surprise move to criticize the state-owned First TV Channel, triggered anger of the state TV chief and journalists. Chief of the State Television Zaza Shengelia resigned, accusing the authorities in mounting pressure on the television. The State TV chief’s resignation was a blow for the Shevardnadze’s government.

**November 20** - The Central Election Commission (CEC) announced final results of the November 2 parliamentary elections. Shevardnadze’s election bloc For New Georgia was in the top of the polls, followed by Adjarian leader Aslan Abashidze’s party Revival Union. Mikheil Saakashvili’s National Movement was only on the third place, while in the exit polls and parallel vote tabulation results the National Movement was in the top. The United States has condemned final vote tally of November 2 parliamentary elections as fraudulent, which does not “accurately reflects the will of the Georgian people.”

**November 21** – A couple of kilometer-long convoy of hundreds of cars, buses and minibuses of protesters advanced towards Tbilisi on November 21, honking horns and chanting anti-Shevardnadze slogans.

**November 22** - President Shevardnadze convened the new Parliament elected in November 2 fraudulent parliamentary elections. Shevardnadze attends the session; however while addressing the MPs a group of protesters with Mikheil Saakashvili, broke into the Parliament chamber. Shevardnadze was ushered out of the building by his body guards.

Outside of the Parliament, he appealed to his supporters, told them that he would not resign, and left the area. Soon after Shevardnadze's departure from the Parliament, his supporters also left the area outside the Parliament and tens of thousands of opposition supporters occupied the territory outside the Parliament. Later the protesters also took over the State Chancellery, the President office.

**November 23** – The Russian President Vladimir Putin dispatched Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov to Tbilisi to mediate between Eduard Shevardnadze and the opposition leaders.

**November 23** - Adjarian leader Aslan Abashidze announced the state of emergency in the Autonomous Republic.

**November 23** - In the evening opposition leaders, Mikheil Saakashvili and Zurab Zhvania met with Eduard Shevardnadze in the Krtsanisi governmental residence. After the talks, Eduard Shevardnadze announced his resignation. Tens of thousands of people started celebration of the bloodless revolution in the streets of Tbilisi. Parliamentary Chairperson Nino Burjanadze became the Interim President.

**November 24** - The U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell in the phone conversation with Nino Burjanadze, acting President of Georgia, supported and encouraged her and her colleagues.

**November 25** - The acting Parliament, elected in 1999, approved to hold snap presidential elections for January 4, 2004.



**November 26** - The leaders of the bloodless revolution, which led Shevardnadze out of office, announced Mikheil Saakashvili as their single candidate to run for presidency.

**November 27** - One of the opposition leaders Zurab Zhvania becomes the State Minister. On the same day, the Parliament also approved the opposition leaders' supporters for the Finance Minister and Interior Minister's positions.

**November 28** - Chairperson of the Central Elections Commission Nana Devdariani filed resignation. Nana Devdariani, along with the former President and the government, was criticized for the rigged November 2 parliamentary elections.

**November 30** - The Parliament approved Zurab Chiaberashvili as the Central Election Commission's Chairman. Zurab Chiaberashvili previously was a director of the election watchdog NGO International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED), which conducted parallel vote tabulation (PVT) during the November 2 parliamentary elections. The Parliament approved Tedo Japaridze as a Foreign Minister on the same day.

**December 1** - Foreign ministers from OSCE participating States have pledged to provide more than five million Euros in immediate assistance to Georgia to help the country organize presidential and parliamentary elections.

**December 1** – The leader of the Traditionalists party Akaki Asatiani refused to support Mikheil Saakashvili in January 4 presidential elections. Asatiani was beside the opposition leaders during the street protests against Shevardnadze. He explained that he does not agree with Saakashvili's election platform.

**December 2** - Colin Powell, the U.S. Secretary of State said, while addressing the OSCE Ministerial Council on December 2, "the international community should do everything possible to support Georgia's territorial integrity throughout and beyond the elections."

“No support should be given to breakaway elements seeking to weaken the territorial integrity of Georgia,” Colin Powell added.

**December 3** - Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Lynn Pascoe led an interagency team to meet with officials of Georgia’s Interim Government to review specific assistance proposals for Georgia’s upcoming elections and support for Georgia’s political and economic reform.

**December 6** - Presidential candidate Mikheil Saakashvili condemned the statements made by leader of Adjara Autonomous Republic Aslan Abashidze, who threatened with boycotting the elections.

**December 6** - Russian President Vladimir Putin held a phone conversation with Georgian Interim President Nino Burjanadze.

**December 7** - Election observer from the Georgian Young Lawyers' Association (GYLA) Giorgi Mshvenieradze, who was arrested by the Adjarian authorities, was released. Giorgi Mshvenieradze, 21, was detained by the Adjara Autonomous Republic’s police on November 2, while he was monitoring the parliamentary elections in Kobuleti.

He was accused of deliberate attempts to impede elections at one of the precincts of Kobuleti. However, according to the human rights advocacy NGOs Giorgi Mshvenieradze was arrested when he noticed a case of ballot stuffing.

**December 10** - No agreement has been reached after six-hour long burdensome talks between Interim President Nino Burjanadze and Adjarian leader Aslan Abashidze. Abashidze still threatened to boycott January 4 presidential elections and not to open the polling stations in the region.

**December 16** - The Traditionalists and National-Democratic parties announced that they created a bloc to form a rightist movement, which will contest the current authorities in the parliamentary elections.

**December 18** - Adjarian leader Aslan Abashidze left for Strasbourg to hold talks with Walter Schwimmer, the Secretary General of Council of Europe.

**December 20** - State Minister Zurab Zhvania and head of the Adjara Autonomous Republic Aslan Abashidze held 4-hour long talks in Batumi, however no particular agreement has been reached over the holding of the presidential elections in the Autonomous Republic.

**December 23** - U.S. ambassador to Georgia Richard Miles left for Adjarian capital Batumi to hold talks with Aslan Abashidze, the head of Adjara Autonomous capital and tried to convince him not to boycott the elections. This was the third visit of Richard Miles to Batumi in December.

**December 25** - Georgian Interim President Nino Burjanadze said after the two-hour long talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin on December 25, that her visit to Russia was “a breakthrough in Russo-Georgian relations.” However, the visit revealed once again that bilateral ties are still far from normalization.

**December 25** - More than 1,7 million voters have undergone voter registration, necessary for making the voter lists for the January 4 snap presidential elections.

**December 26** - The new public movement Our Adjara was established, which aims at promotion of the democracy in the Autonomous Republic. The Interior Minister of Adjara waned the movement’s leaders to avoid setting up the branches in Adjara and to hold the protest rallies in the region.

**December 28** – Aslan Abashidze said in his televised speech broadcasted by the Adjara TV that the polling stations will be opened in the Autonomous Republic on January 4 snap presidential elections.

**December 30** - After the meeting with State Minister Zurab Zhvania, Adjarian leader Aslan Abashidze reiterated that the polling stations will be opened in the Autonomous Republic on

January 4 presidential elections, however Abashidze added that his party Revival Union will boycott the elections.

## 2004

**January 4** - Snap presidential elections held in Georgia. Five presidential candidates were running for presidency – Mikheil Saakashvili, Temur Shashiashvili, Zaza Sikharulidze, Roin Liparteliani and Kartlos Gharibashvili.

Mikheil Saakashvili, who led Rose Revolution in November, 2003, won a landslide victory with almost 96% of votes. Around 450 observers from the OSCE, as well as local and CIS observers were monitoring the elections.

**January 7** - Leader of the Adjara Autonomous Republic Aslan Abashidze re-imposed the state of emergency in the Autonomous Republic. The state of emergency, which was declared in Adjara during the November Rose Revolution, was temporarily canceled on January 3 just day before the snap presidential elections in Georgia. The renewal of the state of emergency was followed by the crackdown of the Adjarian law enforcement agencies on the opposition Kmara movement.

**January 18** – Temur Inaishvili, head of the Emergency Situations Department of the Adjarian Interior Ministry, was shot dead by unknown gunmen in the center of Batumi.

**January 19** – Dozens were injured as a result of the clash between the protesters and the police in the southern Adjarian village of Gonio. The protesters demanded resignation of Aslan Abashidze, the head of Adjara Autonomous Republic.

**January 20** – In the wake of Adjarian leader Aslan Abashidze’s visit to Moscow, Russian foreign Ministry issued a statement on January 20 backing Abashidze’s policy and condemning his opposition as “extremist forces.” <http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=6060>

**January 21** - Leader of the Adjara Autonomous Republic Aslan Abashidze left for Strasbourg to meet with Council of Europe Secretary General Walter Schwimmer.

**January 23** – Interim President Nino Burjanadze left for Adjarian capital Batumi to hold talks with the leader of Autonomous Republic Aslan Abashidze.

**January 24** - Georgian President-elect Mikheil Saakashvili took a spiritual oath on the Bible and received a blessing from Catholicos-Patriarch of the Georgian Orthodox Church Ilia II at the Gelati Cathedral in western Georgia.

**January 25** - Mikheil Saakashvili arrived in Batumi and together with the Adjarian leader Aslan Abashidze attended the military parade in the capital of Adjara Autonomous Republic, shortly before Saakashvili was sworn in as the President.

**January 25** - Mikhail Saakashvili was inaugurated as Georgia's new president. Saakashvili, 36, who is the youngest President in Europe, was elected with more than 96% of votes. Thousands of people, including foreign guests and official delegations, gathered in front of the Parliament building to attend the inauguration ceremony.

**January 28** - The Parliamentary Assembly of Council of Europe (PACE), in its recommendations to the Georgian government, expressed concern regarding “the current reshaping of Georgian political life and the risk of a disappearance of all parliamentary opposition after the forthcoming [March 28] elections and, in consequence, of any true institutional counterweight.”

**February 3** - Koba Davitashvili, the political secretary of the President Saakashvili's party National Movement, announced that he quits the party, expressing protest regarding the anticipated constitutional changes.

“It is inadmissible when we change the constitution for Zurab Zhvania [State Minister], who wants to become a Prime Minister. The constitution can not be adjusted just for one

particular person. We should make this statement duly to save parliamentary system in the country,” Koba Davitashvili said.

**February 7** - Adjarian leader Aslan Abashidze left for Moscow.

**February 10** - A group of opposition MPs set up a special commission to investigate the suspected facts of government’s pressure on Rustavi 2 and Mze independent television stations. These two leading television stations simultaneously stopped broadcasting of the popular political talks shows, which were on air every night except the weekends that sparked rumors over the possible pressure on the TV companies from the authorities.

**February 17** - The Parliament approved with 165 votes to 5 Zurab Zhvania as Prime Minister and the new cabinet, which consists of 15 Ministers and four State Ministers.

**February 18-21** - Council of Europe Secretary General Walter Schwimmer paid an official visit to Georgia. He also traveled to Adjara Autonomous Republic and met with the Adjarian leader Aslan Abashidze in Batumi.

**February 20** - The opposition movement Our Adjara’s offices were raided in Adjarian capital Batumi, after the opposition staged a protest rally in Batumi. The clashes between the supporters and opposition of the Adjarian leader also took place in Batumi. Disorders coincided with the visit of the Secretary General of the Council of Europe (CoE) Walter Schwimmer in Batumi, who held talks with Aslan Abashidze.

**February 25** - Matyas Eorsi, who leads the Parliamentary Assembly of Council of Europe (PACE) pre-election delegation to Georgia, said he is concerned over the political imbalance in the composition of the election administration at all levels. Matyas Eorsi said the PACE hoped that the new leadership would have changed the composition of the Central Election Commission and lower level election administrations in order secure political balance in the commissions.

**March 3** - Head of the Adjara Autonomous Republic Aslan Abashidze visits Moscow.

**March 5** - Vakhtang Komakhidze, journalist working for the Rustavi 2 television, was severely beaten up in the Khelvachauri district of the Adjara Autonomous Republic by the police.

**March 5** - President Saakashvili demanded from Adjarian leader Aslan Abashidze to abolish Autonomous Republic's Security Ministry. But Abashidze refused to do so.

**March 12** - Adjarian leader Aslan Abashidze left for Moscow.

**March 14** - Armed groups blocked the administrative border between Adjara and the rest of the Georgia and prevented Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili and other members of the government to travel to the Autonomous Republic.

**March 14** - In his televised address to the nation President Mikheil Saakashvili described Adjarian leadership's activity as "a mutiny attempt against the Georgian State."

**March 14** - OSCE Chairman-in-Office, Bulgarian Foreign Minister Solomon Passy arrived in Georgia.

**March 14** - Anti-Crisis Center was set up to coordinate the Georgian government's activities in resolving the confrontation with the Adjarian leadership. Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania was appointed as the chairman of the center.

**March 15** - President Saakashvili announced that Georgia's central authorities imposed "partial" economic sanctions against its defiant Adjarian Autonomy in a bid "to exhaust Adjarian regime's resources."

**March 16** - Mayor of Russian capital Moscow Yuri Luzhkov, who has close links with Adjarian leader Aslan Abashidze, arrived in Batumi.

**March 18** - Tensions defused between Tbilisi and Batumi after President Saakashvili and Adjarian leader Aslan Abashidze met and struck a deal that allowed for economic sanctions on Adjara to be lifted. An agreement has been reached over disarmament of paramilitary forces in Adjara, release of political prisoners, joint control of the customs and port of Batumi, providing conditions

for free election campaigning in Adjara, holding of free and fair elections.

**March 22** - Georgian President's representatives to Adjara, who were appointed by Mikheil Saakashvili to monitor operation of the Sarpı customs checkpoint and port of Batumi in the Autonomous Republic failed to perform their duties.

**March 24** - President Saakashvili issued a decree, according to which diplomatic passports of high officials of the Adjara Autonomous Republic, including Adjarian leader Aslan Abashidze, Mayor of Batumi Giorgi Abashidze and Interior Minister Jemal Gogitidze, were cancelled.

**March 26** - U.S. Ambassador to Georgia Richard Miles traveled to Batumi and held talks with the leader of Adjarian Autonomy Aslan Abashidze.

**March 27** - Georgian Security Ministry announced that the law enforcers detained two persons, which together with allies allegedly intended to seize weapons in one of the military bases in western Georgia to cause disorders on elections day.

**March 28** - Parliamentary elections, which were partial rerun of the disputed November 2, 2003 polls, were held in Georgia. The polling stations were opened in Adjara Autonomous Republic as well. There were 11 parties and 5 election blocs contesting for 150 mandates in the 235-seat legislative body. Ruling National Movement party won a landslide victory. International election observers noted progress in the Georgian polls

**March 28** - Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania held talks with Adjarian leader Aslan Abashidze in Batumi.

**April 5** - Tbilisi-based TV company Channel 9 suspended broadcasting.

**April 6** – The commander of Russian troops deployed in Georgia Alexander Studenikin was injured in a bomb blast in capital Tbilisi.



**April 8** – The Strasbourg-based European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruled that Tengiz Asanidze, who was in custody in Adjarian Autonomy, should be released immediately after 12-year of imprisonment. Asanidze v Georgia was a first case discussed by the ECHR regarding Georgia. Asanidze was released on April 9.

**April 13** – Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania met with Adjarian leader Aslan Abashidze in Batumi. But Abashidze refused to disarm his paramilitary forces.

**April 14** – Two crews of Rustavi 2 television were attacked in a two separate incidents in the Adjarian Autonomy. Georgian televisions broadcasted footage showing a group of men at Choloki checkpoint, which divides Adjara from the rest of Georgia, beating up cameraman of Rustavi 2. Another attack took place in Kobuleti.

**April 15** – A group of Georgian businessmen, led by influential media and financial tycoon Badri Patarkatsishvili left for Batumi to hold talks with Adjarian leader Aslan Abashidze in an attempt to mediate between the central authorities and the Adjarian leadership.

**April 16** – U.S. Ambassador to Georgia Richard Miles met with Adjarian leader Aslan Abashidze in Batumi.

**April 16** – Georgian Minister for Sport and Culture Goka Gabashvili said that the Georgian central government opposes holding of the Women’s World Chess Championship in Adjarian Autonomy’s capital Batumi, scheduled for May 21-June 7.

**April 19** – Maj. Gen. Roman Dumbadze, who was dismissed as a commander of the 25th Armored-Mechanized Brigade, deployed in Adjarian capital Batumi, has officially announced his insubordination to the Defense Ministry orders. Maj.Gen. Dumbadze says “the 25th brigade is subordinated only to [Adjarian leader] Aslan Abashidze.”

**April 21** - Murad Tsintsadze, the commander of the Georgian Interior Ministry’s 300-man unit deployed in defiant Adjarian

Autonomy said he would defy central authorities' orders and remains in Adjarian leader Aslan Abashidze's loyalty.

**April 22** - Five months after Rose Revolution Georgia's new Parliament was convened. President Saakashvili opened the inaugural session of the Parliament and urged his supporter MPs, which dominate in the legislative, "to keep unity." Nino Burjanadze was re-elected as the Parliamentary Chairperson at the session.

**April 24** - Adjarian Senate, upper chamber of the Autonomous Republic's legislative body approved Aslan Abashidze's proposal to impose emergency situation and a curfew in the region.

**April 27** - 46 soldiers of Adjarian leader Aslan Abashidze's elite special purpose unit fled Adjara and pledged loyalty to the country's central authorities.

**April 30** - Security forces broke up some 300 protesters in Adjarian Autonomy's capital Batumi. Dozens of protesters were reportedly injured.

**May 1** - President of the World Chess Federation (FIDE) Kirsan Ilyumzhinov said after separate talks with Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili and Adjarian Autonomy's leader Aslan Abashidze that the Women's World Chess Championship will be held in the Russia's Republic of Kalmykia's capital Elista. Initially Adjarian capital Batumi should have hosted the tournament scheduled for May 21-June 8; whoever Georgia's central central authorities went against.

**May 1** - Anzor Dumbadze, Deputy Interior Minister and Chief of the Ecological Police of Adjarian Autonym, left Batumi and pledged loyalty to the country's central authorities.

**May 2** - Two key bridges in Adjara – Choloki and Kakuti were blown up, by the local authorities, hence destroying the only road links between the Autonomous Republic and the rest of Georgia. Later Adjarian leader Aslan Abashidze explained the move with

an attempt to prevent incursion in Adjara allegedly planned by the country's central authorities.

**May 2** - Council of Europe Secretary General Walter Schwimmer expressed alarm over the recent developments in Georgia's defiant Adjarian Autonomy. "It is shocking to hear that... in Georgia, bridges are exploded because the central and the local [Adjarian] authorities have lost their ability to dialogue", said Walter Schwimmer. Latter the CoE Secretary General's this statement triggered a protest of the Georgian government, because the statement was perceived in Tbilisi as an attempt by Schwimmer to put a blame for escalations tensions both on Tbilisi and Batumi.

**May 3** - The U.S. Department of State condemned Adjarian leader Aslan Abashidze and accused him of "trying to provoke military crisis."

**May 4** – An opposition protest rally was attacked by the local security forces in Adjarian capital Batumi. Dozens of protesters were reportedly injured. But the violent break up of peaceful demonstration triggered more protest rallies in Batumi later on the same day, demanding Abashidze's resignation.

**May 5** – Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili spoke with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin by phone to discuss situation in Adjara, where the thousands of protesters demand resignation of the leader of Autonomous Republic Aslan Abashidze.

**May 5** – Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania, who was in Adjara, said after the talks with Adjarian Interior Minister Jemal Gogitidze that those high officials of Adjarian government, who "will remain in the frames of the Georgian Constitution," would be guaranteed with security.

**May 5** – Secretary of the Russian Security Council Sergei Ivanov arrived in Adjarian capital Batumi to hold talks with Adjarian leader Aslan Abashidze.

**May 6** – "Aslan [Abashidze] has fled, Adjara is free," President Saakashvili announced at dawn and congratulated Georgians, as

he described, “with a second bloodless revolution” in Georgia. President Saakashvili also said that Abashidze’s resignation “will pave the way for Georgia’s prosperity.” “It will be the beginning of Georgia’s territorial integrity,” he added.

Saakashvili left for Adjara shortly after Aslan Abashidze left for Moscow after the overnight talks with the Secretary of Russian National Security Council Igor Ivanov in Batumi.

## **Annex #2**

### **Expert data**

#### **The categories utilized in the tables**

The provided data is anonymous and we are not able to disclose the information what statement belongs to which expert. At the same time, it is informative of what political orientation was and is the author. Taking into consideration the above mentioned information, we coded the attitude of experts towards the revolution (or towards Saakashvili, Zhvania, Burjanadze team that was previously opposition, later headed the Revolution and by the time of interviews occupied high position in the government). To indicate the political orientation, the following is used to code the experts: L-Loyal towards the Revolution Group; C-Critical towards the revolution group; N-Neutral towards the Revolution Group.

It was decided that the code of the author would indicate the dynamics of his/her political orientation. For this reason, three place combination of the above mentioned symbols is utilized , where I refers to the relation of the author to the revolution in pre-revolutionary period, II signifies the position during the Revolution and III indicates the position in post-revolutionary period. The code was attributed to the author based on what was known about his political stance in the public.

The codes are displayed in the third column of the tables.

#### **The relation (attitudes) displayed in the statements**

In the statements of experts there is a likelihood that the certain attitude /relation can be displayed towards the person/event described in the statement. The attitude displayed in the statement (that was assessed according to our opinion) was referred to using the following figures: [-1] – negative attitude; [0] –neutral attitude; [1] –positive attitude. It is predisposed that there is an equal interval between these numbers and the arithmetical operations of summation and average are utilized.

The figures of attitudes displayed in the statements are provided in the column 4 of the tables.

**The relation of the content of statement to the function of the civil society**

The social role of civil society carries in itself different motives, actions and relationships. Specifically, the intellectual, informational or other activities derived from public interest and civic values that do not aim towards economic or political outcomes. The content of the expert statements mostly refers to the motif of the civil society, its actions or relationships in the macrosystem (society). The figures were used to assess what was the relation between the content of the statement and the social function of the civil society. Figure [-1] –is utilized to indicate that the actor performed its function badly; [0] referred that the actor could not perform its function; [0.5] – was used when the actor could partially perform its function according to the content of the statement; [1] – when the statement indicated that the author performed its function well ; [2]-when the actor of the statement (e.g. non-governmental organization) performed the function of another actor (e.g. party) . These figures were treated as numbers and simple statistical operations were performed on them.

The relation of the content of the statement to the social function is displayed in the column 5 of the tables

**Generic civic subjects**

**1. Structural analysis**

**Table#1 Specific(subjects) actors of the civil society**

	Actor	Frequency of naming	%
1.	Freedom Institute	32	26.0
2.	Young Lawyers Association	24	19.5

3	Kmara (“Enough”)	14	11.4
4	Fair Elections	10	8.1
5	Alpe	8	6.5
6	Soros Foundation	8	6.5
7	Rustavi 2	7	5.7
8	The committee of civic noncompliance	3	2.4
9	Media	2	1.6
10	Non-governmental organizations	2	1.6
11	Caucasus Institute	2	1.6
12	Eurasia	2	1.6
13	Young Economists	2	1.6
14	60 minutes	1	0.8
15	Gorbi	1	0.8
16	Press	1	0.8
17	The Union of Democrat Meskhetians (დემოკრატიკ მესხეთა კავშირი)	1	0.8
18	Community Organizations	1	0.8
19	Revolutionary Committee (“revkomi”)	1	0.8
20	Caucasus House	1	0.8
Sum of the frequencies		123	99.7

### Unified data of generic and concrete civil society subjects

The symbols in tables 2-8 carry the following connotations:

N – Number of statements;

A – The alternatives to the attitude scores;

F – The alternatives to the compliance scores with the function;

NNN,... CCC – Codes of expert positions;

S<sub>A</sub> – Sum of the attitude scores;

$S_F$  – Sum of the compliance scores with the function;

$S_N$  – Sum of the statement numbers;

$M_A$  – Mean score of the attitude scores;

$M_F$  – Mean of the compliance scores with the function;

Frequencies of the scores displayed in the tables.

**Table # 2 Attitude towards motivation**

	N	A	NNN	NLL	LLL	LLC	CNN	CLL	CLC	CCN	CCC	$S_A$	$M_A$
Gen.Sub.	3	1				1						-1.0	-0.3
		-1	2										
Rustavi 2	6	1			2							1.0	0.17
		0			2						1		
		-1									1		
Other Actors	1					1						1.0	1
$S_N$	10		-2		2	2					-1	1	0.10

**Table. # 3 Attitudes towards actions and relationships**

	N	F	NNN	NLL	LLL	LLC	CNN	CLL	CLC	CCN	CCC	$S_A$	$M_A$
Gen. civ. subjects	6	1			3	6			2	1		8	0.13
		0	5	1	16	10	2	1	4	2	4		
		-1	1			1					2		
Rustavi 2	2	1			1							-3	-0.1
		0			12	5			4		2		
		-1				2			1		1		



Government TV	5	0			1							-4	-0.8
		-1			2	1					1		
Other Actors	5	1			1		1		1			3	0.6
		0							1		1		
S <sub>N</sub>	98		6	1	35	26	3	1	13	2	11	4	0.008

**Table # 4 Attitude towards other actors relationships towards civic subjects**

	N	F	NNN	NLL	LLL	LLC	CNN	CLL	CLC	CCN	CCC	S <sub>A</sub>	M <sub>A</sub>
Gen.civ. subjects	7	1			1							-1	-0.14
		0	1		2	1							
		-1									2		
Rustavi 2	5	0			3				1		1	0	0
State Tv	2	0					1				1	0	0
Other actors	1	-1									1	-1	-1
S <sub>N</sub>	15		1	0	6	1	1	0	1	0	5	-2	-0.13

**Table # 5 Attitude towards development**

	N	F	NNN	NLL	LLL	LLC	CNN	CLL	CLC	CCN	CCC	S <sub>A</sub>	M <sub>A</sub>
Gen.civ. subjects	2	-1			1						1	-2	-1
Other actors	1	-1									1	-1	-1
S <sub>N</sub>	3				1						2	-3	-1

**Table # 6 The relation of civic subjects' motivation towards their function**

	N	F	NNN	NLL	LLL	LLC	CNN	CLL	CLC	CCN	CCC	S <sub>F</sub>	M <sub>F</sub>
Gen.civ. subjects	3	2	1									4	1.3
		1	1			1							
Rustavi 2	6	2			2						2	10	1.67
		1			2								
State Tv	0											0	0
Other actors	1	2				1						2	2
S <sub>N</sub>	10											16	1.6

**Table # 7 The relation of the actions of civic subjects towards their function**

	N	F	NNN	NLL	LLL	LLC	CNN	CLL	CLC	CCN	CCC	S <sub>F</sub>	M <sub>F</sub>
Gen.civ. subjects	61	2	2		6	5	2	1	1	2	3	71.5	1.19
		1	2	1	12	11		1	4		1		
		0.5			1	1			1				
		-1	2								1		
rustavi 2	28	2			3	3			3		2	33	1.18
		1			8	1			1		1		
		0			2	3			1				
State Tv	5	1			1							-3	-0.6
		-1			2	1					1		
Other actors	5	2							1		1	7	1.4
		1			1		1		1				
S <sub>N</sub>	98		6	1	35	26	3	1	13	2	11	108.5	1.55

**Table # 8 The relation of other actors relationships with the civic subjects towards its function**

	N	F	NNN	NLL	LLL	LLC	CNN	CLL	CLC	CCN	CCC	S <sub>F</sub>	M <sub>F</sub>
Gen.civ. subjects	7	2	1	0	1						1	8	1.14
		1			2	1							
		-1									1		
Rustavi 2	5	2			3				1		1	10	2
State Tv	2	2					1				1	4	2
Other actors	1	2				1						2	2
S <sub>N</sub>	15		1	0	6	2	1	0	1	0	4	24	1.6

**Table # 9 The relation of development towards civil society function**

	N	F	NNN	NLL	LLL	LLC	CNN	CLL	CLC	CCN	CCC	S <sub>F</sub>	M <sub>F</sub>
Gen.civ. subjects	2	2									1	1	0.5
		-1			1								
Other actors	1	1									1	-1	-1
S <sub>N</sub>	3				1						2	0	0

## Grouping of statements according to the position of experts

**Table # 10 Statements of those experts who were and are still neutral towards the revolutionary group (code: NNN)**

Nº	Statement	Expert	Attitude	Function
1.	The position of the most active non-governmentals proved to be the mask	NNN	-1	2
2.	Non-governmentals are oriented towards grants	NNN	-1	1
3.	Non-governmentals zombied the population	NNN	-1	1
4.	Non-governmentals did not play any role	NNN	0	-1
5.	Media played significant role. It served as a voice of the opposition	NNN	0	2
6.	The role played by the media (especially tele) was very important. It mobilized population	NNN	0	1
7.	The negotiations took place between government and the media	NNN	0	2
8.	Civil society did not play any role	NNN	0	-1
9.	Large funds were spent on them	NNN	0	2
	Sum		-3	9
	Mean		-0.3	1

**Table. # 11 Statement of the expert who was neutral towards the Revolutionary group in pre-revolution period and became loyal during the Revolution and afterwards(code: NLL)**

N <sup>o</sup>	Statement	Expert	Attitude	Function
1.	Other channels than Rustavi 2 threatened the population with war	NLL	0	1

**Table # 12 Statements of those experts who were and are still loyal towards the Revolutionary group (code: LLL)**

N <sup>o</sup>	Statement	Expert	Attitude	Function
1.	Televisions were divided in two	LLL	0	1
2.	Non-governmentals influenced opposition	LLL	0	2
3.	The role played by the non-governmentals was vital	LLL	0	1
4.	Non governmental sector had a serious impact on the formation of public opinion	LLL	0	1
5.	Non governmental sector assisted the organization of the Revolution	LLL	0	2
6.	Non governmentals stood by the side of the opposition to the end	LLL	0	2

7.	Certain part of non governmentals were actively involved in and directed the Revolution	LLL	0	2
8.	Non governmentals formed public opinion	LLL	0	1
9.	Non governmentals created practical phylosophy for the civil society	LLL	0	1
10.	Non governmentals had an input in the formation of public opinion	LLL	0	1
11.	Non governmentals had partial impact	LLL	0	0.5
12.	The information about falsifying the election results was mainly spread by the non-governmentals	LLL	0	1
13.	Media determined everything	LLL	0	1
14.	Media developed public attitude	LLL	0	1
15.	Media played an important role, even decisive.	LLL	0	1
16.	The organizational side of the Revolution was totally on non governmemntals	LLL	0	2
17.	The main action and input of non governmentals was to bring democratic reforms on the agenda	LLL	1	2
18.	Media provided objective information	LLL	1	1

19.	Media ensured that there was not a situation of panic and disorder	LLL	1	1
20.	Non-governmentals introduced democratic values. This was the reason of their reception of funding from foreign donors	LLL	1	1
21.	There was the civic sector with its structures and funding, completely legal	LLL	0	1
22.	Opposition had negotiations with the media	LLL	0	2
23.	There is no well-established civic sector in Georgia	LLL	-1	-1
24.	Rustavi-2 worked frankly	LLL	1	1
25.	Rustavi-2 worked very well and without any instructions	LLL	1	1
26.	Rustavi-2 was oppositional from the very beginning. It knew that the things would work badly if the Revolution did not take place, so it was extremely radical	LLL	0	2
27.	Rustavi-2 always had difficult relationship with Shevardnadze and good relationship with Zhvania and later with Saakashvili	LLL	0	2
28.	Rustavi was the example	LLL	1	1

	of civic journalism			
29.	The Revolution would not take place without Rustavi 2. It worked 22 hours per day	LLL	0	1
30.	The success was largely determined by Rustavi 2	LLL	0	1
31.	Rustavi 2 was the independent subject of the Revolution	LLL	0	1
32.	Rustavi 2 was organic to the Revolution. It was the public headquarters of the Revolution	LLL	0	2
33.	Everybody was informed about the events through Rustavi 2	LLL	0	1
34.	Other media than Rustavi 2 was anti-revolution [or Rustavi 2 was pro-revolution].	LLL	0	2
35.	Rustavi 2... was extremely radical	LLL	0	1
36.	Rustavi 2 was one of the main wheels	LLL	0	1
37.	Rustavi 2 mobilized the people	LLL	0	1
38.	Rustavi 2 often dictated the action steps to the leaders	LLL	0	2
39.	Rustavi 2 had a lot of influence	LLL	0	1
40.	The key role was played by Rustavi 2	LLL	0	1



41.	Even the 1 <sup>st</sup> channel worked for opposition	LLL	0	-1
42.	The 1 <sup>st</sup> channel performed according to the instructions ( e.g. reduced number of people in the broadcasts)	LLL	-1	1
43.	There was no point in the work of the 1 <sup>st</sup> channel	LLL	-1	-1
44.	“The Green Wave” (“Mtsvane Talga”) was revolutionary not only in words but in the music (played rock)	LLL	1	1
45.	There were negotiations with Rustavi 2 as with the core player	LLL	0	2
46.	Rustavi 2 had received guarantees from the opposition	LLL	0	2
47.	Civil society promoted to publicizing such themes during the Revolution, as corruption, Human Rights, impotence of the government, difficult social situation, lost territories, elections	LLL	0	1
48.	Government was trying to offer large sum of money to Rustavi 2	LLL	0	2
	Sum		5	55.5
	Mean		0.11	1.18

**Table # 13 Statements of those experts who were loyal towards the Revolutionary group in pre Revolution and Revolution period, and critical in post revolution period (code: LLC)**

Nº	Statement	Expert	Attitude	function
1.	Civil society during revolution was clean, straightforward and open	LLC	1	1
2.	Media zombied the population	LLC	-1	1
3.	Non governmentals were significant players in allocating funds, developing the plan, implementation and organization	LLC	0	2
4.	Non-governmentals organized everything	LLC	0	2
5.	Non governmentals created ideological basis	LLC	0	1
6.	The leaders of non-governmentals organized meetings with the embassies and the representatives of foreign countries	LLC	0	2
7.	The members of non governmentals sat in televisions and created ideological basis of revolution	LLC	0	2
8.	Non-governmentals bore an impact on the formation of public opinion	LLC	0	1
9.	Non governmentals had education programs that helped the development of	LLC	0	0.5

	democracy but they were not widespread and did not bring about qualitative changes			
10.	Non governmentals were more important than political parties	LLC	0	2
11.	Media worked a lot for communications	LLC	0	1
12.	The well known members of the society stood at the street rallies and gave an example to the people	LLC	0	1
13.	Non governmentals and “kmara” represented public opinion and had the function of the catalyst	LLC	1	1
14.	Non governmentals formed democratic and civic mentality in Georgia	LLC	1	1
15.	Non governmentals had decisive role in the sphere of civic education	LLC	1	1
16.	Media said what people wanted them to say	LLC	1	1
17.	The mobilization of the people and protection from violence was achieved through media	LLC	1	1
18.	Non governmentals objectively created democratic impulses through media	LLC	1	1
19.	The representatives of non governmentals were very popular among people in the end	LLC	0	1

20.	Civil Society and <i>Kmara</i> had to show the population the true face of the Georgian government and catalyze the processes	LLC	1	2
21.	E. Khoveria called for action	LLC	0	2
22.	Rustavi 2 managed to mobilize people and maintain the spirit of revolution, it was a moving force	LLC	0	1
23.	Rustavi 2 entered the opposition service	LLC	0	2
24.	Rustavi 2 achieved the weight of a political party player	LLC	0	1
25.	Rustavi 2 was the active participant of the Revolution	LLC	0	1
26.	The work of Rustavi 2 was one-sided	LLC	-1	1
27.	Rustavi 2 and the Nationals held the same attitude. They were conspired	LLC	-1	2
28.	K. Kandiashvili made the population sleep	LLC	-1	-1
	Sum		4	34.5
	Mean		0.14	1.23

**Table # 14 Statements of those experts who were critical towards the Revolutionary Group at pre-revolution period, and neutral during Revolution and post-Revolution period (code: CNN)**

N <sup>o</sup>	Statement	Expert	Position	Function
1.	Media was an organized instrument to implement everything	CNN	0	2
2.	Regardless of how the non governmental sector was created, it did not play less important role in public opinion formation than parties and government	CNN	0	2
3.	NGO sector developed democratic and liberal standpoints – this was media, Freedom Institute, GYLA, <i>ALPE</i>	CNN	1	1
4.	Zhvania weakened the state TV	CNN	0	2
	Sum		1	7
	Mean		0.25	1.75

**Table # 15 The statement of an expert who was critical towards the Revolution Group in pre-revolution period and loyal during Revolution and post-revolution periods (code: CLL)**

N <sup>o</sup>	Statement	Expert	Attitude	Function
1.	Civic sector managed to bear an influence on public opinion.	CLL	0	1

**Table # 16 Statements of those experts who were critical towards the Revolutionary group in pre and post revolution periods and loyal during the Revolution (code: CLC)**

N <sup>o</sup>	Statement	Expert	attitude	function
1.	The non governmental sector created and developed the expectation in the population that there would be changes	CLC	0	1
2.	Non-governmentals did not play any significant role	CLC	0	0.5
3.	Civic sector allocated funds (for revolution).	CLC	0	2
4.	The TV constantly broadcasted the representatives of non-governmentals	CLC	0	1
5.	Media played an important role in creating the adequate picture. There were many with different orientations. Everybody knows who holds what orientation and this made possible to draw average conclusions	CLC	1	1

6.	Civic sector made the opposition more humane and played the decisive role	CLC	1	1
7.	Rustavi 2 organized the revolution	CLC	0	2
8.	The public opinion would not have been formed had not been there Rustavi 2.	CLC	0	1
9.	Rustavi 2 was one of the creators of the Revolution s	CLC	0	1
10.	Rustavi 2 was directing the Revolution	CLC	0	2
11.	Rustavi 2 (Kitsmarishvili) bargained with both sides and would support the one who would pay more	CLC	-1	2
12.	Freedom Institute, Young Lawyers and Alpe financially strengthened the opposition and revolution, organized rallies and etc.	CLC	0	2
13.	Channel 9 was impartialme-9 arxi obieqturi iyo	CLC	1	1
14.	The opposition invested a lot of money in Rustavi 2	CLC	0	2
	Sum		2	19.5
	Mean		0.14	1.39

**Table # 17 The statements of those experts who were critical towards the Revolutionary group before and during the Revolution and neutral in posy-Revolution period (code: CCN)**

N <sup>o</sup>	Statement	Expert	attitude	function
	The impact of non governmentals was especially great in the regions	CCN	0	1
	Media had enormous role in the formation of public opinion	CCN	0	1
	Non governmentals implemented civic education and taught ABC of the democracy	CCN	1	1
	Sum		1	3
	Mean		0.3	1

**Table # 18. Statements of those experts who were and still are critical towards the Revolutionary Group (code: CCC)**

N <sup>o</sup>	Statement	Expert	Attitude	Function
1.	The non-governmentals were directed from a single center	CCC	0	1
2.	Non-governmentals destroyed georgia	CCC	-1	-1
3.	Media (and Rustavi 2) were subjective	CCC	-1	1
4.	Many journalists gathered with V. Maglaperidze and planned revolution.	CCC	0	2



5.	For me ( Shevardnadze) I did not consider that non-governmentals and media had threatening positions or actions	CCC	0	1
6.	Media conducted PR campaign of Saakashvili s	CCC	0	2
7.	Media negotiated both with the government and with the opposition	CCC	0	2
8.	Non-governmentals were used as an instrument by politicians	CCC	-1	2
9.	Media was free during my (Shevardnadze ) times (or is not free now)	CCC	-1	2
10.	Non-governmentals transformed into governmentals	CCC	-1	2
11.	Rustavi 2 simply fought Shevardnadze purposefully	CCC	0	2
12.	Kitsmarishvili wanted to come to the authority	CCC	-1	2
13.	“Freedom Institute” and Rustavi 2 were the decision-makers [in Revolutionary processes]	CCC	0	2
14.	Rustavi 2 was the television of the party	CCC	0	2
15.	Rustavi 2 reported the meeting of 5000 people as if the whole Georgia was there	CCC	-1	1
16.	Government media popularized Saakashvili	CCC	0	-1

17.	The plan was developed by the Freedom Institute	CCC	0	2
18.	Officially, the Government contacted the 1 <sup>st</sup> channel and at the same time had business with Rustavi 2	CCC	0	2
19.	Government media was influenced both by the government and by the opposition	CCC	0	2
20.	The majority of non-governmentals was financed by Soros. The Revolution was feeding non-governmentals. Those whose funding came from neutral sources, stayed neutral..	CCC	-1	2
21.	“Young Lawyers” were not lucky enough (they could not transform into the governmentals)	CCC	-1	1
	Sum		-9	31
	Mean		-0.43	1.48

**Table # 19 The mean scores of relations and the frequencies of answers in the statements of different codes (Indications used in the table: C-code; N –number of statements; A – mean of attitudes, AN –Sum of attitudes in this group)**

	C	N	A	AN	-1 %	0 %	+1 %	+1-1 %
1.	NNN	9	-0.3	-2.7	33.3	66.6	0	-33.3
2.	NLL	1	0	0	0	100	0	0
3.	LLL	47	+0.11	5.17	6.38	76.63	17.0	10.62
4.	LLC	28	+0.14	3.92	14.3	57.1	28.6	14.3
5.	CNN	4	+0.25	1	0	75	25	25
6.	CLL	1	0	0	0	0	100	100
7.	CLC	14	+0.14	1.96	17.1	71.4	21.4	4.3
8.	CCN	3	+0.3	0.9	0	66.6	33.3	33.3
9.	CCC	21	-0.43	-9.03	42.8	57.1	0	-42.8
	S	128		4.18	113.9	570.4	225.3	
	M			0.03				

**Table # 20 Mean scores of the relation with function and the frequencies of answers in the statements of different codes**

	C	N	F	FN	-1	0	+0.5	+1	2
1.	NNN	9	1.0	9	22.2	0	0	33.3	44.4
2.	NLL	1	1.0	1	0	0	0	100	0
3.	LLL	47	1.18	55.46	6.4	0	2.1	83.0	29.8
4.	LLC	28	1.23	34.4	3.6	0	3.6	60.7	32.1
5.	CNN	4	1.75	7	0	0	0	25.0	75.0
6.	CLL	1	1.0	1	0	0	0	100	0
7.	CLC	14	1.39	19.46	0	0	7.1	50.0	43.0
8.	CCN	3	1.0	3	0	0	0	100	0
9.	CCC	21	1.48	31.08	9.5	0	0	23.8	66.7
	S	128	11.03	161.4					
	M			1.26					

## Annex 3

### The peculiarities of analysing Media data

The data in tables are displayed in two ways: in Absolute (F) and Percentage (P) numbers. Absolute numbers are provided in tables, additional numeration of which is 1. As for percentage numbers, they are displayed in the tables, additional numeration of which is 2.

Usually, in the calculation of the percentage of the number displayed in the table, where the denominator indicates the sum of the values in the table, or the percentage refers to the whole number of specific datum indicated in the table

Certainly, such data is very interesting, but we are more concerned with the issue of the calculated frequencies of specific units (actors, themes) in specific newspapers of certain months in the overall number - the derived frequency of every newspaper of every month, or more specifically in the media space (MS) Thus we considered appropriate to calculate the percentage by multiplying 100 on the fraction the numerator of which is the frequency of the specific unit and the denominator is the sum of the studied units in media space. This means that the percentage of frequency in our tables refers to the percentage of it in the media space. In case of actors, the sum of accounted frequencies in the media space amounts to 4500, in case of the themes-4457 (The difference is explained by the fact that in some cases the actors were named without the context of the theme. This value is calculated by the formula:

$$P_i[W_k] = 100 * F_i[W_k] / \sum_{MS} (F_n[W_m])$$

where  $P_i[W_k]$  is  $W_k$  the percentage frequency of the category;  $F_i[W_k]$  is the absolute value of the same concept;  $\sum_{MS} (F_n[W_m])$  is the sum of all media space frequencies (all concepts in all contexts). For analysis the percentage data is more practical. The absolute values are displayed to explain how the percentage was derived

The frequency of an actor or a theme indicates how important is the actor or the theme for media. At the same time, the data of

three months are displayed. In the last month of three months, in November the Rose Revolution took place. It can be doubted that the frequencies of those actors and themes, considered as important by the media, would undergo changes in November. Based on this hypothesis, we introduced the index  $V_n$  that measures the November changes in frequencies and their variations. For this reason the standard deviation was used (which is generally used in variation indexes). The mean number of frequencies derived from three months is subtracted from November frequency, or

$$V_n [W_k] = P_n [W_k] - \text{sum} (P_m [W_k])/3.$$

Where  $V_n [W_k]$  stands for the index of November changes:  $P_n [W_k]$  – is the frequency of actors and themes in November;  $\text{sum} (P_m [W_k])/3$  – is the mean of the frequencies of the same word percentage, or their sum divided by three. This index will have the positive meaning if the November frequency increases and negative if the November frequency decreases. The value of index will be related to the percentage value. The meaning of these indexes is displayed in the consequent tables.

## Annex #4 Tables

**Table # 1. The frequency of actors (P) on a monthly basis in 24 hours**

	Sept.		ოქტ.		ნოვ.		Diff. sum	
	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+
1. Shevardnadze	2.4	0.15	3.1	0.20	9.2	0.67	14.7	1.02
2. Saakashvili	0.13	0	0.07	0.02	0.22	0.29	0.42	0.31
3. Burjanadze	0.02	0.49	0.27	0.15	0.15	0.22	0.44	0.87
4. Zhvania	0.07	0	0.20	0.02	0.02	0.07	0.29	0.09
5. Devdariani	0.33	0.38	0.09	0	0.49	0.02	0.91	0.40
6. Abashidze	0	0.04	0.47	0	1.84	0.04	2.3	0.09
7. Sarishvili	0	0	0.73	0.02	0.35	0	1.1	0.02
8. Mamaladze	0.38	0.07	0.20	0	0.09	0	0.67	0.07
9. Government	5.5	0.07	8.3	0	12.0	0	25.8	0.07
10. Opposition in general	0.35	0	0.38	0.09	0	0	0.73	0.09
11. Radical Opposition	0	0	0	0	0.40	0.95	0.40	0.95
12. Government bloc	1.1	0.07	2.1	0.11	0.84	0.04	4.1	0.22
13. Non-governmental organizations	0.09	0	0	0	0.02	0.29	0.11	0.29
14. "Kmara"	0	0	0	0	0.49	0.07	0.49	0.07
15. Mass media	0.04	0	0.13	0	0.27	0.02	0.44	0.02
16. Rustavi 2.	0	0	0	0	0.11	0.20	0.11	0.20
Sum	10.41	1.27	16.04	0.61	26.5	2.88	53.01	4.78

**Table # 2. The frequency of actors (P) on a monthly basis in “Sakartvelos Respublika” (“Georgian Republic)**

	Sept.		ოქტ.		ნოვ.		Diff. sum	
	-	+	-	+	-	+		
1. Shevardnadze	0.07	2.5	0.22	3.2	0.24	1.9	0.53	7.5
2. Saakashvili	1.0	0.02	0.71	0	1.3	0.02	3.0	0.04
3. Burjanadze	1.2	0	0.87	0.11	0.47	0	2.6	0.11
4. Zhvania	1.02	0	1.2	0.04	0.67	0.02	2.9	0.07
5. Devdariani	0	0.42	0	0	0.15	0.04	0.15	0.47
6. Abashidze	0	0	0	0	0.11	0.04	0.11	0.04
7. Sarishvili	0	0	0	0.04	0	0	0	0.04
8. Mamaladze	0	0	0	0.09	0	0	0	0.09
9. Government	0.62	0.51	1.3	0.67	0.20	0.04	2.1	1.2
10. Opposition in general	1.5	0.02	0.04	2.5	0	0	1.5	2.5
11. Radical Opposition	0	0	0	0	3.27	0.07	3.27	0.07
12. Government bloc	0.02	0.35	0.04	0.20	0.07	0.20	0.13	0.75
13. Non-governmental organizations	0	0.11	0	0.07	0	0	0	0.18
14. “Kmara”	0.04	0	0.09	0	0.44	0	0.58	0
15. Mass media	0.09	0	0.31	0	0.15	0.07	0.55	0.07
16. Rustavi 2.	0	0	0.24	0	1.0	0	1.2	0
Sum	5.56	3.93	5.02	6.92	8.1	2.4	18.62	13.11

**Table # 3. The frequency of actors (P) on a monthly basis in “Kviris Palitra” “Weekly Digest”**

	Sept.		October		Nov.		Diff. sum	
	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+
1. Shevardnadze	0.55	0.11	1.2	0	0.80	0.24	2.5	0.35
2. Saakashvili	0	0	0	0.09	0.22	0.07	0.22	0.15
3. Burjanadze	0.04	0	0.27	0.09	0.02	0.04	0.33	0.13
4. Zhvania	0.15	0	0.20	0.35	0.15	0.07	0.51	0.42
5. Devdariani	0	0	0.02	0.02	0.13	0.02	0.15	0.04
6. Abashidze	0	0	0	0	0.15	0	0.15	0
7. Sarishvili	0	0	0.11	0	0.02	0	0.13	0
8. Mamaladze	0.24	0	0.11	0	0	0	0.35	0
9. Government	0.38	0	1.4	0	1.3	0.04	3.0	0.04
10. Opposition in general	0.04	0	0.11	0.09	0	0	0.15	0.09
11. Radical Opposition	0	0	0	0	0.60	0	0.60	0
12. Government bloc	0.13	0	0.29	0	0.04	0	0.47	0
13. Non-governmental organizations	0	0	0	0.09	0	0.02	0	0.11
14. “Kmara”	0	0	0	0	0.04	0	0.04	0
15. Mass media	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
16. Rustavi 2.	0	0	0	0	0.15	0	0.15	0
Sum	1.53	0.11	3.71	0.73	3.71	0.5	8.75	1.33



**Table # 4. The frequency of actors (P) in all newspapers**

	24 Hours		“Sakartvelos Respublika” (“Georgian Republic “)		“Kviris Palitra” (“Weekly Digest”)		Diff. sum	
	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+
1. Shevardnadze	14.7	1.02	0.53	7.5	2.5	0.35	17.8	8.9
2. Saakashvili	0.42	0.31	3.02	0.04	0.22	0.15	3.7	0.51
3. Burjanadze	0.44	0.87	2.6	0.11	0.33	0.13	3.3	1.1
4. Zhvania	0.29	0.09	2.9	0.07	0.51	0.42	3.7	0.58
5. Devdariani	0.91	0.40	0.15	0.47	0.15	0.04	0.91	1.2
6. Abashidze	2.3	0.09	0.11	0.04	0.15	0	2.6	0.13
7. Sarishvili	1.1	0.02	0	0.02	0.13	0	1.2	0.04
8. Mamaladze	0.67	0.07	0	0.09	0.35	0	1.02	0.15
9. Government	25.8	0.07	2.1	1.2	3.0	0.04	31.0	1.3
10. Opposition in general	0.82	0	1.5	2.5	0.15	0.09	2.5	2.6
11. Radical Opposition	0.40	0.95	3.3	0.07	0.6	0	4.3	1.02
12. Government bloc	4.1	0.22	0.13	0.75	0.47	0	4.7	0.98
13. Non-governmental organizations	0.11	0.29	0	0.18	0	0.11	0.11	0.58
14. “Kmara”	0.49	0.07	0.58	0	0.04	0	1.1	0.07
15. Mass media	0.44	0.02	0.55	0.07	0	0	1.1	0.02
16. Rustavi 2.	0.11	0.20	1.2	0	0.15	0	1.5	0.20
Sum	53.1	4.69	18.67	13.11	8.75	1.33	80.54	19.38

**Table # 5. The overall rating of naming of actors (with the sum of P)**

	Actors	-	+	Sum
I	Government	31.0	1.3	32.3
II	Shevardnadze	17.8	8.9	26.7
III	Government bloc	4.7	0.98	5.7
IV	Radical Opposition	4.3	1.02	5.3
V	Opposition in general	2.5	2.6	5.1
VI	Burjanadze	3.3	1.1	4.5
VII	Zhvania	3.7	0.58	4.3
VIII	Saakashvili	3.7	0.51	4.2
IX	Abashidze	2.6	0.13	2.7
X	Devdariani	0.91	1.2	2.1
XI	Rustavi 2	1.5	0.20	1.7
XII	Sarishvili	1.2	0.04	1.3
XIII	Mamaladze	1.02	0.15	1.2
XIV	“Kmara”	1.1	0.07	1.2
XV	Mass media	1.1	0.02	1.1
XVI	Non-governmental organizations	0.11	0.58	0.69

**Table # 6. The rating of the categories of actors**

Government actors			
	-	+	Sum
Government	31.0	1.3	32.3
Shevardnadze	17.8	8.9	26.7
Government bloc	4.7	0.98	5.7
Abashidze	2.6	0.1	2.7
Devdariani	0.9	1.2	2.1
Sarishvili	1.2	0.04	1.3
Mamaladze	1.0	0.1	1.2
Sum	59.23	12.7	72.0
Mean of actors	8.46	1.81	10.29
Actors of opposition			
Radical opposition	4.3	1.02	5.3
Opposition in general	2.5	2.6	5.1
Burjanadze	3.3	1.1	4.5
Zhvania	3.7	0.58	4.3
Saakashvili	3.7	0.51	4.2
Sum	17.5	5.81	23.4
Mean of actors	3.5	1.16	4.68
Actors of civic sector			
Rustavi 2.	1.5	0.20	1.7
“Kmara”	1.1	0.07	1.2
Mass media	1.1	0.02	1.1
Non-governmental	0.11	0.58	0.69

organizations			
Sum	3.81	0.87	4.69
Mean of actors	0.95	0.22	1.17

**Table # 7. November changes with regard to actor frequencies (Vn)**

	24 Hours		Sakartvelos Respublika (“Georgian Republic “)		Kviris Palitra (“Weekly Digest”)		Diff. sum		Abs.
	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	ჯგონო
1. Shevardnadz	4.3	0.27	1.72	-0.6	-0.03	0.123	5.99	-0.21	6.20
2. Saakashvili	0.08	0.19	0.3	0.01	0.147	0.02	0.53	0.22	0.75
3. Burjanadze	0.003	-0.07	-0.40	-0.04	-0.09	-0.003	-0.49	-0.113	0.60
4. Zhvania	-0.08	0.04	-0.95	-0.003	-0.02	-0.07	-1.05	0.107	1.16
5. Devdariani	0.19	-0.11	0.1	-0.12	0.08	0.187	0.38	-0.043	0.42
6. Abashidze	1.07	0.01	0.07	0.03	0.1	0	1.24	0.04	1.28
7. Sarishvili	-0.017	-0.007	0	-0.01	-0.023	0	-0.04	-0.017	0.06
8. Mamaladze	-0.133	-0.023	0	-0.03	-0.117	0	-0.25	-0.053	0.30
9. Government	3.4	-0.233	-0.5	-1.11	0.3	0.027	3.2	-1.36	4.56
10. Opposition in general	-0.273	0	-0.5	-0.8	-0.05	-0.3	-0.823	-1.1	1.93
11. Radical Opposition	0.27	0.63	2.04	0.05	0.4	0	2.71	0.68	3.38
12. Government bloc	-0.53	-0.033	0.03	-0.05	-0.117	0	-0.617	-0.083	0.70

13. Non-governmental orgs	-0.017	0.19	0	-0.06	0	0.16	-0.017	0.29	0.31
14. "Kmara"	0.32	0.047	0.25	0	0.027	0	0.597	0.047	0.64
15. Mass media	0.123	0.013	0.033	0.05	0	0	0.156	0.063	0.22
16. Rustavi 2.	0.07	0.13	0.6	0	0.1	0	0.77	0.13	0.90
Diff. Sum	8.776	1.044	2.79	-2.68	0.707	0.144	12.286	-1.402	23.41
Alg. sum	9.82		0.11		0.851		10.884		

**Table # 8. The rating of actors according to November Changes (Vn)**

		Abs. sum
I	Shevardnadze	6.20
II	Government	4.56
III	Radical Opposition	3.38
IV	Opposition in general	1.93
V	Abashidze	1.28
VI	Zhvania	1.16
VII	Rustavi 2.	0.90
VIII	Saakashvili	0.75
IX	Government bloc	0.70
X	"Kmara"	0.64
XI	Burjanadze	0.60
XII	Devdariani	0.42
XIII	Non-governmental organizations	0.31
XIV	Mamaladze	0.30

XV	Mass media	0.22
XVI	Sarishvil	0.06

**Table # 9. Theme “professionalism” in the newspaper 24 hours (P)**

Professionalism								
	September		October.		November.		Diff. sum	
	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+
1. Shevardnadze	1.2	0.18	1.1	0.04	0.25	0	2.6	0.22
2. Saakashvili	0.07	0	0	0	0	0.04	0.07	0.04
3. Burjanadze	0.02	0.11	0.16	0.04	0.02	0	0.20	0.16
4. Zhvania	0	0	0.11	0.02	0.02	0	0.13	0.02
5. Devdariani	0.13	0.18	0.07	0	0.02	0	0.22	0.18
6. Abashidze	0	0	0.07	0	0.02	0	0.09	0
7. Sarishvili	0	0	0.20	0.02	0	0	0.20	0.02
8. Mamaladze	0.09	0.02	0.16	0	0	0	0.25	0.02
9. Government	4.7	0.7	7.3	0	2.8	0	14.8	0.07
10. Opposition in general	0.36	0	0.38	0.09	0	0	0.72	0.09
11. Radical Opposition	0	0	0	0	0	0.02	0	0.02
12. Government bloc	1.1	0.07	2.1	0.11	0.29	0	3.4	0.18
13. Non-governmental organizations	0.09	0	0	0	0	0	0.09	0
14. “Kmara”	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

15. Mass media	0.04	0	0.13	0	0	0	0.18	0
16. Rustavi 2.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sum	7.7	0.69	11.6	0.49	3.4	0.07	23.0	1.0

**Table # 10. Theme “ personality” in the newspaper 24 hours (P)**

Person	September		October.		November.		Diff. sum	
	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+
	1. Shevardnadze	1.1	0.11	1.8	0.13	2.8	0.09	5.7
2. Saakashvili	0.07	0	0.07	0.02	0.09	0.04	0.22	0.07
3. Burjanadze	0	0.38	0.11	0.11	0.04	0.04	0.16	0.31
4. Zhvania	0.07	0	0.02	0	0	0	0.09	0
5. Devdariani	0.07	0.18	0.02	0	0	0.02	0.09	0.22
6. Abashidze	0	0.04	0.31	0	0.78	0.02	1.1	0.07
7. Sarishvili	0	0	0.54	0	0.11	0	0.65	0
8. Mamaladze	0.29	0.04	0.04	0	0.04	0	0.38	0.04
9. Government	0	0	0	0	3.3	0	3.3	0
10. Opposition in general	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
11. Radical Opposition	0	0	0	0	0.02	0.16	0.02	0.16
12. Government bloc	0	0	0	0	0.29	0.02	0.29	0.02
13. Non-governmental organizations	0	0	0	0	0	0.22	0	0.22

14. "Kmara"	0	0	0	0	0	0.04	0	0.04
15. Mass media	0	0	0	0	0.02	0	0.02	0
16. Rustavi 2.	0	0	0	0	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.04
Sum	1.6	0.78	4.0	0.27	7.6	0.72	12.1	1.5

**Table # 11. Theme "to be earnest " in the newspaper 24 hours (P)**

" to be earnest "								
	September		October.		November.		Diff. sum	
	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+
1. Shevardnadze	0	0	0	0	3.8	0.16	3.8	0.16
2. Saakashvili	0	0	0	0	0.11	0.02	0.11	0.02
3. Burjanadze	0	0	0	0	0.02	0.07	0.02	0.07
4. Zhvania	0	0	0.04	0	0	0.07	0.04	0.07
5. Devdariani	0.07	0	0	0	0.15	0	0.22	0
6. Abashidze	0	0	0	0	0.45	0.02	0.45	0.02
7. Sarishvili	0	0	0	0	0.07	0	0.07	0
8. Mamaladze	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
9. Government	0.43	0	0.94	0	3.5	0	4.8	0
10. Opposition in general	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
11. Radical Opposition	0	0	0	0	0.38	0.47	0.38	0.47
12. Government bloc	0.04	0	0.04	0	0.13	0	0.22	0
13. Non-governmental organizations	0	0	0	0	0.02	0.07	0.02	0.07



14. "Kmara"	0	0	0	0	0.04	0.02	0.04	0.02
15. Mass media	0	0	0	0	0.25	0.02	0.25	0.02
16. Rustavi 2.	0	0	0	0	0.09	0.16	0.09	0.16
Sum	0.54	0	1.02	0	9.01	1.08	10.51	1.08

**Table # 12. Theme "the past" in the newspaper 24 hours (P)**

" Past "									
	Sept.		October.		November		Diff. sum		Sum
	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	
1. Shevardnadze	0	0.02	0.07	0.02	2.27	0.31	2.27	0.36	2.69
2. Saakashvili	0	0	0	0	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.04	0.07
3. Burjanadze	0	0	0	0	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.04
4. Zhvania	0	0	0.02	0	0	0	0.02	0	0.02
5. Devdariani	0.07	0.02	0	0	0.18	0	0.25	0.02	0.27
6. Abashidze	0	0	0	0	0.29	0	0.29	0	0.29
7. Sarishvili	0	0	0	0	0.04	0	0.04	0	0.04
8. Mamaladze	0	0	0	0	0.04	0	0.04	0	0.04
9. Government	0	0	0	0	2.2	0	2.2	0	2.2
10. Opposition in general	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
11. Radical Opposition	0	0	0	0	0	0.29	0	0.29	0.29
12. Government bloc	0	0	0	0	0.07	0	0.07	0	0.07
13. Non-governmental organizations	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
14. "Kmara"	0	0	0	0	0.22	0	0.22	0	0.22
15. Mass media	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
16. Rustavi 2.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sum	0.07	0.04	0.09	0.02	5.35	0.67	5.44	0.74	6.2

**Table # 13. Theme “democratic orientation in the newspaper  
“ 24 hours” (P)**

“Democratic Orientation ”									
	Sept.		October.		November		Diff. sum		Sum
	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	
1. Shevardnadze	0	0	0.09	0	0.20	0.11	0.29	0.11	0.40
2. Saakashvili	0	0	0	0	0	0.13	0	0.13	0.13
3. Burjanadze	0	0	0	0	0.04	0.09	0.04	0.09	0.13
4. Zhvania	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
5. Devdariani	0	0	0	0	0.13	0	0.13	0	0.13
6. Abashidze	0	0	0.09	0	0.31	0	0.40	0	0.40
7. Sarishvili	0	0	0	0	0.13	0	0.13	0	0
8. Mamaladze	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
9. Government	0.04	0	0.13	0	0.25	0	0.43	0	0.43
10. Opposition in general	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
11. Radical Opposition	0	0	0	0	0	0.02	0	0.02	0
12. Government bloc	0	0	0.02	0	0.07	0.02	0.09	0.02	0.11
13. Non-governmental organizations	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
14. “Kmara”	0	0	0	0	0.22	0	0.22	0	0.22
15. Mass media	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
16. Rustavi 2.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sum	0.04	0	0.34	0	1.4	0.38	1.7	0.38	2.1

**Table # 14. Theme “professionalism” in the newspaper “Sakartvelos Respublika” (P)**

Professionalism									
	Sept.		October.		November		Diff. sum		Sum
	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	
1. Shevardnadze	0.02	2.1	0.16	1.8	0	0.43	0.18	4.3	4.5
2. Saakashvili	0.49	0.02	0.47	0	0	0	0.96	0.02	0.99
3. Burjanadze	0.67	0	0.56	0.09	0.04	0	1.3	0.09	1.4
4. Zhvania	0.56	0	0.49	0.04	0	0	1.0	0.04	1.0
5. Devdariani	0	0.29	0	0	0	0.02	0	0.31	0.31
6. 6. Abashidze	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
7. Sarishvili	0	0	0	0.02	0	0	0	0.02	0.02
8. Mamaladze	0	0	0	0.04	0	0	0	0.04	0.04
9. Government	0.58	0.52	1.2	0.67	0	0.04	1.7	1.2	2.9
10. Opposition in general	1.5	0.02	2.5	0.04	0	0	4.0	0.07	4.1
11. Radical Opposition	0	0	0	0	0.22	0.04	0.22	0.04	0.27
12. Government bloc	0.02	0.36	0.04	0.20	0	0.09	0.07	0.65	0.72
13. Non-governmental organizations	0	0.11	0	0.07	0	0	0	0.18	0.18
14. “Kmara”	0.04	0	0.09	0	0	0	0.13	0	0.13
15. Mass media	0.09	0	0.22	0	0	0.07	0.31	0.07	0.38
16. Rustavi 2.	0	0	0.20	0	0.04	0	0.25	0	0.25
Sum	4.0	3.4	5.9	3.0	0.31	0.69	10.2	7.0	17.2

**Table # 15. Theme “personality” in the newspaper “Sakartvelos Respublika” (P)**

Personality									
	Sept.		October.		November		Diff. sum		Sum
	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	
1. Shevardnadze	0	0.36	0.02	0.85	0.04	0.29	0.07	1.5	1.6
2. Saakashvili	0.27	0	0.16	0	0.65	0	1.1	0	1.1
3. Burjanadze	0.07	0	0.07	0.02	0.13	0	0.27	0.02	0.29
4. Zhvania	0.22	0	0.13	0	0.54	0	0.90	0	0.90
5. Devdariani	0	0.13	0	0	0.13	0	0.13	0.13	0.27
6. Abashidze	0	0	0	0	0.09	0.04	0.09	0.04	0.13
7. Sarishvili	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
8. Mamaladze	0	0	0	0.04	0	0	0	0.04	0.04
9. Government	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
10. Opposition in general	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
11. Radical Opposition	0	0	0	0	0.74	0	0.74	0	0.74
1. Government bloc	0	0	0	0	0.07	0.04	0.07	0.04	0.11
2. Non-governmental organizations	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
3. “Kmara”	0	0	0	0	0.07	0	0.07	0	0.07
4. Mass media	0	0	0	0	0.07	0	0.07	0	0.07
5. Rustavi 2.	0	0	0	0	0.18	0	0.18	0	0.18
Sum	0.56	0.49	0.8	0.92	2.7	0.38	3.7	1.8	5.5

**Table # 16. Theme “to be earnest” in the newspaper “Sakartvelos Respublika”(P)**

“ to be earnest ”									
	Sept.		October.		November		Diff. sum		Sum
	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	
1. Shevardnadze	0	0	0.04	0	0.02	0.25	0.31	0	0.31
2. Saakashvili	0.22	0	0.09	0	0.36	0	0.67	0	0.67
3. Burjanadze	0.52	0	0.25	0	0.27	0	1.0	0	1
4. Zhvania	0.20	0	0.49	0	0.02	0	0.72	0	0.72
5. Devdariani	0	0	0	0	0	0.02	0	0.02	0.02
6. Abashidze	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
7. Sarishvili	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
8. Mamaladze	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
9. Government	0.04	0	0.16	0	0	0	0.20	0	0.20
10. Opposition in general	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
11. Radical Opposition	0	0	0	0	1.3	0	1.3	0	1.3
12. Government bloc	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
13. Non-governmental organizations	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
14. “Kmara”	0	0	0	0	0.29	0	0.29	0	0.29
15. Mass media	0	0	0.09	0	0.04	0	0.13	0	0.13
16. Rustavi 2.	0	0	0.04	0	0.36	0	0.40	0	0.40
Sum	0.99	0	1.2	0	2.7	0.27	5.1	0.02	5.1

**Table # 17. Theme “the past ” in the newspaper “Sakartvelos Respublika” (P)**

“ The past”									
	September		October		November		Diff.sum		Sum
	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	
1. Shevardnadze	0.04	0.07	0	0.58	0.18	0.85	0.22	1.5	1.7
2. Saakashvili	0	0	0	0	0.34	0.02	0.34	0.02	0.36
3. Burjanadze	0	0	0	0	0.02	0	0.02	0	0.02
4. Zhvania	0.04	0	0.09	0	0.11	0.02	0.25	0.02	0.27
5. Devdariani	0	0	0	0	0.02	0	0.02	0	0.02
6. Abashidze	0	0	0	0	0.02	0	0.02	0	0.02
7. Sarishvili	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
8. Mamaladze	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
9. Government	0	0	0	0	0.20	0	0.20	0	0.20
10. Opposition in general	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
11. Radical Opposition	0	0	0	0	1	0.02	1.0	0.02	1.02
12. Government bloc	0	0	0	0	0	0.07	0	0.07	0.07
13. Non-governmental organizations	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
14. “Kmara”	0	0	0	0	0.09	0	0.09	0	0.09
15. Mass media	0	0	0	0	0.04	0	0.04	0	0.04
16. Rustavi 2.	0	0	0	0	0.43	0	0.43	0	0.43
Sum	0.09	0.07	0.09	0.58	2.5	0.99	2.7	1.6	4.3

**Table # 18. Theme “democratic orientation ” in the newspaper “Sakartvelos Respublika” (Georgian Republic) (P)**

“D e m o cratic orientation ”									
	September		October.		November		Diff.sum		Sum
	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	
1. Shevardnadze	0	0	0	0	0	0.07	0	0.07	0.07
2. Saakashvili	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
3. Burjanadze	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
4. Zhvania	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
5. Devdariani	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
6. Abashidze	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
7. Sarishvili	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
8. Mamaladze	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
9. Government	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
10. Opposition in general	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
11. Radical Opposition	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
12. Government bloc	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
13. Non-governmental organizations	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
14. “Kmara”	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
15. Mass media	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
16. Rustavi 2.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sum	0	0	0	0	0	0.07	0	0.07	0.07

**Table # 19 Theme “ professionalism” in the newspaper  
“Kviris Palitra” (Weekly Digest) (P)**

professionalism									
	September		October.		November		Diff. sum		Sum
	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	
Shevardnadze	0.09	0.04	0.58	0	0.02	0	0.69	0.04	0.74
Saakashvili	0	0	0	0.04	0.02	0	0.02	0.04	0.07
Burjanadze	0	0	0.09	0	0	0	0.09	0	0.09
Zhvania	0.07	0	0.04	0.04	0	0	0.11	0.04	0.16
Devdariani	0	0	0.02	0	0	0	0.02	0	0.02
Abashidze	0	0	0	0	0.16	0	0.16	0	0.16
Sarishvili	0	0	0.09	0	0.02	0	0.11	0	0.11
Mamaladze	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The Government	0.7	0	1.1	0	0.31	0.04	1.7	0.04	1.7
Opposition in General	0.04	0	0.11	0	0	0	0.16	0	0.16
Radical opposition	0	0	0	0	0.16	0	0.16	0	0.16
Government bloc	0.13	0	0.25	0	0	0	0.38	0	0.38
Non-governmental organizations	0	0	0	0.09	0	0	0	0.09	0.09
“Kmara”	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mass media	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Rustavi 2.	0	0	0	0	0.04	0	0.04	0	0.04
Sum	0.61	0.04	2.3	0.18	0.74	0.04	3.6	0.27	3.9



**Table # 20. Theme “ personality ” in the newspaper “Kviris Palitra” (Weekly Digest) (P)**

Personality									
	September		October		November		Diff. sum		Sum
	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	
Shevardnadze	0.38	0.02	0.04	0	0	0.11	0.43	0.13	0.56
Saakashvili	0	0	0	0	0.04	0	0.04	0	0.04
Burjanadze	0.04	0	0.09	0.04	0.02	0	0.16	0.04	0.20
Zhvania	0.02	0	0.09	0	0.09	0.07	0.20	0.07	0.27
Devdariani	0	0	0	0	0.09	0.02	0.09	0.02	0.11
Abashidze	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sarishvili	0	0	0.02	0	0	0	0.02	0	0.02
Mamaladze	0.25	0	0.04	0	0	0	0.29	0	0.29
The Government	0	0	0	0	0.16	0	0.16	0	0.16
Opposition in General	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Radical opposition	0	0	0	0	0.07	0	0.07	0	0.07
Government bloc	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Non-governmental organizations	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
“Kmara”	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mass media	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Rustavi 2.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sum	0.69	0.02	0.29	0.04	0.47	0.20	1.5	0.27	1.7

**Table # 21. Sense of responsibility in the newspaper “Kviris Palitra” (Weekly Digest) (P)**

“to be earnest”									
	September		October		November		Diff. sum		Sum
	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	
Shevardnadze	0.09	0.04	0.58	0	0.13	0.02	0.81	0.07	0.87
Saakashvili	0	0	0	0.04	0.09	0.07	0.09	0.11	0.19
Burjanadze	0	0	0.09	0.04	0	0	0.09	0.04	0.13
Zhvania	0.07	0	0.11	0.04	0.07	0	0.25	0.04	0.29
Devdariani	0	0	0	0.02	0.04	0	0.04	0.02	0.07
Abashidze	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sarishvili	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mamaladze	0	0	0.07	0	0	0	0.07	0	0.07
The Government	0.11	0	0.29	0	0.40	0	0.81	0	0.81
Opposition in General	0	0	0	0.09	0	0	0	0.09	0.09
Radical opposition	0	0	0	0	0.16	0	0.16	0	0.16
Government bloc	0	0	0.04	0	0	0	0.04	0	0.04
Non-governmental organizations	0	0	0	0	0	0.02	0	0.02	0.02
“Kmara”	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mass media	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Rustavi 2.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sum	0.27	0.04	1.2	0.25	0.90	0.11	2.4	0.40	2.8

**Table # 22. Theme “the past” in the newspaper “Kviris Palitra” (Weekly Digest) (P)**

“ The past ”									
	September		October		November		Diff. sum		Sum
	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	
Shevardnadze	0	0	0	0	0.20	0	0.20	0	0.20
Saakashvili	0	0	0	0	0.07	0	0.07	0	0.07
Burjanadze	0	0	0	0	0	0.04	0	0.04	0.04
Zhvania	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Devdariani	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Abashidze	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sarishvili	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mamaladze	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The Government	0	0	0	0	0.27	0	0.27	0	0.27
Opposition in General	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Radical opposition	0	0	0	0	0.22	0	0.22	0	0.22
Government bloc	0	0	0	0	0.04	0	0.04	0	0.04
Non-governmental organizations	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
“Kmara”	0	0	0	0	0.04	0	0.04	0	0.04
Mass media	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Rustavi 2.	0	0	0	0	0.11	0	0.11	0	0.11
Sum	0	0	0	0	0.95	0.04	0.95	0.04	0.99

**Table # 23. Theme “democratic orientation” in the newspaper “Kviris Palitra” (Weekly Digest) (P)**

“d e m o cratic orientation ”									
	September		October		November		Diff.sum		Sum
	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	
Shevardnadze	0	0	0	0	0.45	0.11	0.45	0.11	0.56
Saakashvili	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Burjanadze	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Zhvania	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Devdariani	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Abashidze	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sarishvili	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mamaladze	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The Government	0	0	0	0	0.13	0	0.13	0	0.13
Opposition in General	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Radical opposition	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Government bloc	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Non-governmental organizations	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
“Kmara”	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mass media	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Rustavi 2.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sum	0	0	0	0	0.58	0.11	0.58	0.11	0.69

**Table # 24. Theme “ professionalism” in the newspapers (P)**

Profesionalism									
Newspapers	September		October		November		Diff.sum		Sum
Evaluation	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	F2
<i>24 hours</i>	7.7	0.69	11.6	0.49	3.4	0.07	23.0	1	- 4.27
“Sakartvelos Respublika” (The Georgian Republic)	4.0	3.4	5.9	3.0	0.31	0.69	10.2	7.0	- 3.09
“Kviris Palitra” (Weekly Digest)	0.61	0.04	2.3	0.18	0.74	0.04	3.6	0.27	- 0.46
Diff. sum	12.3	4.1	19.8	3.7	4.5	0.81	36.8	8.3	- 7.82
Sum	16.4		23.5		5.3		45.1		

**Table # 25. Theme “ personality” in the newspapers (P)**

Personality									
Newspapers	September		October		November		Diff.sum		F2
Evaluation	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	
<i>24 hours</i>	1.6	0.78	3.0	0.27	7.6	0.72	12.1	1.5	3.57
“Sakartvelos Respublika” (The Georgian Republic)	0.56	0.49	0.38	0.92	2.7	0.38	3.7	1.8	1.47

“Kviris Palitra” (Weekly Digest)	0.69	0.02	0.29	0.04	0.47	0.20	1.5	0.27	- 0.03
Diff. sum	2.8	1.3	3.6	1.2	10.7	1.3	17.2	3.6	5.01
Sum	4.1		4.86		9.8		20.8		

**Table # 26. Theme “ to be earnest ” in the newspapers (P)**

To be earnest									
Newspapers	September		october		November		Diff.sum		F2
Evaluation	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	
<i>24 hours</i>	0.54	0	1.02	0	9.01	1.08	10.7	1.1	5.53
“Sakartvelos Respublika” (The Georgian Republic)	0.99	0	1.2	0	2.7	0.27	5.1	0.27	1.0
“Kviris Palitra” (Weekly Digest)	0.27	0.04	1.2	0.25	0.90	0.11	2.4	0.40	0.1
Diff. sum	1.8	0.04	3.4	0.25	12.6	1.5	18.1	1.5	6.63
Sum	1.8		3.6		14.1		19.6		

**Table # 27. Theme “ the past ” in the newspapers (P)**

The past								
Newspapers	September		October		November		Diff. sum	
Evaluation	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+
<i>24 hours</i>	0.07	0.04	0.09	0.02	5.3	0.67	5.5	0.74
“Sakartvelos Respublika” (The Georgian Republic)	0.09	0.07	0.09	0.58	2.5	0.99	2.7	1.6
“Kviris Palitra” (Weekly Digest)					0.96	0.04	0.96	0.04
Diff. sum	0.16	0.11	0.18	0.60	8.8	1.7	9.1	2.4
Sum								

**Table # 28. Theme “ democratic orientation ” in the newspapers (P)**

“Democratic orientation”								
Newspapers	September		October		November		Diff. sum	
Evaluation	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+
<i>24 hours</i>	0.04	0	0.34	0	1.4	0.38	1.75	0.38
“Sakartvelos Respublika” (The Georgian Republic)	0	0	0	0	0	0.07	0	0.07
“Kviris Palitra” (Weekly Digest)	0	0	0	0	0.58	0.11	0.58	0.11

Diff. sum	0.04	0	0.34	0	1.95	0.56	2.33	0.56
Sum								

**Table # 29. The frequency of themes in the newspapers (P)**

Themes	September		October.		November		Diff.sum	
	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+
Evaluation								
Professionalism	12.3	4.1	19.8	3.7	4.5	0.8	36.8	8.35
Personality	2.8	1.3	3.6	1.2	10.7	1.3	17.2	3.6
To be earnest	1.8	0.04	3.4	0.25	12.6	1.5	18.1	1.5
The past	0.16	0.11	0.18	0.6	8.8	1.7	9.1	2.4
Democratic orientation	0.04	0	0.34	0	1.9	0.56	2.3	0.56
Differential Sum	17.1	5.59	27.4	5.77	38.7	5.83	83.5	16.45
Sum	22.68		33.14		44.49		100	

**Table #30. The rating of themes according to their frequencies**

Themes	Diff. sum		Sum
Evaluation	-	+	
Professionalism	36.8	8.35	45.15
Personality	17.2	3.6	20.8
To be earnest	18.1	1.5	19.6
The past	9.1	2.4	11.5
Democratic orientation	2.3	0.56	2.86



**Table # 31. The significance of the themes for Revolution (P)**

Themes	24 hours		Sak. Resp			Kvir. Pal.		Diff. Sum	
	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	
Evaluation	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	
Professionalism	-4.27	0.26	-3.1	-1.6	-0.46	-0.05	-7.82	-1.95	
Personality	3.57	0.22	1.47	-0.22	-0.03	0.11	5.01	0.11	
To be earnest	5.53	0.71	1.0	-0.07	0.1	-0.02	6.63	0.62	
The past	10.37	0.42	1.6	0.46	0.64	0.03	12.61	0.91	
Democratic orientation	0.82	0.25	0	0.05	0.39	0.07	1.21	0.37	
Differential Sum	16.02	1.34	0.97	-1.38	0.64	0.14	17.64	0.06	

**Table # 32. The rating of themes according to their significance for the Revolution (according to sum of P)**

Themes	Diff. sum		Sum
	-	+	
Evaluation	-	+	
Professionalism	12.61	0.91	13.52
Personality	-7.82	-1.95	9.77
To be earnest	6.63	0.62	7.26
The past	5.01	0.11	5.12
Democratic orientation	1.21	0.37	1.58
Differential Sum	17.64	0.06	37.25

## Annex# 5

### Expert Questionnaire

1. What was the cause of the Revolution? (causes: subjective and objective)  
1.1. Was the Rose Revolution organized?  
1.2. If the Revolution was organized, who was the organizer?  
1.3. Was it organized before the parliamentary elections or afterwards?

1.4. How were the decisions made about the action plan and who was responsible for its implementation?  
II2.1. Was the Revolution directed from abroad or coordinated by the opposition forces?  
2.2. Which political forces directed the processes during the Revolution?

2.3 What positions and attitudes were in place in the opposition forces and its leaders during the Revolution?  
2.4 Were there differences in opinions evident among the leaders about the implementation of the action plan?  
2.5 Who had the final say in decision making and at what stages?  
2.6 What key moments can you distinguish among “Rose Revolution” processes?

III3.1 Did the negotiations take place among the opposition and the President and the Government?  
3.2 Did the government have the readiness with regard to the revolutionary development of the processes?  
3.3 Did the government have the information what would be the outcome of falsifying the election results and what processes could possibly take place?

3.4 Did the government work towards neutralizing opposition actions?  
3.5 What positions and attitudes did the political forces and leaders united in government bloc maintain in regards to the future development of the events?  
3.6 Did the certain representatives of government have secret negotiations with the opposition?  
3.7 Did the government have consultations with the Diplomatic Corps and international circles?

IV4.1 What was the relation of other political forces of Georgia towards the anti-government campaign?  
4.2 Were the other political forces involved in the developed processes and to what

extent?4.3 Whom did the other political forces support and what did they request for this?

4.4 Why did the violence not occur?V5.1 What were the funding sources and amount received by the opposition before and during the Revolution?5.2 Approximately, what were the financial means that came from abroad for the organization of the

Revolution?5.3 Which businessmen were on the side on opposition or government and what was the role played by them in the developed events?VI6.1 What was the position of foreign countries about the processes that developed in Georgia?6.2 Did the consultations take place between the US and Russian governments?

6.3 What were the issues discussed with the authorities and the opposition during Ivanov's visit?VII7.1 What were the attitudes displayed by the population before the elections and during the

Revolution?7.2 Has the public mentality changed during past ten years? If so, what contributed to this?7.3 If yes (if it changed), was this influenced by the non-governmentals?VIII8.1 Did the

consultations take place among the authorities, opposition and mass media?8.2 The role of Mass media in the developed processes and public mentality formation?8.3 What was the role played by the Georgian church in Rose Revolution?IX9.2 What was the role played by the non-governmental sector in the successful implementation of Rose Revolution?

9.3 Basically, which non-governmental organizations were the active participants in the developed processes?X10.1 How was the ideology of Rose Revolution created and who was its author?

XI11.1 What perspectives exist for Georgia after Rose Revolution?

11.2 To what extent does the factor of Rose Revolution impact the image of Georgia and its desire to join Euro Atlantic structures?

## **Questionnaire**

### **Civic Sector**

1. **Please name the organizations you know that constitute the civic sector** (non-governmental organizations, free media, professional unions, interest groups)

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2. **What are the sources of your information about the activities of civic sector organizations and their representatives?** (You can indicate several answers)

I work in the civic sector	1
From the television	2
From the periodic press	3
From relatives and friends	4
I don't receive information	5
Other	6

3. **How important is the development of civic sector and its active position for the development of the country?**

Very important	1
Important	2
Has very little importance	3
Has no importance	4
I don't know	5

4. **Does the civic sector influence the events developed in the country?**

Has large influence	1
Has influence but very little	2
Has no influence	3
I don't know	4

**5. Do you trust?**

	Trust fully	I trust	Neither trust, nor mistrust	Don't Trust	Don't trust at all	I can't answer/no answer
The President of Georgia	1	2	3	4	5	999
The Parliament of Georgia	1	2	3	4	5	999
The government of Georgia	1	2	3	4	5	999
Judiciary authorities	1	2	3	4	5	999
Independent media	1	2	3	4	5	999
The church	1	2	3	4	5	999
Non-governmental organizations	1	2	3	4	5	999
Professional Unions	1	2	3	4	5	999

**6. Mostly, on what the democratic development should be based in Georgia? (only one answer)**

On the efforts of the government	1
On the increased activation of civic sector	2

**7. In the terms of equal salaries, where would you rather be employed? (only one answer)**

In the budgetary organization	1
In private sector	2
In the government structure	3
In the civic sector organization (NGO)	4
In the political party	5
Any organization	6

## Non-governmental organizations

8. Are you informed about the activities of non-governmental organizations?

I have enough information	1
I have very little information	2
I have no information	3

9. Please, name the well-known non-governmental organizations:

1. \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_
2. \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_
3. \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_
4. \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_
5. \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_
6. \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_
7. \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_
8. \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

10. Which statement do you support?

Non-governmental organizations promote the development of the democracy in society	1
Non-governmental organizations create the situation of chaos and disorder in society	2

11. Do you have the experience of collaboration with the non-governmental organizations and in what directions?

I have worked there	1.
I have volunteered	2.

I have taken part in trainings/seminars	3.
I have referred them for consultations	4.
I have utilized the charity	5.
I have received material support (microloan for small business development)	6.
I did not have a relationship with them	7.

**12. If yes, please indicate the organization with which you collaborated, the form and the period of collaboration**

<b>The form of collaboration</b>	<b>Organization</b>	<b>When (Indicate the year)</b>
<b>1. I have worked there</b>		
<b>I have volunteered</b>		
<b>I have taken part in trainings/seminars</b>		
<b>4. I have referred them for consultations</b>		
<b>5. I have utilized the charity</b>		
<b>6. I have received material support (microloan for small business development)</b>		

**13. Which statement do you support?**

13.1	Non-governmental organizations make it easier for the people to Project their rights and realice their interests	1
	The non-governmentals feed people with bear promises and in reality they can provide no assistance in reality	2
13.2	Non-governmental organizations promote the establishment of progressive ideas in society	1
	Non-governmental organizations do not care about the nacional values and promote the foreign values	2
13.3	In Georgia, non-governmental organizations mainly perform their declared functions (Human Rights Protection, Environment protection, Education work etc)	1
	The non-governmentals in Georgia are only interested in receiving grants and do not care about public interests	2

**14. If your rights are violated, who would you refer for assistance? (assess institutions below)**

	Would definitely refer	Would more refer than not refer	Would more be inclined not to refer	Would not refer
1. Ombudsman	1	2	3	4
2. Court	1	2	3	4
3. Parliamentary Committee of Human Rights Protection	1	2	3	4
4. Non-governmental organizations that protect Human Rights	1	2	3	4
5. Mass-media	1	2	3	4
6. Opposition Parties	1	2	3	4
7. The authorities of the criminal world	1	2	3	4
8. Friends and acquaintances	1	2	3	4
9. Government parties	1	2	3	4
Other (please, indicate)				



**Independent media**

**15. Please list the means of periodic media (newspapers, magazines) that you know and rate the degree of your trust to them**

	Name of the newspaper/magazine	I trust	Neither trust nor mistrust	Don't trust
1		1	2	3
2		1	2	3
3		1	2	3
4		1	2	3

**16. Please list the Georgian TV Channels that you watch frequently and rate your degree of trust to them**

	TV channel	I trust	Neither trust, nor mistrust	Don't trust
1		1	2	3
2		1	2	3
3		1	2	3
4		1	2	3

**17. Circle the statements you agree with**

17.1	Media should be independent and voice the public opinion	1
	The degree of freedom of media should derive from state interests	2
17.2	Independent media is the means of the development of democracy	1
	Independent media introduces the situation of chaos and disorder in the country	2

## Rose Revolution

### 18. What factors influenced the implementation of Rose Revolution? Rate the importance of each statement

	Decisive Role	Important Role	Not important role	No role
8. The emergence of a new political force	1	2	3	4
9. The impotence of the old government	1	2	3	4
10. Corruption	1	2	3	4
11. Non-democratic character of the government	1	2	3	4
12. The increasing of societal awareness/changing in public mentality	1	2	3	4
13. Economic factors	1	2	3	4
14. the intervention of foreign states (the will)	1	2	3	4
15. Other (please, indicate)				

### 19. Rate the role played by the institutions listed below in the implementation of Rose Revolution (Rate each of the institutions)

	Decisive	Important	Of very little importance	no importance
1. Political forces/ movements	1	2	3	4
2. Non-governmental organizations	1	2	3	4
3. Mass media	1	2	3	4
4. the Church	1	2	3	4
5. Professional Unions	1	2	3	4
6. International foundations and organizations	1	2	3	4
7. Big foreign countries	1	2	3	4
8. Other (please, indicate)	1	2	3	4

20. What were the activities of non-governmentals during the Rose Revolution period that influenced you personally ( you remembered it, you changed your opinion, motivated you to act)

The TV broadcasts of the representatives of NGOs	1
The disclosure of falsifying the election results	2
Protest rallies	3
Other (please, indicate)	

21. Please, name those organizations of civic sector or the representatives of society that had a certain input in the Rose Revolution and the degree of your current trust to them (Do not read: It is difficult to answer )

Organization person	a) Before and during revolution				Ab) Now			
	I trusted	Neither trusted nor mistrusted	Did not trust	It is difficult to answer	I trust	Neither trust, not mistrust	Do not trust	It is difficult to answer/ refuse to answer
1.	1	2	3	999	1	2	3	999
2.	1	2	3	999	1	2	3	999
3.	1	2	3	999	1	2	3	999
4.	1	2	3	999	1	2	3	999
5.	1	2	3	999	1	2	3	999
6.	1	2	3	999	1	2	3	999
7.	1	2	3	999	1	2	3	999

**22. please, name those newspapers and magazines that somewhat influenced you before and during Revolution**

Newspaper/magazine	Very important	Important	Of no importance (Of a very low importance)
1.	1	2	3
2.	1	2	3
3.	1	2	3
4.	1	2	3
5.	1	2	3

**23. Please, name the TV shows and Tv channel that had certain influence on you before and during Revolution**

TV Channel	TV show	Very Important	Important	Not Important (of a very low importance)
	1.	1	2	3
	2.	1	2	3
	3.	1	2	3
	4.	1	2	3
	5.	1	2	3

24. Please, name the representatives of civic sector (non-governmental organization, journalists, professional unions, interest groups) whose opinion was of great importance to you during the Revolution

Person	Representation (indicate what organization he/she represented during the Rose Revolution)	very important	important	not important
		1	2	3
		1	2	3
		1	2	3
		1	2	3
		1	2	3

25. Were the representatives of civic sector involved in the developed processes during pre revolution and revolution periods in your city, rayon?

Yes	1
No	2
I don't know/ It is difficult to answer	999

26. If yes, please, name which organizations and individuals were involved in the processes and what were the activities carried out by each one of them?

Organizations/ Individuals	Organization of rallies of protest	Organizing meetings	Other (please, indicate)
	1	2	
	1	2	
	1	2	
	1	2	

	1	2	
	1	2	
	1	2	

## Demographic data

### 27. The place of interviews

Adjara	1
Guria	2
Imereti	3
kakheti	4
Mtskheta-Mtianeti	5
<b><u>Kvemo kartli</u></b>	6
Racha Lechkhumi and Kvemo Svaneti	7
Samtskhe-Javakheti	8
Samegrelo and Zemo Svaneti	9
<b><u>Shoda Kartli</u></b>	10
Tbilisi	11

### 28. Name of the populated place (Please, indicate) \_\_\_\_\_

### 29. The type of the populated place

City type	1
Village type	2

### 30. Sex of the respondents

Women	1
Men	2

### 31. Age of the respondents

From 18 to 24	1
From 25 to 35	2
From 36 to 44	3
From 45 to 54	4
From 55 to 64	5
65 and up	6

**32. Nationality of the respondents**

Georgian	1
Non-Georgian	2

**33. Education of the respondents**

High Education	1
Non high education	2
Student	3

**34. Respondents' economic status till 2004 and now**

	<b>before 2004</b>	<b>at present</b>
Employed worker	1	1
Entrepreneur/ farmer employer	2	2
Self-employed in non-agricultural sector	3	3
Self-employed in agricultural sector	4	4
Employed in family enterprise/ on the land without any payment	5	5
Unemployed	6	6
Housewife	11	11
Student	12	12
Retired/ disabled	13	13
Other (please, indicate)		

**35. What was the sphere of the respondents employment till 2004?**

#	<b>Sphere of employment</b>	<b>Private Business</b>	<b>State sector</b>	<b>Private sector</b>
1	Enterprise Real estate	1	2	3
2	Service sector	1	2	3
3	Trade	1	2	3
4	Transport	1	2	3
5	School/ High education institution/Kindergarten	1	2	3

6	Healthcare object/ ambulance/ hospital	1	2	3
7	Police/army/ Court/ prosecution	1	2	3
8	Mayor's Office; Local governing bodies ( <i>"Gamageoba/Sakrebulo"</i> )	1	2	3
9	Household	1	2	3
10	Science, culture, mass media			
11	Government Structures			
11	Non-governmental sector			

**36. What is the sphere of respondents' current employment**

#	Occupation sphere	private business	public sector	private sector
1	Enterprise Real estate	1	2	3
2	Service sector	1	2	3
3	Trade	1	2	3
4	Transport	1	2	3
5	School/ High education institution/Kindergarten	1	2	3
6	Healthcare object/ ambulance/ hospital	1	2	3
7	Police/army/ Court/ prosecution	1	2	3
8	Mayor's Office; Local governing bodies ( <i>"Gamageoba/Sakrebulo"</i> )	1	2	3
9	Household	1	2	3
10	Science, culture, mass media	10		
11	Government Structures	11		
12	Non-governmental sector	12		

**37. Family Income**

Much Lower than average	1
Little lower than average	2
Average	3
Little higher than average	4
Much higher than average	5



**Name/Surname of the interviewer**

\_\_\_\_\_

Number of the interviewer \_\_\_\_\_

Date of the interview: \_\_\_\_\_

Questionnaire reviewed by (name and last name of the supervisor)

\_\_\_\_\_



**Events of November 2003 are known as the Rose Revolution in Georgia. This book explores the role of NGOs and mass media in achieving the regime change in Georgia**

